THE IMPACT OF LIQUOR ON THE WORKING CLASS (WITH PARTICULAR FOCUS ON THE WESTERN CAPE). THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE LIQUOR INDUSTRY AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THIS REGARD

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Thesis submitted to fulfil the requirements for the Degree M. Soc. Sci. (Criminology)

University of Cape Town

October 1984

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my sincere thanks to the following people, who each in their own way, contributed to this thesis. Don and Patch Pinnock, Venetia Lorenzo, Ingrid Averbach, Professor Dirk Van Zyl Smit, Mana Slabbert, Christine Glover, Michael Maughan-Brown, May Isakow, Liz Offen, Di Sandler, Denis Davis, Dr Nigel Worden, Linda Wedepohl, Sally Creed, Nigel Daly, Debbie Robinson.

A special word of thanks goes to all the friends on the farms who risked so much by merely talking to me. To the 'laities' in Elsies River, who taught me so much about life, "Salut".

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the role liquor has played in shaping both the rural and the urban 'Coloured' working class in the Western Cape.

The dramatic events during the 1976 Soweto uprisings and the subsequent blatant and dramatic restructuring conveniently illustrate the complex interplay between the interests of liquor capital, the State, and the urban Black workforce. Furthermore it exposed the blatancy with which liquor consumption was manipulated by the State to reproduce the work-force to the needs of capital in general. The Decriminalisation of shebeens, and the withdrawal of the State from overt liquor distribution, is seen as an attempt at co-optive strategies by which class stratification among urban Blacks is accellerated.

A historical examination of the relationship between primary liquor capital (the winefarmers) and the State creates the context within which the contemporary role of liquor is explored. The power and influence of primary liquor capital has resulted in perennial over-production which of necessity had to be distributed through illicit channels.

By a process of selective enforcement of liquor laws, the State has colluded with liquor capital to enable continued accumulation to take place. At the same time this process co-opts the illicit distributors, the shebeeners of the Cape Flats, into an uneasy alliance in terms of which they assist in controlling the urban working class.

In the rural context, the tot system forms part of coercive management, by which the agricultural labour force is kept underdeveloped, dependent, and both spatially and occupationally immobile. The processes of informal criminalisation and recriminalisation augment the control over the labour force achieved by the institutionalised administration of liquor.

CHAPTER 1

A INTRODUCTION

During the uprisings of 1976, over 250 state-run liquor outlets in Black townships over the entire country were destroyed.[1] This action on the part of the working class showed that they recognised and rejected the part which the system of liquor distribution played in their oppression. It left the State, found with the extent of the destruction and the danger of its recurrence, no real alternative but to institute some fundamental change in this particular section of the overall system of racial capitalism. The State was called upon to respond. However, the response which it produced was in appearance at least, highly contradictory:

* It supported moves towards greater centralisation and control (and less competition) in production and distribution of liquor.

* At the same time it passed the Competitions Act of 1979 with the apparent intention of preventing just such centralisation.[2]

* It sold its liquor outlets in Black townships to Black entrepreneurs.[3]

* It legalised shebeens in Black townships.

* At the same time it launched, through the Department of Health, the National Plan to combat overconsumption, incorporating all organisations and institutions which could possibly exercise

an influence over drinking behaviour.[4]

It is the intention of this thesis to argue that this apparently contradictory sequence of events was a manifestation of far deeper contradictions which have characterised the production, distribution and consumption of liquor from the beginning of the Colonial State in South Africa. These contradictions are based on the following postulates:

* Liquor producers and distributors, like all other producers aim to expand their markets as much as possible. For particular historical reasons, which will be detailed below, the grape farmers and wine producers constitute a particularly powerful political pressure group with exceptional influence on the State. This influence they have consistently used to promote market expansion.

* Wine farmers, like some other producers, rely heavily for their profits on very cheap and docile labour. This has traditionally been obtained by the strategy of paying part of their labourers' wages in cheap surplus wine. Not only does this directly reduce the costs of labour, it also serves to induce alcohol dependence in the workforce. The workforce is thus made more manageable and less mobile; furthermore it helps reproduce the labour-force in the form most useful to the farmers.

* Certain other producers share the winefarmers need for immobile and docile workers,[5] but do not share in their desire to expand markets for liquor.

* Other sections of capital increasingly require

highly productive, reliable labour to operate more sophisticated machinery. For them overconsumption of liquor by their workers is a costly and destabilising nuisance.

* Whether this directly relates to the lastmentioned group or not, there is a number of religious/philanthropic pressure groups which have consistently fought to reduce the consumption of liquor by the working class sinceit is in conflict with the ideological framework characterised by the "Protestant work ethic".

While these particular contradictions are peculiar to the issue of liquor, it is argued that they are also specific manifestations of general contradictions which constantly operate within the system of racial capitalism. It is also argued that the role of the State in society is to attempt constantly to lessen the disruptive effects of such contradictions with the goal of maintaining the overall smooth functioning of the system. Thus it could be expected that the reaction of the State following the 1976 uprisings would be an attempt to control the disruptive effects of the contradictions specific to liquor while at the same time using the specific terrain of the liquor dispensation, if not to address deeper contradictions, at least not to aggravate them.

The thesis will explore and test this expectation particularly through an examination of the spheres of enactment and enforcement of legislation. The steps by which this will be done, which are reflected in the chapters of the thesis are as follows:

1) History

A brief historical section (Chapter 2) will review the major trends and a few particularly significant occurrances in the development of the liquor industry since its inception. Particular attention will be paid to the legal and law enforcement issues. The section will show the development of the contradictions to the point of the crisis of 1976, indicating the various actors and their respective influences.

2) Liquor Distribution and its Impact on the Working Class : The Case of Urban Blacks

The second section (Chapter 3) will explore the development of the contradictions specifically as they effect one section of the working class - the urban Blacks. These contradictions led up to the crisis of 1976 and the State's major response - the decriminalisation of Black shebeens. This section will establish an explanatory framework showing how the actions of the State constituted an attempt to reduce the overall contradictions in such a way as to ensure system maintenance. The evidence which will be used is drawn from secondary sources. The section should be seen as establishing a theoretical framework within which to situate the study of the role of liquor as a means by which the State reinforces the process of system maintenance through class formation and control.

This is intended to be a generalised framework and not one to relate only to the specific action of legalising shebeens. The differing regional

configuration of capital and the exigencies of production under a variety of climatic and technological conditions as well as the differing degrees of consciousness and resilience of the labour force under varying circumstances have caused contradictions to manifest themselves in varying ways. These, in turn, have evoked a varying response from the State. If the framework is appropriate it should help to explain the role of liquor in all these situations.

3) Testing the Framework 1: Liquor Distribution and Impact on the Cape Urban Working Class

In at least one area the State's response appears to have been substantially different over a number of years. The 'Coloured'[6] working class in the Western Cape and elsewhere has been treated differently from its Black counterpart. Consumption of liquor has never been criminalised for 'Coloureds' to the extent that it was for Blacks. On the other hand, while Black shebeens are being legalised, Coloured shebeens are not.

Chapters four and five of the thesis will present two, in depth, empirical case studies which will show the extent to which the theoretical understanding gained in chapter 2 is borne out in practise in different situations. The work contained in these chapters is original and is seen as constituting the major contribution of the thesis to the extension of knowledge.

4. Testing the Framework 2: The Reproduction of Agricultural Labour through the Tot System (Chapter 5)

This chapter examines in depth a different situation

- that of the wine farmers in the Western Cape. Once again a spatially specific case study serves to indicate the way in which liquor is used to ensure the maintenance and stability of the overall system. By means of alcohol dependence that was structurally induced in the labour force the wine farmers were able to conceal the harshness of coercive labour relations. Through their dependence on liquor the labourers tacitly condoned their relative underdevelopment. At the same time they succumbed to their own subjugation and control by the tot system. The tot system is one means of reproducing the farm labour force to suit the productive needs of winefarming capital. The system renders the labour force occupationally and spatially immobile.

B LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY

With a few notable exceptions,[7] the available literature on liquor approaches the matter from the sectarian view of one or other professional discipline and considers it only within the confines of those parameters. Without, for the moment, questioning the importance or validity of the internal logic of such studies, they are hampered by a number of shortcomings arising out of their confined perspective, in particular the medical and the social-work oriented studies use the concept of consumption, and usually over-consumption, as their starting point. Liquor abuse and its effect on the body,[8] the mind,[9] the unborn child,[10] the family group,[11] and community[12] are analysed, and treatment programmes devised which could heal

or rectify the physical damage as well as change the behaviour patterns of the affected persons or groups.

The shortcoming of this approach is that it accepts uncritically the concept of consumption on its own without recourse to the related concepts of production and distribution. By this exclusion the liquor problem is individualised. Bolstered by the free enterprise rhetoric that no-one is forced to purchase or consume liquor, this oversimplification enables liquor capital to exonerate itself from any complicity or responsibility[13] for the consequences of its process of accumulation.

From the specialised perspective with which the various professions approach liquor consumption, it is necessary to couple consumption with individualisation. How else, they would ask, can one treat the alcoholic and his family? The problem with that form of treatment is that it only addresses part of the cause of consumption and overconsumption. It assumes total responsibility on the part of the individual - that s/he acts totally out of her/his own free will in deciding on how much to drink, or whether to drink at all.

Similarly, the unproblematic treatment of consumption ignores the role the State has played in contributing towards consumption and overconsumption. Very few studies have realised the important role liquor has played in the reproduction of an unskilled and/or underskilled, proletarianised labour force, nor have the combined

interests of liquor capital and the State been scrutinized sufficiently when consumption has been studied.[14]

I am not, on the other hand, arguing that liquor consumption is absolutely determined. That would be an equally fragmented approach, and could not stand up to scrutiny. Instead, I favour a class-based analysis which addresses the processes by which ideology is either assimilated, deflected or resisted by various classes under specific conditions. By facilitating and understanding of these processes in the context of capitalist production, a class based analysis provides the theoretical handle with which the complex matter of liquor production, distribution and consumption, with all its consequences and ideological overtones can be grasped.

Individualisation of overconsumption, coupled to an emphasis on alcohol abuse amongst all classes obscures the fact that liquor impacts differently on different groupings. Not only does the State pursue a different policy vis-a-vis availability of liquor to different classes or even segments of the same class at different times and places, but liquor capital also promotes its produce in different ways to different classes at different times and places. These and other shaping forces (the elements which go into reproducing classes) result in differing classes and class fractions.[15]

In the area of liquor <u>production</u>, on the other hand a noticable effort has been made to investigate the linkages particularly between producers and

the State.

Thus, for example, Venturas, writing about "Economic aspects of the Development of the SA wine industry in the twentieth century"[16] attempts to demonstrate how State policy aimed at price stabilisation in the agricultural sector constitutes an "interference with the interplay of the demand and supply functions in the market for agricultural goods, within a market economy."[17] This framework enables her to account for the perennial overproduction and maintenance of high prices of grape products. She also concedes that the level of 'interference' can be ascribed to the importance of agriculture in general, and viticulture in particular, to the economy of the Western Cape. Whilst labour relations and conditions are confined to a brief appendix, the predominant emphasis throughout the thesis is on the legislative and structural conditions facilitating accumulation for grape farmers.

The framework she has chosen, however, imposes limitations on the scope of her inquiry. It does not, for instance, allow for an exploration of the concept of liquor as a commodity, the ambivalence of liquor, and its role in the ideological repertoire of the ruling class. Her study does not concern itself with the role of liquor in shaping and containing classes through legal or illegal distribution. Nor is it interested in the conflict between fractions of capital over liquor and the relation of those fractions to the State. Moreover, she only contemplates State complicity within narrow confines. Lastly, her

study only examines consumption in the abstract, as a statistical entity, not as a response to a stimulus or a form of recreation.

Those studies into illicit distribution which have been conducted under the auspices of the Human Sciences Research Council (and its predecessor)[18] also face serious shortcomings. They were commissioned by the Institute on Non-European Affairs Administrators,[19] whose ideological role in liquor distribution is difficult to overlook. The studies on the whole are empirical and descriptive, lack a thorough analysis of the location of illicit distributors within the wider matrix of production, distribution and consumption, and most of them are predictably silent on the politics of liquor. Those that do refer to its political connotations, do so fleetingly and superficially.[20] Their theoretical base precludes these authors from viewing liquor distribution in terms of class formation and manipulation. They are thus unable to explain convincingly, for example, why shebeens in Black areas are to be legalised, whilst those in 'Coloured' areas are to remain illegal. They are, similarly, unable to relate shebeen legalisation to working class uprisings of 1976 and 1980 or to the accumulation requirements of liquor capital. They would thus see no correlation between shebeen legalisation, the greater centralisation of power and ownership in the liquor industry, State withdrawal out of liquor production and distribution, and the changing nature of township financing. Illicit distribution to them remains tied within the economistic-recreational axis and extends no further.

A class-based analysis provides, in my opinion, a more comprehensive theoretical base from which to understand the development of liquor production, distribution and consumption. The work of Gramsci has contributed substantially to my understanding of the forces and processes which constitute the crucible of class formation.[21] I have also relied on writers such as Hall for an interpretation of Gramscian Theory with a criminological focus.[22] O'Meara's Volkskapitalisme has been invaluable in its Gramscian analysis of the development of Afrikaner Nationalism. The history of Western Cape Liquor capital is inextricably interwoven with the growth of Afrikaner Nationalism, as chapter 2 will demonstrate.

I have also drawn heavily on O'Meara's skillful exposition of the importance of ideology in the shaping of classes. It is my contention in this thesis that liquor, at various times and places has constituted one of the important constituents of an ideology having a specific impact on the working class - that it has not only contributed to shaping economic possibilities for some, but has also affected the way in which classes have conceptualised their existence and their potential for change (or the lack thereof).

O'Meara argues that "....an analysis of ideology must begin with the historical development of capitalist production relations - the concrete processes of class formation and class struggle, and the political and ideological forms these took".[23]

In both the pieces of primary research that I have conducted for this thesis I have attempted to locate my investigation within the parameters of this injunction. The material conditions of existence of agricultural labourers on wine farms (in which liquor played a role) elicited a different response and conceptualisation of struggle to conditions which shaped the trajectory of liquor distribution in the urban working class. O'Meara's analysis provides an explanation:

"To begin at this level is to insist that classes are neither serried ranks of homogenous individuals, nor are they immaculately conceived. Rather, as heterogeneous collectivities, classes are fathered in struggle. Born under specific historical conditions, and into and as a result of particular struggles in concrete social formations, classes carry their birthmarks with them as defining characteristics. In the historical processes of class formation, the various agents of the same class are incorporated in varying sets of social relations and are subject to differing conditions and pressures. They undergo differential experiences, engage in differing struggles and form widely differing mental conceptions of these experiences. Thus, for example, the process of proletarianisation 'frees' producers from their means of production and means of labour, transforming them into wage labourers. But it does so unevenly. Peasants on the one hand and urban petty commodity producers on the other may well finally end up as members of the same (working) class. Yet they travel there by very different economic, political and ideological routes. In the process they are subject to very different economic pressures, are engaged in widely divergent struggles and forms of political organisation and form varying cultural and ideological conceptions of the processes involved. They carry with them, as an integral part of their (now proletarian) existence, these different (and often contradictory) conceptions and representations of their different experiences. Such conceptions and representations provide the cultural and ideological framework within which the new position is experienced, interpreted and mediated".[24]

This thesis sets out to explore some of the forms these shaping forces have taken. Most overtly, of course, and for criminological purposes most significant, are formal and informal laws. These have either criminalised certain actions and facilitated others, depending on the needs of those in power, and the response of the powerless. Gusfield argues that:

"...(D)eviance designations have histories; the public definition of behaviour as deviant is itself changeable. It is open to reversals of political power, twists of public opinion, and the development of social movements and moral crusades. What is attacked as criminal today may be seen as sick next year and fought over as possibly legitimate by the next generation".[25]

Formal laws may therefore at times take on a significance which is more symbolic than instrumental. Burman[26] has demonstrated that much depends on <u>how</u> a law is implemented or enforced. The symbolic dimensions may become apparent only once the enforcement agencies adopt a specific attitude to the target population. This thesis explores the role of selective enforcement in avoiding contradictions which the State is otherwise incapable of resolving.

By the same token the process of repeal of punitive measures can have important symbolic benefit when seen against the backdrop of stringent measures. This is particularly so when the formally abolished measures are substituted by a process of informal recriminalisation, which achieves the same instrumental efficacy, but through an agency other than the State. It is therefore far too simplistic

to look at decriminalisation as an abstract concept denoting a benign legislature.[27] What is important is to analyse the interplay between the State's formal agencies, and informal agencies whose exercise of localised power can achieve the same effect without seeming oppressive.[28]

RESEARCH METHOD

One of the most crucial dilemmas each researcher faces is the trade-off between authenticity/veracity/naturalness of data and "scientific credibility" in his/her gathering process. The less 'artificial' the intersection between researcher and host, the greater the likelihood of a 'natural response', and hopefully, a 'truthful' set of answers. The parenthesised words are used here in the full knowledge that they do not represent absolutes, that they are problematic, and that they are value-laden terms. Every penetration of a researcher into a class to which he does not ordinarily belong creates an artificiality which will affect the way in which he is treated and how information is channeled his way. What makes that penetration more or less meaningful towards the quality of information is the way in which the penetration takes place and which master role the researcher chooses.[29] Augmenting this is the quality of the relationships the researcher builds up with his hosts and his artful strategy of eliciting unsuspecting, spontaneous but sincere responses. The relationships are of course coloured by"the access bargain : What is being traded for what, when the researcher

gives incentives for his hosts to allow him sufficient field access to explore the inner connections of the phenomena which interest him?"[30]

FARMS

Having observed the vulnerability of farm labourers to victimisation, and having been exposed to the attitudes of some wine farmers while I was living and intermittently working on wine farms between 1976 and 1979, I decided on my research strategy. Aware of the sensitivity of most farmers in the area to 'meddlers in their internal affairs', as well as a nearly obsessive protectiveness towards their labourers from outside interferences, and a touchy response to enquiries about the tot system, I decided that an 'up-front' approach would produce largely tailored information. The divisions and conflicts amongst the labourers, and encouragements by the farmers to sustain those divisions, together with their vulnerability, also rendered 'straight' research techniques suspect. As I intended gathering information which both 'host-groups' considered sensitive, the best method, in my opinion, was not to identify myself as a researcher , but to use my intermediate status on the farm as a point of entry. My duties during the grape harvest (which last approximately two to three months a year) gave me a legitimate front through which I had access to farmers supplying the same co-operative winery, as well as their tractor/truck-drivers. There I would talk shop with them and the information would be recorded at the end of the day - or in between truckloads. Occasional

socialising with some farmers/managers also provided an opportunity to talk farming and labour, which sometimes lead to farmers exchanging stories about their specific problems and methods of dealing with them.

To the labourers on four farms I became (over a period of four years) a source of emergency -aid (hospitalisation, police, first-aid), a spectator at their sporting events, family photographer, legal adviser, and to some, taxi and friend. Apart from the latter two roles, the others were only an irritation, not a threat to the surrounding farmers. My friends were very carefully chosen and meetings confined to times and places that remained largely undetected or happened on 'legitimate' occasions. In the course of all these interactions I conducted informal open-ended conversations with the labourers, their families and friends, generating, whenever the situation allowed, comparisons among the participants of their different situations. This led to informative exchanges of facts without my having to pose direct questions. By degrees the circle of informants widened and my knowledge of their material conditions and their conceptualisation of their condition deepened. Data was cardexed after interactions.

Information gathered by this method was, whenever possible, cross-checked with other informants. Personal observation over a long period also helped to take the edge off exaggerations. Although this method was painfully slow, at least I was assured of as untainted a body of information

as my relation to the various actors allowed. At no stage was I inclined to 'go for a kill' and fire a barrage of questions to any informant so as to arouse suspicion about my motives. I sustained the attitude of one who was interested and concerned about the totality of interactions and attitudes.

Outlining some general principles of field research Butters insists that an open and reciprocal relationship to the host needs to be negotiated "in which the researcher will give some account of his identity and purposes".[31] My response to this injunction is that under the specific conditions of my fieldwork, identifying my purposes would have been detrimental to the credibility of the data. I would also have exposed the labourers to victimisation.

The information I have gathered is, therefore, uneven. I received daily information about events on two of the farms whose entire labour force I knew very well. About two other farms, both adjoining the first two, I received information on a weekly basis from friends and informants there. In time I got to know most of the labourers there, but was unable to develop as detailed a body of information about events and processes as I had on farms one and two. Yet the information was sufficient to broaden the basis of my knowledge gained on the first two farms, and compare the four farms with each other. Five other farms housed labourers who became informants and friends. The information about developments on their farms reached me intermittently whenever we could safely

get together, usually about once a month over a period of three years. The other nine farms each presented two informants - a labourer/driver and a farmer/manager. I only had access to them at harvest time over a period of six years. Each harvest we chatted about developments that had taken place during the previous year. Waiting for our loads to be processed by the cooperative we often had thorough discussions before one or the other had to attend to his vehicle. Some labourers and farmers were more forthcoming than others, which is again a source of uneven information. All of this latter information was elicited under the guise of idle interest while killing time.

At the wineries I was able to speak fairly regularly to the assistant managers during harvest time. Occasionally I was able to talk to the winery managers at two wineries. During harvest the scale operator fed me daily with data and second-hand information about the members of the cooperative.

I have, to sum up, interviewed 18 farmers/managers and 17 of their drivers. On the farms I have interviewed eighty labourers, male and female, and forty eight children of school-going age. (25 Males and 23 females).

None of them were told that I was doing research, although most of them knew that I worked at a university. But the context in which I met and talked to them rendered that fact less important. To the farmers and drivers I was merely a harvest

driver who had another job during the rest of the year. To the people on the farm I was someone who rented a house on one of the winefarms, and, as in their case, the house was tied to the job of driving during harvest time (drywe ry). What was curious however, was that I was not a 'normal' Boer (in this context a white man), and actually became a friend of some of the labourers.

The times I spent with the interviewees varied substantially. I spent between twenty minutes and one hundred hours with them. Because of the clandestine nature of the information-gathering process a three-hour visit often only elicited information which, under 'normal' interview conditions, could have been extracted in thirty minutes, or even less. Similarly, the situation often dictated that I was unable to ask all I had intended to within the single visit. Most interviewees were thus visited at least twice.

Apart from talking to the various hosts, I spent a large amount of time just being there, watching and listening. At the winery I spent between fifteen minutes to an hour at least five times a day for eight weeks a year over a period of six years. The greater portion of that time was spent listening, watching and learning - with both drivers and farmers. Likewise on the farms, as circumstances allowed I'd spend whole afternoons over weekends in and among the cottages listening, talking, watching, and taking photographs. The breakdown of interviews is tabulated in the Appendix p. 216

SHEBEENS/STREET GANGS

My access to the street gang, the Born Free Kids (BFK), was facilitated by one of my close contacts a farm labourer and friend. Only after 'working' with him on farm-related research for two years did I discover that he was a 'Pumulanga', a high-ranking leader of the gang. He had also spent eight years in prison where he became a 26-gang member. He had stopped his 'operational' gang activities and reverted to being a farm labourer. Nevertheless, he was still highly esteemed among gangsters and exercised substantial authority when he chose to. Gangsters and ex-prison-inmates who had 'bounced back' onto the farms from the city or prison often visited him to pay him their respects.

He had been 'screening' me for two years already and had made up his mind about my trustworthiness, when he instructed a 'laitie' to become my protector, guide, and informant. The 'laitie', son of a farm labourer, was a member of one of the BFK cells in Elsies River. He led me there and cleared away many obstacles I would otherwise have encountered.

I became a tolerated presence in the cell, which was attached to the shebeen that forms the pivot of the case study in chapter 4. It took a while for the gangsters to 'relax' with me, if that is ever possible under the circumstances. I had to learn gang slang which is a mixture of English, Gamtaal (lower working class Afrikaans), Zulu and Xhosa - plus a whole array of terms not related

to any of them.

As far as they knew I was a 'cat' (a modern with it, fashionable, independent groover) who was into 'moving'. ('Moving' is a compendium of meanings which can include (a) physically cruising about an area, either on foot or by car, (b) listening to the latest Reggae or disco or beat music, (c) procuring and consuming the latest drugs in a fashionable style, (d) generally being young, free, and independent). I also happened to work at University and was interested in shebeen legislation. But apart from that, I had a car, a white face, sometimes money, and had been an 'agent' (lawyer). All of these attributes increased my usefulness to them.

I spent an intensive four months with them, between October 1981 and January 1982, during which I talked, watched and listened. They introduced me to the shebeen owner, for whom some of them worked. I spent between two and four days a week with the gang. The remaining days and evenings during that time were spent at the shebeen. I did not spend any nights in Elsies River and only experienced one Friday and one Saturday evening there.

My guide and protector also led me to one of the Manenberg cells of the gang, the Macassar cell and the Garden Village (Somerset West) cell. Another valuable source of information were the girl-friends (gooste) of the gangsters. I was specifically interested in their perceptions of events which the gang members described with

characteristic exaggeration. Some of them and their mothers visited various gangsters in prison from time to time. By transporting them there I had an opportunity of gaining information about their perceptions and attitudes. In all four girlfriends, accompanied by their mothers were interviewed in this manner. The information was cardexed at the earliest possible opportunity.

During those four months I interviewed a social worker in Elsies River, Thea De Vrouw. She had a considerable knowledge of illicit liquor distribution and its attendant problems. I also interviewed the managers, or part-owners of four of the five retail liquor outlets in Elsies River at the time. The manager of the fifth refused to be interviewed.

Three members of SANCA, the South African National Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence, were approached for their perceptions on the area. They were Emerich Neuhoff, Emily Brown and Andy Rutgers. In all the above cases I committed the contents of the interviews or interactions to cardexes at the earliest possible opportunity. Some of my visits to the gang, and some individual interactions were recorded on audio tape.

In January I interviewed four employees of the Stellenbosch Farmers Winery:

Dave Hughes - Consumer Relations Manager
Sue Birch - Black Market Manageress
Hugh Solomon - Ex Low Price Wine Manager
Jaques Roux - Low Price Manager at the time

These interviews, as well as an additional interview with an ex-employee of Stellenbosch Farmers Winery, were all recorded on audio-tape and condensed into cardexes.

Telephone interviews were conducted with Gary May of South African Breweries; and Sue Birch (12.10.1983) to update information obtained in the earlier interview.

For the nine months February to October 1982 I had to suspend my gang participant observation because of the imprisonment of my guide and protector. On his release I visited the gang and the shebeen with decreasing frequency until in May 1983 the impending internal squabbles made any further visits too hazardous. The breakdown of interviews is tabulated in the Appendix, p.217

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A INTRODUCTION

The contradictions characterising the distribution of liquor to the working class, which form the focus of the major part of this study, can be traced back to the beginning of colonial occupation at the Cape. This section will explore the origins and development of the contradictions. It will not attempt to be a comprehensive history of labour relations or the relationships between various fractions of capital. Instead it will explore these where they specifically effect the distribution of liquor. The historical importance of the wine industry and its central role in the development of the whole liquor industry, identifies it as a suitable focus for the background to this thesis.

The major themes that will be explored are firstly the continual efforts on the part of wine producers to expand the market for their production in the face of exclusion from major foreign markets. This was coupled with an inability to sell the major portion of each crop to any but the least quality-conscious consumers on the local market.

On the other hand market expansion for liquor producers became a problem to producers of other commodities, whose labour force was detrimentally affected by excessive liquor consumption.

Secondly, this section examines the constant need

to recruit, control and retain labour at highly exploitative rates, in which process the use of liquor could serve the interests of wine producers in particular.

B PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION UNDER V O C RULE

The settlement at the Cape was initially established by the Dutch East India Company (V O C) for the purpose of supplying company ships with fresh produce. Production and marketing were therefore company functions. The permission to individuals to farm in their own right as "free burghers" did not carry with it the right to do their own marketing.[1] As early as 1684[2] the free burghers made their first attempt to organise and fix prices, but the fact that the "patriot movement" which emerged in 1780[3] was founded with fundamentally the same purpose, serves as some indication that the earlier attempts had not been notably successful.

The marketing problems of the free burghers were not solely attributable to the action of the Company, they were also partly related to the notoriously poor quality of the wine produced. Since the major potential market was overseas and the bad wine deteriorated during long journeys through the Tropics, the product which was marketed in the end was almost undrinkable.[4]

Nevertheless liquor production increased steadily throughout the 18th century. In 1720 there were more than two million vines in the Colony, in 1752 the figure had risen to three point nine million, by 1790 to about nine million.[5] The 1732 crop

produced 2 050 leaguers,[6] of which 642 (31%) were exported to Batavia alone. Total wine exports in 1749 were 764 leaguers. On a rough calculation the exports (in 1749) could have constituted nearly 40% of the total crop.

The farmers problems in relation to marketing were to an extent compensated for by the system of slavery which implied low production costs. Labour was also available from the indigenous Khoi-Khoi inhabitants in conditions which were hardly distinguishable from slavery.[7]

The cheapness of labour, although it was a major disadvantage in itself, implied that there was virtually no local market for sub-standard wines of the sort most commonly produced. There is evidence that rations of wine were given to slaves in agricultural areas and that urban slaves were sometimes given pocket money with which to buy wine.[8] The fact that slaves are not normally paid any wages indicates that this practice could not have had any direct economic advantage. It can therefore be assumed that its purpose lay in reducing the potential for resistance among the slave community and thereby increasing control.

C FROM BRITISH ANNEXATION TO THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY

The annexation of the Cape Colony in 1806 brought with it imminent disaster for the farmers with the outlawing of the slave trade in 1807.[9] The fact that this gesture to the interests and sensibilities of the British population was not a long term threat to the Cape farmers became clear, however, in

1809. In that year the Caledon Code[10] established a pass system which meant that every Khoi who did not own land[11] was bound to be employed by a colonist and had no legal freedom of movement without the permission of his employer. If a contract was terminated a few days grace was granted for the purpose of finding a new employer.[12] Breach of contract by the servant was criminalised. Three years later the Khoi were further immobilised, and their bondage to labour strengthened by Cradock's apprenticeship legislation by which children of Khoi labourers were incorporated into the labour force from their eighth year onwards until their eighteenth year, provided they had been maintained and fed by their parents' employer during their first eight years.[13]

Both of these enactments contained clauses aimed at limiting the degree of exploitation and immobility of the Khoi labourers. Caledon's Code stipulated the registration of contracts longer than one month's duration and limited the employer's right to hold the labourer in his service longer than the contract stipulations, even if the labourer was indebted to the farmer.[14] This was an important concession to the servants who, it must be remembered, predominantly received only food, housing and clothing as remuneration for their labour.[15]

There were also legislative changes, imposed by Britain, collectively referred to as the Slave Amelioration Acts. These laws, passed in the 1820's and 1830's extended the rights of slaves and generally provided for more humane conditions for them. Rayner argues that the British Government was attempting

to create conditions that would, firstly, ensure the physical reproduction of the Cape slaves, which was necessarily a priority due to the closure of the slave trade in 1806/7. The second motive was less discernible, but aimed, it seemed, at "reproducing a particular set of social relations, involving continued subordination of the worker, while gradually eliminating the category of 'chattel slave' within bourgeois law".[16]

The acceptability of the new regime established by its handling of the labour issue in its early years was confirmed by the advantages brought in terms of international trade. The Cape status as part of the British empire coupled with considerations relating to Napoleonic wars in Europe led in 1813 to a special tariff for Cape wines one third the rate of that for European competitors.[17] The quality of the Cape wines had not improved significantly since the previous century. Consequently the reduction in tariffs was essential for Cape wines to be able to compete. This export dispensation led to a boom in the Cape wine industry which lasted into the second half of the century.

The increased market opportunities created potential for capital accumulation on a scale that had never been available to the farmers before. It was important that the labour necessary to realise this potential should remain constantly available. In this respect the start made by the Caledon Code and the apprenticeship legislation was not fully maintained. In the early 1820's the Slave Amelioration Acts[18] increased the costs of keeping slaves and reduced the master's power of control and right

to punish them. By Ordinance 50 of 1828, the pass system was abolished, the apprenticeship system was made subject to parental approval and the right to inflict corporal punishment was limited. The ultimate set back for the wine farmers occurred in 1834 with the abolition of slavery.[19]

D ABOLITION OF SLAVERY TO CALEDON TREATIES

The changing labour dispensation which led up to the abolition of slavery put the farmers in a position in which they were forced to resort to less formal methods of securing their labour supply. One of these was debt peanage which was officially outlawed in the early part of the British period. This meant that officially farmers were prohibited from detaining employees on the grounds of debt incurred for liquor purchases. The farmers were not, however, prevented from supplying liquor to their labourers as part of their real wages.[20]

This practice became increasingly important after the emancipation. Liquor, Marais observes, provided that edge which would persuade a labourer to join one master instead of another.[21] Farmers competed with each other by offering more liquor than their rivals. The customary practice was giving labourers five tots a day, and then a bottle each at night, constituting what a Paarl magistrate described as two quarts of wine per day.[22] The practice usually carried over to weekends when a lesser amount, only one bottle a day was given to each labourer.

Farm labourers were thus regularly given, as part of their wages, considerable quantities of liquor.

This liquor was that portion of each farmer's production which he was least able to sell because of its inferior quality. Each wine-making process inevitably results in a proportion of 'reject' wine and it was (and is) largely this that the labourers were given. The Tot institution was from this point of view an economic benefit to the farmers, as it rendered totted labour cheaper than labour paid for in other currency. It also, no doubt, kept the labourers in a perpetual state of anticipation of liquor. In effect, it institutionalised liquor dependence amongst the labour force which had the desired effect of rendering farm labourers spatially less mobile and probably more docile in their demands.

But liquor consumption inevitably produces contradictions if the quantities involved approach those experienced by post-emancipation labourers. Whilst partially having the desired effect of procuring and retaining labourers, the Tot system certainly did not make them good, dependable workers. Their productivity must have been relatively low, and their learning processes slowed down considerably, to say nothing about their morale and conscientiousness as workers.[23] Furthermore, in the case of a considerable proportion of labourers the likelihood that the tot wine was augmented by weekend purchases at the country canteen was high. After 1846 the licensing system was relaxed to allow for an increase in the number of canteens.[24] Drinking can be seen as one of the primary approved recreational habits of farm labour, and generations of labourers were reared on the concept of regular liberal quantities of liquor. The only factor which countered the impression that overconsumption was

generally approved of was the farmer's attitudes to drunkeness. It must, indeed, have been a querulous contradiction, even to inebriated minds, that the very farmers who supplied liberal quantities of wine to labourers daily were the ones who punished the labourers for the effects which that liquor had on them. But then, one of the salient effects of high liquor consumption on humans is that it seems to make contradictions, even flagrant, fundamental contradictions, less problematic, provided the level of inebriation is kept high!

Liquor had become an important means of procuring labour after emancipation, but its contradictory effects on the labour force necessitated a stronger degree of control and punishment. The farmers therefore began to organise a pressure group to influence legislation in the colony. This resulted in the passing of the Masters and Servants Ordinance in 1841.[25]

This Ordinance was, however, enacted as a temporary measure and was considered too lenient by the farmers.[26] The impasse was solved after the franchise was extended to male farmers in the colony after the constitution of 1853.[27] In 1856 a new and "improved" Master's and Servant's Act was passed.[28] This measure restored class relations and a degree of control over labour which was very close to the conditions that had existed prior to the abolition of slavery.[29]

The intensification of criminalisation of 'breaches of contract', that would otherwise have resulted in civil action, predominantly dismissal of the

servant, was the most important change introduced by the 1856 Act. It was a criminal act, as well as a breach of contract of employment, to show "insubordination, neglect, and insulting behaviour" to a master.[30] It was a criminal offence to refuse to do work, to be drunk, or to be involved in brawling. Desertion was also criminalised[31] as was absence from work without the master's permission. Disobedience and unauthorised use of the master's property also qualified for criminal penalties which the 1856 Act had increased over the 1841 Ordinance. According to Venturas, no wage claims nor increases were allowed to be negotiated on a collective basis in terms of the Act.[32]

This Act entrenched a set of attitudes and relations which was to characterise farm labour right through to the present day.

E THE CALEDON TREATIES TO THE UNION

The wine farmer's bubble burst in 1861 when by the Caledon Treaty with France the British government dropped punitive tariffs against French and other wines.[33] Cape wines, which had not been substantially improved in the intervening years no longer found the ready market they had enjoyed. Exports to the UK dropped from 1 002 449 gallons in 1859 valued at £153 379 to 30 679 gallons valued at £5 213 in 1864.[34]

Cape wine farming, the most important economic agricultural activity and prime export, was within a few years reduced to a state of extreme depression.[35] The importance of this recession in

the wine industry cannot be overestimated, since the reserves of capital built up between 1813 and 1861 in wine farming now found their traditional opportunity for accumulation blocked.

Combining the depressed state of the market was a brandy excise, passed in 1878. At a time when there was no general income tax to finance projects such as railway construction and frontier wars, and at a time when eastern farmers were suffering the effects of their black labourers' excessive brandy consumption, the brandy excise made a lot of sense to a cabinet dominated by easterners.[36]

The response of the Cape wine farmers was to organise themselves politically in an attempt to solve their economic problems. To this end "Die Wijnbouwers Vereeniging" was formed in 1877.[37] Within a few years this organisation was joined by other Afrikaner national and cultural interests in the foundation of the Afrikaner Bond.[38]

This political alliance was unable to reverse the exclusion of Cape wines from overseas markets, although efforts were made at improving the quantity of the produce. In the 1880's overseas viticultural experts were brought in to advise Cape farmers on quality improvement techniques.[39] This effort was hampered by an outbreak of Phylloxera disease which destroyed a large percentage of vines throughout the winelands from 1886 to the mid 1890's.

Despite the lack of success in the export field farmers continued to expand production. The number of vines throughout the Colony increased from 55,3

million to 70 million in the decade ending in 1875. From these vines the production of wine and brandy was as follows: Wine production increased from 3,2 million gallons in 1865 to 4,5 million gallons in 1875, whereas brandy production rose from 434 000 gallons to one million gallons over the same period.[40] This expansion resulted largely from the increased penetration into the working class market. Consumption increased among the local labour force both in the towns and in the countryside. Most importantly it increased among the Africans in the Colony and its "native territories" notably Transkei.[41]

A major problem with market expansion such as this is that increased consumption of liquor faces limitations the moment the target population consumes it in such quantities that it negatively affects the interests of producers of other commodities. The discovery of diamonds and subsequently the discovery of gold, created new and powerful interest groups which were potentially negatively affected by alcohol dependence and the resultant low productivity of their work force. The consequence of this was a series of moves designed to limit the distribution of liquor:

a) The institution of the Compound System controlling labour on the diamond mines in 1885.[42]

b) The closing of country canteens in 1883 in the Orange Free State to enforce an earlier prohibition act.[43]

c) The Cape Liquor Licensing Act of 1883 which prohibited liquor sales to Blacks in proclaimed native areas.[44]

d) The imposition of high tariffs on spirits imported into the Transvaal.[45]

In the face of rising production shrinking legal markets and an acquired taste for spirits amongst a large sector of the population, illicit distribution took on astonishing proportions. Wherever prohibition territory adjoined non-prohibition territory canteen-keepers were happy to do business, whether legal or illegal. Smugglers, of course, thrived under the circumstances, and Bor argues that despite prohibition, liquor turnover in some Black territories hardly diminished. It simply became illegal. His argument is based on the evidence submitted to a Select Committee of the Cape House of Assembly in 1884, which looked into the workings of the Licencing Act.[46] This situation created an important and long standing precedent. To the present day, grape producers rely to a significant extent on illegal distribution to retain their market.

In one sense the expansion of liquor consumption did not conflict with the interests of other producers. The supply of labour to the increasing number of potential employers following the economic boom of the diamond era was dependent on the ability of employers to attract Black labourers into the wage earning sector. Under conditions where Blacks could often do better working on their own behalf the use of liquor as an incentive to enter the wage sector was an asset to employers. For this reason one of the overriding features of the Prohibition Bills were that they outlawed only <u>sales</u> to Blacks. They did not preclude farmers or other employers from dispensing liquor to their labourers as part

of their wages. Legal access to liquor, was dependent on the Black labourer being employed.[47] The explicit intention of these measures is characterised by a submission to the 1893 Labour Commission on the subject of liquor consumption by Blacks.

(It) "Is not detrimental to the farmer, since otherwise all natives would acquire property, and no servants could be had ..... I do not want them to take to drink, but at the same time those who spend their money in drink have to take to work again." (sic) [48]

The Twentieth Century opened with a political coalition in the Cape trying to expand the export market of the wine industry while the internal market relied almost entirely on distribution to workers through their employers or through illegal outlets. The roles of liquor as:

a) the basis of accumulation for a powerful political group

b) a means of labour recruitment

c) a mechanism for social control had already been established. On the other hand the opposition to liquor distribution because of its debilitating effect on the workforce had also found vocal proponents.

F UNION AND AFTER

The formation of Union in 1910 and the institution of self government which accompanied it created a whole new range of political and economic opportunities. In this situation the Afrikaner Bond

which was touched on in the previous section assumed a major importance.

The first reason for this was its contral of capital accumulated during the period 1813 to 1861. This was effectively the only indigenous capital which was not linked to international finance as was most of the mining capital. It had been used in an early attempt to establish a bank in 1882 with partial success. Additional amounts of this indigenous capital had been invested in gold mining.[49] This capital was now available for investment.

The second reason that the wine farmer-based Bond was well placed to fulfill a major role was that the relations of production in the wine farming sector had developed directly from slavery to capitalist forms of surplus extraction. This direct transition, as opposed to an intervening period of share-cropping or tenant farming which occurred in other agricultural sectors made the acceptance of capitalism easy for Cape farmers.[50]

The small numbers involved in the old Bond meant that they were unable to take political action by themselves.

Their interests as indigenous capitalists were in competition with the interests of imperial capital. At the same time, as wine producers they needed access to imperial markets. They were therefore not prepared to join the Nationalist Party in 1913 because they could not accept its anti-imperialist position. Instead they formed their own Cape Nationalist Party which, because it had their capital

backing, was able to absorb the existing Nationalist Party. Between 1914 - 1917 they established Die Nasionale Pers, Sanlam, Santam and Volkskas.[51] This was followed in 1918 by the establishment of the KWV, the wine farmers producer co-operative. This organisation broadened the political base of the movements by once again creating opportunities for significant numbers of individuals to become profitably involved in wine farming. A further crucial function of the organisation was to set up a pressure group to campaign against prohibition as one method of coping with the increasing wine surplus.

The real power of this organisation was only realised after the Wine and Spirits Control Act of 1924. This Act was passed by the international mining capital based Pact government of General Jan Smuts. It was part of a policy to support capitalist agriculture which was forced upon the Pact government by a coalition of interests between National capital and the white working class following the strike of 1922.

In effect, the producer co-operative, established barely six years earlier, was given monopoly control over the disposal and price of distilling wine. All distributors were forced to purchase distilling wine from or through the KWV, and all wine-farmers, whether members of the KWV or not, were obliged to dispose of the distilling portion of their production through the KWV.[52] This aid was of enormous significance to winefarmers. It enabled them to expand production, at fixed guaranteed minimum prices without regard to demand for their product. Between

1918 and 1921 wine production had expanded by 33% in response to fixed prices, and in the face of mounting unsold surplusses. The legislative intervention was designed to arrest the normal course of market forces, which would have dropped prices and precipitated cut-backs in production. Instead the opposite became the case: 28% of wine, grapes and brandy produced between 1921 and 1923 were destroyed by the KWV.[53]

Although the KWV managed to find some takers for exports in the twenties particularly after the 1926 Imperial Conference,[54] the volumes exported did not approach a solution to the growing over-production problems. What co-operation had achieved, however, was to allow sufficient income to accrue to winefarmers by virtue of the pricing mechanisms, even though they had to supply a proportion of their crops free of charge. Rather than imposing tonnage limitations on farmers, the policy of proportional guaranteed pricing gave farmers ample reason for expanding their production.[55]

The tenuousness of the alliance that led to the 1924 Act was shown by the promulgation of the Liquor Act of 1928 which was guided by Tielman Roos, the leader of the Transvaal Nationalist Party.[56] This Act reflected the ideological position of the petty bourgeois Afrikaner nationalists of the Transvaal as well as the material interests of most non-wine producing sections of capital. It effectively combined all previous production Acts by criminalising the sale to, the possession of and consumption of liquor by Blacks. It limited Coloureds to the purchase of two bottles of liquor each at any one time and

place.[57] The consequence of this Act was that once again the bulk of all liquor produced had to be distributed through illegal channels.

Illicit distribution notwithstanding, the Cape liquor industry still produced far more in the thirties than it could dispose of. The legacy of fixed prices and guaranteed markets (for at least a portion of the production) stimulated production and new plantings to unprecedented levels, despite the ravages of the depression.[58] The drought conditions that were the final straw in the proletarianisation of many Northern farmers, did not not affect the water-rich Western Cape as critically as the rest of the country.[59]

The political alliance which had stood to benefit the West from the 1924 Act was re-established in 1933 when the Gesuiwerde Nationaliste Party split away from the new United South Africa Party which formed the "fusion" government.[60] Once again the combination of national finance and agricultural capitalism with the broadbased petty-bourgeois support of the northern nationalists was able to put pressure on the Smuts government to support capitalist agriculture.

The Wine Commission of Inquiry was appointed in 1935 to investigate how the position of wine farmers could be improved. The findings of the Commission were that the 1924 Act had established a structure that would inevitably cause barriers to accumulation. An emphasis on quantity rather than quality and every incentive to produce ever-increasing quantities was threatening profit-levels of the entire industry.

Production had increased between 1924 and 1935 by 92% whereas local consumption had risen by only 30%. The KWV was not successful in exporting or otherwise profitably disposing of the difference[61] so that surplusses of maturing wine grew from 472 139 hectolitres in 1924 to 920 815 hectolitres in 1935. In addition substantial quantities of distilling wine and spirits were destroyed during the depression (366 744 hectolitres).

Falling prices of "good" wine during the depression encouraged farmers to increase plantings so that the absolute amount of distilling wine they could dispose of at guaranteed prices rose. Total vintage rose from 762 102 Hℓ in 1924 to 1 322 131 Hℓ in 1935. Annual surpluses consequently also escalated (from 51 961 Hℓ in 1924 to 398 371 Hℓ in 1935) so that it became necessary to consider production quotas to limit the degree of unsellable stock.[62] The The Committee's recommendations were largely adopted in the Wine and Spirits Control Amendment Act, No 23 of 1940.[63] It vested the KWV with statutory monopolistic control over the wine industry, augmenting the 1924 Act which had accorded that status to the KWV in respect of brandy. The Act introduced a package that was aimed at stabilising the perennial overproduction as well as guaranteeing the winefarmer a profitable business.

The Cape Nationalists who subsequently formed the core leadership of the first nationalist government had managed to achieve a production dispensation highly favourable to liquor producers long before they took power in 1948. Although the legal distribution was severely limited by Prohibition

laws the level of enforcement of these laws was not sufficient to constitute a major problem to liquor producers. These two situations coupled with the labour relations in primary production which had been established in the previous century have formed the basis for the liquor industry to the present day.

The specific developments on the themes dealt with in this section will be picked up in the following sections of the thesis.

CHAPTER 3

LIQUOR DISTRIBUTION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE WORKING CLASS

A INTRODUCTION

The historical section has briefly explored the development of liquor capital in relation to the broad development of South African capitalism. Its development, as we have seen, has progressively led to monopolisation. In the case of the liquor industry, the path towards monopolisation was conflict-ridden. I have dwelt at some length on the specific manner in which liquor capital developed in order to explain the peculiar relationship it enjoyed vis-a-vis those in control of part of the state apparatus.

Liquor producers have had sufficient access to the state to have secured legislation which reproduced the artificial situation of over-production without financial ruin. Market forces were impeded through the operation of guaranteed minimum prices sanctioned by the producer co-operative equipped with statutory powers. But the ambivalent moral attitude towards liquor as a commodity, not least on the part of those sections of capital who required a stable and skilled work force, led to pressures which the state could not ignore. Liquor distribution was limited through restrictive licencing legislation, which constituted a continuing impediment to the growth of liquor capital.

This contradictory situation was constantly re-created. The monopoly, created with state

assistance, was unable to grow profitably because of state-imposed marketing limitations. Under the circumstances it was predictable that liquor capital would use every possible device at its disposal to improve its accumulation potential. Profitability could be increased by various means: 'rationalising' production and distribution procedures, diminishing competition, keeping labour disorganised and underpaid, expanding the range of products, and pressurising the state to extend the legal distribution dispensation, or distributing via illegal channels. All these methods characterise the history of the South African liquor industry.

At the same time the ideological impact of liquor distribution and consumption must not be lost from sight. The manner in which liquor reaches the working class consumer will substantially affect not only the ideological transparency of ruling class control, but also the class position of those persons distributing it. For example, if liquor is legally distributed only through state-owned outlets, as has been the case in Black townships, then its position within the ideological repertoire of the ruling class is far more blatant than if it were distributed by free-enterprise. Moreover, the person/s with the right to distribute in working class areas are likely to affect their class position, and consequently their individual and organisational response to their material position.

It is clear that the manner of granting distribution rights in working-class areas is at the discretion of the state. At particular conjunctures therefore, the liquor distribution dispensation can become

part of a process of class-manipulation and class-control by the State. The particular form that the process takes will depend on the political requirements at that time.

It is within this matrix that I shall analyse the extension of distribution rights in working class areas at various historical junctures.

The first example traces the supply of liquor to Blacks in urban townships, both legal and illegal. Again, the position of the liquor industry's expansion needs constitutes a major component of the historical process. But equally if not more important is the State's complicity in both production and distribution to Blacks in a manner by which the Black working class carries a substantial part of the cost of its own reproduction through liquor consumption. The decriminalisation of liquor distribution by Black shebeeners will be contextualised within the State's varied responses to the 1976 uprisings. In this context the restructuring of the liquor industry into its current monopolistic state is seen as part of the process of drawing closer links between capital and the state. The theme of class-manipulation is, of course, also of central importance when shebeen decriminalisation is discussed.

B LIQUOR DISTRIBUTION TO URBAN BLACKS

The supply of liquor to Blacks, both urban and rural, has been the subject of considerable conflict from the late 19th Century to the present.

The major area of conflict is connected with the

process of labour procurement and the concept of productivity. This was usually a conflict between liquor producers on the one side and other fractions of capital on the other.[1] These latter producers were experiencing problems with labour procurement and productivity as a result of liberal liquor distribution to, and liberal consumption by, their potential or incumbent labour force. Characteristically these conflicts were fought at the level of the State, each faction attempting to procure legislation that would further its own cause. Prior to Union such battles were fought in the Cape,[2] the Transvaal[3] and after Union on a national scale.[4] The many legislative enactments relating to liquor have to be seen as outcomes of such battles, and the quality of the legislation as well as the degree to which it has been enforced should reflect the relative power of the contending forces.

A second area of conflict involves the role of the State in reproducing an urban Black labour force cheaply and peacefully. Liquor production and distribution by the State has an important function to fulfill in this regard. The State's monopolisation of the customary processes of domestic brewing amongst Black families has led to resistance such as the 1929 beer hall riots in Durban,[5] the 1959 Cato Manor Riots,[6] and played a part in the destruction of over 250 State-owned bottle stores and beerhalls during the 1976 Soweto uprisings.[7]

These two sets of conflict cannot, however, be seen in isolation from each other. They interact in a complex manner, and in their totality must always

be contextualised within the broad process of capitalist development and popular resistance. It is the purpose of this Chapter to demonstrate:

i) That the manner in which liquor reached urban Blacks in this century made them shoulder the major costs of their own reproduction. This was a direct strategy on the part of the State to minimise the contradiction arising out of the need, or desire of capital, on the one hand to pay below subsistence wages, while on the other hand also paying very low taxes.

ii) That the low level of township facilities (collective consumption items) were partially attributable to this policy and

iii) That the restructuring of the liquor industry after the Soweto uprisings and the changing methods of liquor supply to urban Blacks is part of a co-operative strategy and that the decriminalisation of shebeens in Black townships is an attempt to foster a Black petit bourgeoisie whose material interests will align them with the current ruling class in opposition to the working class, their clients. This is seen as a part of a broader State strategy which includes the granting of leasehold rights to a small section of the Black population. The strategy is thought to be a response to the contradiction arising out of the need of a substantial section of capital for a productive, stable and secure workforce.

By the second decade of this Century the agglomeration of Blacks in the growing industrial and mining centres of the Witwatersrand had become a problem to the ruling class. Their proliferation within the cities constituted a potential threat to the security of the white elite.[8] The strategy for coping with the problem grew out of the Transvaal Local Government Commission of 1921. The principles it propounded came to be known as the Stallard Doctrine, after its chairperson.[9] They dominated the process of "management-reproduction" of urban Blacks up to the time of the Soweto uprisings.[10] The central tenets of the doctrine as outlined by Black and Wilkinson, were:[11]

"1) Control of influx into the towns and influx from the countryside, and a linked system of labour allocation.

2) The establishment and control of African townships by local authorities - and residential segregation.

3) The self-financing of facilities and amenities - certain means of collective consumption - by the inhabitants of the townships themselves, through a separate native revenue account administered by the local authority.

4) The limiting and eventual total curbing[12] - of land purchases by Africans in the urban areas.

5) The refusal to grant any further political rights to Africans in the towns and cities, beyond those excercised through purely consultative bodies - advisory boards being the first in this tradition - in a two-tier system of local government. Those rights that there were (the Cape franchise, for example), were gradually whittled away and then totally removed"[13].

Although these principles cannot be seen in isolation from each other, it is necessary here to focus specifically on the self-financing concept. The range of income sources from the inhabitants themselves was very limited:

"Fines, Pass and labour registration fees, rents and - most important - profits from 'Bantu beer' which local authorities alone had the right to brew and sell.[14] In effect... the poorest class in society, where wages barely covered subsistence, bore the major cost of housing".[15]

The central tenet of segregated financing is that the Whites should not be burdened with the load of financing the reproduction of the urban Black labour force, despite the fact that it was their city which the Blacks served. Moreover, because of the very temporariness of these migrant Black sojourners, their low wages, and the absence of large-scale business sector in the townships, there was no conventional taxable base: no income tax, no assessment rates, no company tax. The reproduction of the Black labour force could therefore only be financed, if the principle was to work, out of their own consumption expenditure. Private beer brewing was therefore criminalised and the local authorities were granted the sole right to brew and distribute. Drinking sorghum beer was confined to males over 18 years, and it had to be consumed at the site of the municipal beerhall.[16]

This form of township financing, albeit a very sensitive issue, became extremely important for local authorities.

"It is difficult to visualise how the development of housing and other services could have been provided without these profits".[17]

In Johannesburg alone the revenue between 1937 and 1968/9 amounted to R64 946 769 of which the profits were R28,6 million.[18]

The success of the policy owing to increasing sorghum beer consumption by the township dwellers, was justified by the Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Development:

"I again want to emphasize that the profits made by local authorities are used for the benefit of the Bantu community in general ..... formerly the native revenue account was carried by the white taxpayer. Ever since the brewing of beer has been controlled and the supply of beer by so-called beer-queens has been stopped or controlled that money has come to the City Council and they have spent it in the right way. Before these beer sales became the monopoly of local authorities the white taxpayer had to provide facilities which sometimes had to be provided in the locations... later we went still further. City Councils were allowed to use beer profits to defray losses incurred in providing housing schemes for the natives and the losses incurred in reducing rentals in locations, for general capital expenditure on housing schemes or works, or services in connection with native townships, for interest and reduction of capital."[19]

Clearly the State had a substantial vested interest in liquor consumption by Blacks. Indeed, it indirectly allowed for a higher profit rate and a faster pace of accumulation for capital in general, which was largely relieved of the burden of the reproduction of the labour force.[20]

The disruption of traditional lifestyles which the migrant labour system inevitably brought about also

affected drinking norms. The traditional norms of constraint in consumption and ceremonial imbibing were substantially compromised by the recreational patterns that developed in the Black townships.[21] During the prohibition, illicit distribution of 'white man's' liquor (liquor hereinafter, as opposed to sorghum beer) started taking on startling proportions. The acquired taste for strong drink had proven a lucrative source of income for those entrepreneurs brave enough to risk police harrassment. It was estimated that immediately prior to the lifting of the prohibition, 60% of all liquor which the Black working class consumed, reached it via the shebeens.[22]

The State felt itself obliged to curtail overconsumption in order to maintain control over the population and foster a productive labour force. Considerable resources were devoted to policing the prohibition. More than a third of the police budget was spent bringing about some 300 000 convictions annually under the prohibition laws.[23] And despite such a huge input of manpower, the police admitted that they were not succeeding at their task.[24] What vexed the State officials most about the illicit distribution was, firstly, that some Black township residents, the shebeeners, had established a source of comfortable income and were so to speak immune from the principles of the Stallard Doctrine. Blacks, according to the Doctrine, were supposed to be urban workers for Whites or homeland subsistance forms. There was in principle, no room for informal sector operators or even formal sector independent Blacks. Of shebeening the Minister of Justice said:

This is an illicit trade in which large sums of money are involved monthly, it involves exhorbitant profits which hold out great possibilities to the criminal".[25]

It is clear from this statement that those in power in 1962 did not envisage the need for any stratification developing amongst urban Blacks. Their temporariness in the cities precluded the necessity for that.

The second point that needs to be emphasised about the State's attitute to shebeening, is that it seemed as if the State itself intended to benefit from these large monthly sums involved in liquor distribution in the townships in addition to their beer-brewing monopolies. The additional funds that would swell the Bantu revenue account if the State monopolised liquor distribution could be used 'constructively' for the 'benefit of the Natives'.

It is certainly likely that the above were among the considerations which ultimately led to the lifting of the prohibition. Other factors also lent their weight. There was, of course, the liquor lobby, whose problems with surplus production had begun in 1957, after the blessings which the war, the occupation of France and the destruction of vineyards had showered on the winefarmers in the form of increased exports.[26] The historical section's central theme has been the peculiar relationship between the winefarmers, the large groupings of Afrikaner capital, and the incumbents in the ruling élite. The accumulation needs of liquor capital was not something that the State could therefore lightly ignore.

The response by the Black workers to what was in their eyes, the patently iniquitous system of denying them the right to purchase liquor at normal prices, also made its contribution to the decriminalisation of consumption. Twice in the two years prior to the Liquor Amendment Act of 1961 Black discontent had flared into open conflict which claimed numerous lives, both of the residents as well as of the police. In the Black ghetto of Durban, Cato Manor, "it was the exhaustive beer-raids of illegal stills that provided a flashpoint...", although the real reasons for the uprisings were more fundamental and complex.[27] By August of 1959 "unrest was rife in many of Natal's smaller towns as well as a large section of the rural areas".[28] White residents formed vigilante groups to protect themselves against masses of mainly women, the traditional brewers, who spearheaded the uprisings. An estimated 20 000 Black women and an undisclosed number of men demonstrated their anger and discontent.[29]

Hardly seven months later, in March 1960, the pass-burning demonstrations in Sharpeville and Langa escalated into shootings, a considerably heightened racial tension, and a State of Emergency being declared.[30] A report circulated to parliamentarians suggested that discontent relating to the prohibition was a contributory cause to the demonstrations:

"A year or two ago ..... we had a report in connection with the trouble at Sharpeville and Langa ..... It appeared from the report that one of the main grievances of these people was the fact that their own liquor was not available to them and that they had to pay such exhorbitant prices for the other types of liquor that were made available to them at shebeens....."[31]

Although this probably represents an exaggerated interpretation of events it does reflect some of the paranoia over racial tension that was rife at the time. Policing the prohibition had in both cases been an additional cause for bitterness. The consensus of the antiprohibitionists on this score is encapsulated in Mr S J M Steyn's address in Parliament:

"It is a form of racial discrimination which brings the police in disrepute and makes it impossible for them to build up the relationship with the native people which they would like to see built up and which they have built up with the other sections of the community. Nothing, Sir, can be unhealthier for the South African State than the feeling that prohibition applies to the native people only, a feeling which creates in the minds of the native that the police are his enemies, that the police are out to prosecute him and that the police are the representatives of a White tyrany in South Africa".[32]

If it was solely the bitterness about policing that the anti-prohibitionists were concerned about, they were certainly deceiving both themselves and their electorate. The influx control system which was policed as strenuously, was cause for as much if not more bitterness among urban Blacks, and there was no sign of that being scrapped.[33] What most parliamentarians were also overlooking at the time were the ideological dimensions of the State providing liquor to the working class. The way in which it reached township Blacks, seen in the context of the full range of recreational alternatives, approximated to liquor being a collective consumption item. That a section of the Blacks would have preferred more constructive than distractive inputs by the State is demonstrated by a submission quoted

by one of the parliamentarians during the Bantu Beer Bill Debate:

"The City Council should give us schools, not beer-halls. Beer-halls turn our boys into loafers and tsotsis (criminals). The Beer-halls should be removed from our townships. They have turned our townships into hells on earth. Under the influence of liquor young hooligans attack and beat us law-abiding citizens".[34]

None of the anti-prohibitionists expected liquor consumption to drop if it was decriminalised. Indeed, they had to realise that it would definitely increase. All they hoped for was that the profits from the existing illicit distribution would become available to the State, that a nascent Black petit bourgeoisie, the shebeeners, would be deprived of its platform, and be forced back into wage labour.

This was, as in the case of Western Cape 'Coloured' shebeeners, a massive miscalculation. Partially owing to the resilience of the shebeeners themselves, and partially owing to their filling a large gap between the method of State provision of recreational activities and the popular expectations.

The legalised facilities were confined to bottle stores and beer-halls all owned by the Administration Boards. Nowhere could the workers go that was not large, impersonal and State-run, except to the shebeens. Considering that Soweto only had 19 legal outlets for liquor serving a population of ± one and a half million residents in 1980, it was predictable that shebeens would fill the gap. Compared with 562 legal outlets serving White Johannesburg's estimated 450 000 residents at the

same time, these State-provided facilities seemed hopelessly inadequate.[35] But their relatively low numbers do not reveal the State's awareness of the sensitivity of the liquor issue - not only in its own constituency but also amongst township residents, liquor distribution outlets were certainly recognised as potential political targets.[36]

Nonetheless, the State's local authorities did not lose out on the massive shebeen-trade altogether, as the law did not allow for more than nine litres to be transported across township boundaries.[37] Blacks were allowed to buy liquor at any bottle store but not convey more than nine litres at a time into the township. While specialist runners or bootleggers took up the daunting profession of dodging police roadblocks to supply township shebeens, it seemed only logical that the Administration Boards bottle stores could substantially profit from selling to the shebeens themselves.

Liquor sales remained a major source of income to the Administration Boards. Shortly before the Soweto uprisings the 22 Administration Boards derived more than half their gross income from liquor sales to Blacks. Of a total income of R321 million, sorghum beer and other liquor sales brought in R177 million of which just under R30 million was profit.[38] From 1962 onwards liquor consumption was not only to provide revenue for urban amenities, but 80% of liquor-selling profits were devoted to homeland development. The labour reservoirs were thus also partially financed by urban liquor consumption.[39] This decision was intended to tighten influx control. An attempt was also made to develop the homelands

and at the same time to neglect the urban areas so that Blacks would have to move there if they wanted to progress. The rate of provision of collective consumption items consequently dropped in the urban areas. Attempts by the Johannesburg City Council to stem this deterioration by using some of their ratepayers money to provide basic services in Soweto were blocked by the Nationalist minority in the City Council, whose adherence to the Stallard Doctrine seemed as firm as ever. Their rationale was that "the services provided should be limited to those for which the Bantu could afford to pay".[40] Kane-Berman argues that this process, which became most seriously felt in the late sixties and early seventies contributed to Black discontent which underlay the Soweto uprisings.[41]

By June 1976 the set of forces were in operation as in 1962 when liquor consumption was decriminalised. The relative importance of each of them had changed, however, and there was a greater urgency of Black discontent.

As for liquor capital, it was still seeking increased distribution channels to cope with mounting surpluses of grape products, and extend the sustained growth of the breweries. In the absence of legal channels being extended through legislation, they resorted to fostering the illicit distributors. By 1976 urban Blacks were again consuming an estimated 60% of all liquor consumed in the country, 80% of which was reaching them through the shebeens.[42] From 1972 onwards liquor wholesalers fielded full-time promotion teams, with state blessing, to visit shebeens and 'educate' them about their products. They supplied

promotional paraphernalia such as glasses, tablecloths, trays, T-shirts, and sometimes fridges.[43] Personal gifts were also supplied to the shebeeners and their personnel.[44]

The State was thus allowing a de facto situation to be perpetuated. At that stage it was illegal, and the State had little intention of legalising it. Liquor capital was being allowed, illegally, to foster its major market while the token policing was keeping up the façade of enforcing the law.

C THE SOWETO UPRISINGS AND SHEBEEN LEGALISATION

During the uprisings most symbols of State domination in the townships came under attack. The bottle stores and beerhalls were no exception. Some 250 of them were damaged or destroyed.[45]

In most cases, according to Kane-Berman, it seemed as if the motive for attacking the bottle stores was to destroy rather than loot, although some looting did take place.

"One account reports students breaking into a liquor store and then not drinking the liquor but pouring it into the street shouting, 'less liquor, better education!' and 'we want more schools, not beerhalls!'".

Statements to the press justifying their actions against bottle stores, beerhalls and shebeens indicated their perception of drinking as a deflection of the Black struggle, and divisive Black solidarity:

All (that our parents) do is drink and try to forget the problems facing Blacks. That is why we burned down the bottle stores and told the shebeens to

close down. Most have and we will deal with those still operating."

The Soweto Students' Representative Council mentioned in a statement in November 1976 that shebeens were:

"A cause of unhappiness in the Black man's life. A number of lives have been lost because of the operation of these shebeens. Salaries have been lost because they were first opened in shebeens. Futures have been wrecked by the operation of these shebeens ..... nothing good has ever come out of them. Hundreds of our colleagues have become delinquents, beggars or orphans as shebeen kings and queens have become capitalists. We can no longer tolerate seeing our father's pay packets emptied in shebeens."

Once the protests spread to the Cape Peninsula townships, shebeens were subjected to substantial pressure. In October 1976 more than 100 were destroyed by students who also set up "pickets at busstops to search adults who were bringing liquor home with them".[46]

The uprisings forced the State to change the manner of reproducing the Black labour force. A series of strategies emerged, combining coercive and co-optive measures which came collectively to be known as total strategy.[47]

Central to the shift in policy was the realisation that most of the major principles of the Stallard Doctrine had to be diluted or reversed. It was realised that urban Blacks were a permanent feature of the South African social formation, and that a stable middle class should be fostered. That involved incorporating Blacks into the free enterprise system, giving them a greater share in municipal

administration and providing a degree of security in urban land tenure. Substantial concessions were made to the principle of Blacks financing the cost of their own reproduction. Private capital was drawn into an alliance with the State to finance and manage the proposed and actual changes brought about.[48]

The policy towards liquor distribution to, and consumption by Blacks also underwent changes. Shortly after the worst unrest was over, in August 1977, the Minister of Justice instructed the Liquor Board to investigate the feasibility of decriminalising shebeens and allowing Blacks to enter the liquor trade in their townships. The Board was specifically instructed to consider the implications such a move would have to already vested interests.[49] The Board conducted lengthy investigations causing considerable delays.

Substantial behind the scenes manoeuvring was taking place in the liquor industry itself. The problem for the best part of this century, was that natural market expansion, and therefore continuing accumulation, was being stifled by restrictive distribution legislation. Given a limited legal market, the major producers and wholesalers attempted to get as much of the market as possible. They embarked on a strategy of vertical integration, so that they could influence consumer spending by retailing techniques. Moreover, they had to sustain an expensive policy of advertising, price cutting and, what is euphemistically referred to as aggressive marketing.[50]

An oligopolistic situation existed, in which the breweries owned substantial interests in the wine and spirit sector;[51] and one of the large wine and spirit companies owned a brewery.[52] Furthermore, the primary grape producers, represented by the KWV were not structurally linked to wholesale and retail distributors. A reorganisation of overlapping ownerships was engineered, reputedly by the Afrikaner business magnate, Dr Anton Rupert, chairman of the Rembrandt Group.[53] The State was requested to sanction this reorganisation.

The State duly agreed, and blessed what became known as the 1979 Agreement. Effectively, it entailed an exchange - SAB absorbed Intercontinental Breweries and became the outright beer monopoly, and forfeited in return some of its control of the wine and spirits sector. This sector in turn was organised into a massive conglomerate, Cape Wine and Distillers (CWD) in which SAB, Rembrandt and the KWV each held 30%, and the public the remaining 10%. CWD became a near-monopoly in wine and spirits, controlling approximately 85% of that sector.[54] A further proviso of the agreement was that vertical integration in the industry be diminished gradually.[55]

Ironically, the State passed the Maintenance and Promotion Competition Act in the same year, a law designed to prevent monopolisation such as the 1979 Agreement which the State had just sanctioned. At the same time, when monopolisation of the industry was undoubtedly going to diminish competition and increase consumption, it also launched a national plan, something of a total strategy, to combat the over-consumption of liquor.[56]

Once the liquor industry had been reorganised the State announced that in principle it was in favour of decriminalising shebeens in Black townships.[57] An important proviso, however, was that this would be done when other methods of financing the townships had been developed.[58] More so than before the uprisings, the State was now dependent on the shebeens to finance the townships. The beerhalls that had been destroyed during the unrest had not been rebuilt, so that it was mainly shebeeners' purchases from Administration Boards Bottle-stores - albeit illegal - that was contributing to township finance.[59] And while on the one side the State's Administration Boards were colluding in the illegality of selling to shebeens, the State's police were prosecuting the shebeeners for illegally selling liquor.[60]

Another condition of the imminent decriminalisation was that finance capital would be allowed to "participate as sureties and minority shareholders in such Black liquor business for an interim period".[61] Considering that there are approximately 4 000 sizeable full-time shebeens and an additional ± 4 000 smaller, sometimes part-time shebeens in Soweto alone,[62] there are lucrative prospects for finance capital.

In time it is the stated intention to phase out all State involvement in liquor distribution in the townships, "when alternative sources of income are placed at the disposal of Administration Boards and/or Community Councils".[63]

From an ideological point of view the erstwhile criminals and owners of dens of vice and sin are

to become the largest single component of the newly-accredited petit bourgeoisie. No longer will the White faces of State officials be seen supplying liquor to Blacks, but free-enterprise Black entrepreneurs will be profiting from that process. They too will have to sustain the losses which any future attack on liquor outlets may cause. Their political allegiances are therefore likely to support the forces which maintain a milieu in which their businesses can flourish. By supporting the status quo they will have co-operated voluntarily in the apparent depoliticisation of liquor distribution to their customers, the Black working class.[64]

A major question still remains unanswered. What source of funds will substitute liquor profits. This will necessitate considerable restructuring. It seems as if Blacks will be granted 99 year leasehold on which rates can be charged. The newly legalised shebeeners will have to pay income tax and sales tax, as well as purchase liquor licences and some of the business sites of the old beerhalls that will be put out to tender.[65] Business districts within townships which are likely to be constructed will also provide a tax base.

A further ideological shift is that Blacks will be given greater representative powers in municipal management. The rider to this extension of rights, is that the newly-elected Black Councils will also bear the unpopular burden of raising finance for the management/reproduction of the urban Blacks. Again the White faces of Administration Board officials will no longer appear to be overtly suppressing Blacks in what Bloch and Webster call "coercive management par excellence".[66]

In this process liquor outlets are again likely to be a focus of conflict. A report in the Sunday Times in March 1984 already bears evidence of such conflict having begun. Essentially it involved a private businessman buying a bottle store from the Ficksburg, Orange Free State, Administration Board for R190 000.

"But the members of the Meqheleng Community Council ... are equally adamant that Mr Moalosi should not get the bottle store. They want to retain the business and plough its profits back into the community"[67]

Shebeens, too are likely to be a continuing source of conflict, as only a limited number of the 8 000 - odd Soweto shebeens are likely to be legalised[68] The organised shebeen fraternity, the National Taverners Association, which has local affiliates from each township but only represents the sizeable shebeens, is likely to insist on the police protecting their market. Illicit distribution by small-timers is still likely to continue.[69]

D CONCLUSION

The manner in which liquor has reached urban Blacks in this Century has thus profoundly effected the shaping of that section of the South African working class, both directly and indirectly.

The direct, immediate impact of liquor consumption relates to the proportion of earnings a household spends on liquor compared with other consumption items. This crucially influences the level of mental and emotional support which is generated within that unit, which can profoundly shape the trajectories of the individual family members into the future.

CHAPTER 4

LIQUOR DISTRIBUTION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE CAPE URBAN WORKING CLASS

A INTRODUCTION

As the previous section has shown, the issue of liquor in the Black townships can be relatively easily situated within the context of the response of the state to a variety of contradictions over a period of time. The use of liquor distribution as a means of cheaply financing collective consumption has been well documented as has the move towards the creation of a middle class.

On the other hand, the position in Coloured areas does not initially appear either to be so easily explained in terms of State response to contradictions, or to throw so much light on more general social issues. Possibly for this reason there is far less documentation on the subject.

The first part of this chapter, which deals with legal distribution shows that the process of creating a Coloured middle class, started much earlier than the same process for Blacks. Since Coloureds were already accepted as permanent members of the urban community and as candidates for relatively skilled jobs, this is easily explainable.

The second part of the chapter seeks to explain why this process has not been taken to its logical conclusion with the full "normalisation" of the liquor trade in capitalist terms. It also explores other facets of the interaction between the state

and the working class showing how the distribution of liquor is issued to serve the purpose of system maintenance.

This section, unlike those going before is not based on secondary sources but relies on empirical research interpreted through the theoretical framework established in the previous chapters.

B LEGAL LIQUOR DISTRIBUTION IN 'COLOURED' AREAS

Prior to the passing of the Group Areas Act in 1950, the concept of 'Coloured' areas had a different connotation. In fact, there were no such legally defined racially homogenous areas in Cape Town. The working class lived wherever cheap accommodation was available, whether in District Six, Schotsche Kloof, or any other convenient area. If no accommodation was available, in shanty-towns such as Windemere, Vrygrond, Elsies River and other parts of the Western Cape. The more affluent members mingled with Whites in Suburban Cape Town.

Liquor distribution proceded from White-owned bottle stores, bars and winegardens that were situated in District Six and the suburbs.

The 1945 Cape Coloured Liquor Commission of Inquiry reveals that the most prevalent alcohol consumption was that of 'canteen wine', containing 16.6% alcohol by volume. It was judged to be of very low quality and aimed exclusively at the working class. In fact 97% of all wine consumed was canteen wine, most of which was consumed in the year of vintage. The fortification was necessary to keep it from fermenting.[1]

The Western Cape winefarmers relied heavily on the working class which consumed by volume, the largest portion of their production.[2] Yet to the winefarmers this was not enough. They maintained that the restrictions on distribution in terms of numbers of outlets and their opening times were insufficient to allow them normal market growth. Throughout the Cape 'Coloureds' were also restricted in the amount of liquor they were allowed to buy per visit to a bottle store (two bottles of wine), and in some areas the Liquor Board had stipulated the closure of bottle stores on Friday afternoons in order to limit overindulgence.[3] While the farmers were clamouring for derestriction other fractions of capital (including some winefarmers) were forced to take Black migrants into employment because of the low productivity that liquor consumption had occasioned among Coloureds.

"In the Western Province, too, contractors have to rely on native labour because the Coloureds are too enfeebled to do the hard work required. Even on the farms, where the Coloured labourer had been employed for many generations the native is also making his appearance. Farmers admit that if the Italian prisoners of war had not been made available they would have been in a predicament and it would appear that if the Coloured people are allowed to degenerate further it will mean not only the physical and moral deterioration of themselves but a serious economic loss to South Africa as well".[4]

Throughout the 1930's and forties there seemed to be no clear policy about the reproduction of the 'Coloured' segment of the working class. Three commissions looked into the matter and made their recommendations.[5] Common to all three was the alarming degree to which liquor had rendered the population unproductive, 'demoralised' and disorganised. The

Cape Coloured Commission of 1937 came close to recommending the abolition of the tot system[6]; the Meaker Commission of 1945 strongly urged the government to do so, but the winegrowers carried enough clout to ride these criticisms of their labour control methods.[7]

What did emerge from the recommendations particularly from the 1937 Cape Coloured Commission was a version of Smuts' segregationist scheme which entailed a move towards separatism, group areas, 'Coloured' housing schemes and training schemes that would channel Coloureds into jobs reserved for them.[8] Following the National Party victory the move towards separatism was intensified.

The separatist notion was translated into reality with the entrenchment of National Party power. While 'reshaping' the method of 'Coloured' representation, at the site of reproduction in separate group areas, the ruling bloc also attempted to encourage the growth of a small 'Coloured' elite. This group would hopefully provide some leadership to the rest of the 'Coloured' population, and the state had to ensure that they were materially well enough catered for to be satisfied with their lot.

"What clearly was required, was the impetus of a Coloured (at least aspirant) bourgeoisie which could give sectionist 'leadership' to the Coloured colour-caste, while necessarily remaining bound to the alliance with its ruling class creators".[9]

This was the rationale which necessitated a series of derestrictions of formerly blocked income opportunities. In terms of the new policy private free enterprise was to be encouraged among the

Coloured population. In response to the Malan Commission which recommended that Coloureds be allowed to own their outlets, as well as hotels in their own areas,[10] Coloureds were allowed to become shareholders in bottle stores to be erected in 'Coloured' areas. In order to spread the benefit of these potentially vast accumulation avenues to as many aspirant entrepreneurs as possible, there had to be at least ten shareholders in the company applying for liquor licences. Later this number was increased to 20.[11] To this end also the Coloured Development Corporation was formed in 1962.[12] The function of the Coloured Development Corporation was to provide capital loans at favourable interest rates to aspirant entrepreneurs whose ventures looked feasible. In addition it launched some of its own protests in the 'Coloured' areas which provided an infrastructural backup to the retailing and light manufacturing which the private entrepreneurs launched.

The type of private ventures it supported were undertakers, cinemas, bookkeeping practices, building contractors, panelbeaters and spraypainters, hairdressers, hotels, restaurants/liquor outlets, retailers commercial buildings, and manufacturers. The three categories that involved liquor distribution - hotels, restaurants/liquor outlets received a high proportion of total funds allocated. In 1978/9 they accounted for 26.8% (an amount of R856 350,00) and in 1979/80 they accounted for 22% (R923 015,00) of funds (R3 196 905,00 and R4 029 103,00 respectively) allocated to private applicants in those years.[13]

By 1982 there were approximately 30 outlets in Coloured Group Areas in greater Cape Town. Some of these, particularly in the poorer areas were geared predominantly to the shebeen-trade catering for bulk purchases.[14] Others were not interested in selling to shebeeners. One of these latter bottle store managers whom I interviewed, in Elsies River, claimed to be in favour of responsible consumption and aimed his retailing strategy at the more affluent members of the Elsies River Community. He was not prepared to make the advances to the police which a large shebeen-trade rendered essential.[15] Nor was he prepared to collude in the illegality of entering a series of diverse names and addresses in the sales register which would obscure bulk purchases by shebeeners.

The process of supplying shebeens is thus a conscious decision which the management of the legal retail outlets in 'Coloured' (and White) areas make before they embark on the necessary strategies which safeguard trouble-free purchases. It is patent deception to claim, as some of the largest shebeen-suppliers that I interviewed do, that they do not know whether their customers are shebeeners or not. They have accumulated capital by being co-opted into State strategy under the umbrella of free enterprise and are simply attempting to conceal their complicity. At the same time they are, knowingly or not, attempting to sustain the fiction that the free-enterprise liquor distribution process is a-political.

Thirty-odd legal outlets for a population of close to one million people in greater Cape Town spells inefficient marketing in distribution parlance.

It will become clear from the section on shebeens in 'Coloured' areas below why they are unlikely to be legalised in the foreseeable future. The course that events are most likely to follow according to liquor industry sources, is an increase in licence allocations on the existing basis.[16]

C ILLEGAL DISTRIBUTION IN 'COLOURED' AREAS

The previous section has demonstrated how sparsely the legal retail outlets were distributed after 1962. A substantial 'inefficiency existed in the liquor marketing network, and there was considerable scope for income opportunities by filling the gaps. Moreover, legal outlets were confined to regular business hours, did not offer entertainment, and most important, did not extend credit to their customers. "Informal" distributors could thus offer potential customers a far better service than legal distributors could.

It is important, before the case study of illicit distribution is undertaken, to locate illicit dealers in the South African political economy.

Liberal theory maintains that a fairly clear-cut division between formal and informal sectors of the economy can be made. The latter represents the backward, traditional, low technology sector of the economy, characterised by marginal business operating from residential premises on low capital inputs. Moreover, the informal sector requires little effort of know-how to enter, and once ensconced the occupants often use family members as their labour.[17] Whereas this description of the informal sector is fairly accurate in terms of liberal theory,

it does not offer a convincing argument concerning its relationship to the formal sector. The dualism posited by liberal theory is strenuously challenged by Marxist writers on the grounds that it overlooks both the interdependence of the two sectors, as well as the aetiology of informal sector.

This omission is particularly pertinent in the context of racial capitalism in view of the criminalisation of certain formal income opportunities to Blacks and 'Coloureds'. Job reservation, regionally prescribed licencing laws and land ownership combined with the difficulty of obtaining capital or credit through conventional channels, has resulted in a retardation of occupational and spatial mobility of all but the ruling Whites.[18] According to Wilkinson and Webster racial capitalism has resulted in a

"failure of the process of social reproduction, despite the broadening and deepening of capitalist relations in South Africa, to produce a more broadly-based African petty-bourgeoisie or a labour force stratified along lines similar to those of the labour forces of advanced capitalist social formations"[19]

This development has been accompanied by the continuing regeneration of a sizeable relative surplus population having to find some means of subsistence in the urban ghettoes. The reproduction of the working class is affected not only by the level of wages paid to labour in the formal sector, but also by the level of domestic labour inputs by members of each family. Furthermore, the level at which the working class family is reproduced is affected by the provision of collective consumption items (supplied by the State) and finally, by the intensity of informal sector activity.[20]

The range of activities falling within the description

of the illegal informal sector is fairly wide: from production (eg. liquor brewing) to services (receiving stolen goods, drug-pushing, prostitution, protection rackets), and transfers (theft, pickpocketing, robbery, confidence trickery).[21]

The illicit liquor distributors that are our concern here would fall into the category of what Wilkinson and Webster call "'outworkers' of commercial capital, distributing its commodities to those corners of the market that remain inaccessible to conventional outlets". They supply "products and services which bourgeois morality has prevented the latter from commoditising openly".[22] They supply liquor under conditions which commercial capital is prevented (by legislation) from distributing. The two most important conditions are credit and indefinite selling times.

But apart from these two factors there are two other important considerations which contribute to the wide prolification of shebeens in 'Coloured' areas of the Western Cape: firstly personal safety, and secondly the dependency on the shebeener which is reproduced by the method of illicit distribution.[23]

Shebeens are of course, not the only form of informal sector activity. Some of the income opportunities in ghettos rely on direct predation on their residents. A whole range of methods exist starting from pickpocketing and bagsnatching through increasing application of threatened or actual violence to outright robbery. These are practised by the 'Roebane', the robbers, who operate either individually, or more often in gangs.[24] The constant

threat of personal attack, particularly at night and especially over weekends, substantially affects any resident's decision whether to buy liquor a kilometer away from his house at a legal outlet or just around the corner, at a shebeen where everyone knows him and he is relatively safe.[25]

All the above factors have to be seen in the context of the importance of shebeens both to liquor capital, and to the State. Although these are largely interdependent interests, they each adopt different dynamics and are troubled by different sets of contradictions.

Liquor capital needs to circumvent the legal limitations on wider distribution to avert ever-increasing surplus-production problems. The officially admitted surplus figure for the 1982 grape harvest was 34.7%,[26] the Financial Mail mentioned figures such as 400 million litres, constituting 50% of the 1980 harvest as being unsold.[27] Thus illicit distribution takes on a central role for the entire liquor industry, and determines their attempts to either secure 'selective' and symbolic enforcement of the liquor law, or to press for decriminalisation of shebeens. At an ideological level liquor capital attempts show the negative image of illicit distribution is ill-founded. They claim that shebeens contribute towards rectifying the imbalance that exists in collective consumption in White and Black areas. Specifically the substitute for recreational facilities, such as clubs and pubs.

"Where and when perceived individual rights and legitimate aspirations (social, political and economic) are denied or withdrawn, individuals resort

by illegitimate means to regain or achieve them - so is the case of shebeens. 'One of the basic institutions in British work life is the public house ... Of the social institutions that moulds men's lives between home and town in an industrial town, ... The pub has more buildings, holds more people, takes more of their time and money than church, cinema, dance hall and political organisations put together'. Surely this equally applies to the Shebeens".[28]

This argument is particularly salient in Black areas where a specialisation in informal sector activity is more common than in 'Coloured' areas. Shebeeners in 'Coloured' townships quite often also sell other drugs next to liquor, as well as stolen goods.[29] Liquor capital can thus hardly argue that shebeens in 'Coloured' areas are like pubs 'back home' and deserve to be decriminalised. Instead their strategy is to attempt to secure, 'agreements' with the police force to 'protect' legal liquor retailers and not to harass shebeeners too strenuously when they purchase their supplies at these outlets. This may in turn have a long term effect of encouraging shebeens to specialise only in liquor sales. Once rid of the negative image of other drugs and stolen goods, liquor capital could then press for decriminalisation of shebeens in 'Coloured' areas too. At this stage, however, it is restricted to supporting the symbolic enforcement strategy.

While market expansion is the main concern of liquor capital, the State needs to be seen to be taking the interests of other power/pressure groups into consideration before relaxing legal distribution limitations. These interests are still in the 1980's articulated in terms of moral, religious and philanthropic arguments, although some recent

statements in Parliament recognised the ideological role of liquor in the "destruction of the working class".[30]

Conflicting opinions over liquor distribution are not only articulated at Parliamentary level. Within the state apparatus, the function of ministries such as Commerce and Tourism, Health, and Justice (to name but a few) are affected differently by any changes in the liquor distribution dispensation. In this chapter the focus will be primarily on the relation between liquor distribution and township policing in 'Coloured' areas. The more the interests of the police are served by 'help' from the shebeens, the less strenuously they will be inclined to enforce the laws relating to illicit distribution.

All the above factors, therefore, exert their own peculiar influences on the existence of shebeens at any given stage under consideration. Acting together, and of course exerting contradictory pressures at times, they shape the extent of, and the peculiar nature of, illicit liquor distribution. It is the purpose of this section to examine, by means of a case study, the relationship between shebeens in 'Coloured' townships of the Western Cape and liquor capital, the police, the community, and the street gangs.

(i) BACKGROUND TO SHEBEENS IN THE WESTERN CAPE

Throughout the duration of the prohibition of liquor-sales to Blacks, between 1896 and 1962, Whites had legal access to a virtually unlimited choice of products and unlimited quantities of liquor. Coloureds in the Western Cape had equally free choice in the range of products, but were limited to a maximum of three quarts per purchase per day.[31] Blacks were only allowed to purchase and consume sorghum beer.

Under the circumstances the pattern of shebeening took on the form of Whites and Coloureds purchasing at legal retail outlets, and transporting the liquor to Black townships where it was sold illegally to Blacks. Another form of shebeening was home production, where Skokiaan kings and queens brewed the 'concoctions' so vilified by the formal liquor industry and State representatives as being dangerous and 'unhealthy'.[32]

Shebeening constituted the main source of income to a large number of people. It was suggested that approximately 30 000 individuals in the Cape Peninsula were making a living out of shebeening by 1960.[33] It was also suggested that approximately 60% of all liquor produced reached the consumer through illicit channels.[34] It was argued, on behalf of those in favour of anti-prohibition, that this vast informal sector would whittle away once Blacks had legal access to liquor.[35] It turned out to be a weak argument. Firstly, because the gaps in this legal market remained formidable,[36] and secondly, because the erstwhile shebeeners refused

to simply disappear. They changed their style of operation to suit the new dispensation.

By the early 1980's shebeening was probably still the main pillar of the informal sector, followed closely if not overtaken by drug-dealing, with stolen goods agencies and direct methods of predation bringing up the rear. The informal sector is notoriously difficult to quantify, but for those to whom the 'facts' constitute numbers rather than relationships and processes, I will venture a speculation.

In 1982 Pinnock estimated the number of residents of greater Cape Town who "call themselves gangsters" as somewhere around 80 000.[37] That figure needs to be qualified. It would be more accurate, in my opinion, to include ex-gangsters in that figure as well. Moreover, the label gangster needs to be stretched to those individuals who have only a loose affinity to gangs, a part-time sporadic involvement. Only then does the figure of 80 000 seem realistic. At the same time I was involved in a shebeen-count in the Elsies River - Clarkes Estate - Uitsig area of the Cape Flats.[38] The managers of four of the five legal retail outlets in those areas were interviewed and asked for estimates of their shebeen clients.[39] Combining both these sources a figure of 400 for the area seems realistic. From relative volumes of sales over the whole of Cape Town,[40] and from shebeen estimates made by my gangster connections in various areas, a very conservative figure of 3 000 shebeens for the Cape Flats area was arrived at. This figure <u>excludes</u> shebeens in Black townships of the area.

(ii) SHEBEENS AND LIQUOR CAPITAL

If there is any error in my estimates of the number of shebeens, it will be on the conservative side. The major significance of these estimates is that they expose the ratio of legal to illegal liquor outlets. The 3 000-odd shebeens purchase their liquor mainly at 50-odd legal outlets adjoining or situated in the Coloured townships. Most of these 50 retail outlets are owned by private companies consisting of at least 20 'Coloured' shareholders.[41]

These bottle stores, particularly in the poorer areas, are geared predominantly to supplying bulk-purchases by shebeeners. I would confidently estimate that at least 70% of all liquor consumed by 'Coloureds' in the greater Cape Town area reaches them through the shebeens. In some areas the shebeens are capable of selling liquor at lower prices than bottle stores.[42]

Shebeens are thus firmly entrenched in the process of liquor distribution and are of extreme importance to the legal producers and distributors, particularly to the wine and spirits faction of the liquor industry. The bulk of wine that is produced in this country is low-grade, low-priced wine aimed at the urban and rural working class. The Western Cape working class, nurtured for generations on the Tot System, consumes approximately 75% of all low-grade wine produced in South Africa.[43] Low-grade wine is in turn by far the largest proportion of all liquor produced from grapes.[44]

For the continuing accumulation of the Western Cape-based liquor industry, the working class as consumer target and the splinter-working-class shebeens as distributing vehicle are of central importance. Without shebeens extending the limits of legality through credit-sales and other services liquor sales volumes would definitely be considerably lower than they are, plunging the liquor industry into even greater problems of overproduction.

It is therefore obvious that the liquor industry is inclined to use all the influence, leverage, and power at its disposal to ensure that illicit distribution is not hampered by over-zealous policing. Considering the blatancy with which shebeeners purchase their supplies at retail outlets the police would have no problems in arresting shebeeners and confiscating their stock if they put their minds to it.

The reality at street level is that the police enforce the Liquor Law selectively. Partly responsible for this are the encouragements they receive from the liquor industry and from within their own hierarchy to do so. The other part of their decision stems from the dynamics of policing working class areas, to be dealt with below.

The shapers of marketing strategies in the large liquor companies are well aware of how sensitive a political issue liquor distribution is.[45] All the more sensitive, therefore, is illicit distribution. They are extremely conscious of

retaining an image at large which will show them to be 'responsible' distributors. This 'responsible' attitude will sometimes be sustained even though it costs hundreds of thousands of rands in loss of profit.[46] On the other hand, they have the problem that the majority of the liquor they produce and distribute legally, reaches the consumer through illegal shebeens in working class areas. They concede that the only way in which retail outlets can sustain a successful shebeen-clientele is by an accommodation with the local police, but claim to have no part in negotiating this accommodation.[47] The level at which these overt deals are made seems to be at that of the retailer. The more subtle representations emanate from liquor producers at a political and/or media level.[48]

In view of the strenuous competition in the liquor industry between grape-based liquor and beer, both vying for larger proportions of consumer spending on liquor, it seems logical that liquor producers/distributors should have attempted to liaise with shebeens in 'Coloured' areas. In Black areas, promotion teams have been visiting shebeens since 1972 with State blessing.[49] The fact that the same pattern has not repeated itself in 'Coloured' townships is due to the unsavoury image of shebeens there. Most sizeable shebeens are run and protected by street gangs whose tendency to monopolise the most lucrative informal sector activities such as drugs and stolen goods has made them a publicity risk for liquor capital.

Gang territoriality and mutual hostility discount

the possibility of shebeeners organising themselves into a pressure group as was the case with shebeens in Black areas.[50] Furthermore, only about 20% of shebeens offer any facilities for customers to consume the liquor on the premises. So that the local-pub-image would be hard to use legitimately. Until they could be persuaded to separate their other forms of business from liquor sales, it is doubtful that these shebeens will become the primary vehicle of market expansion in coloured areas. Liquor capital cannot afford to be seen in association with them.

The shebeeners are therefore confined to only one contact in the liquor industry, the retailers. If they prove themselves to be regular, reliable customers, they may qualify for credit, depending on the policy of the local retailer. It is important for both parties that the purchasing procedure remains free from harrassment by the police. Retailers who can build up a reputation for safe purchases are amply rewarded by substantially increased custom. Some retailers have circumvented the problem by effecting deliveries in unmarked vehicles to the site of the shebeen, thereby lessening the risk to the shebeener.[51]

Apart from security, price is another important consideration for the shebeener. Bulk discounts encourage larger purchases but provide more incriminating evidence if he is raided.

Beyond these few basic services and concessions, there seems to be very little contact between

shebeener and the rest of the industry. There exists in the Western Cape none of the extensive back-up in terms of fridges, glasses, table cloths and all the other sales promotion paraphernalia which shebeens in Black areas are treated to.[52] Once the shebeener has made his purchase, or, if he is lucky, the stocks have been delivered to him, it is up to his own ingenuity to create the necessary alliances, accommodations and strategies which will render the reproduction of his business cycle possible. Dangers abound. Apart from the danger of police harrassment, there are opposition shebeens to contend with, as well as the street gangs, to whom a shebeen is always a potential target for free booze. Finally, there is the community itself, which could possibly be pressurised not to buy from him, or fail to pay for credit sales, or inform on him to the opposition or the police. To avoid all of these dangers a shebeener needs help, powerful help. The commonest form of assistance which shebeeners procure is the street gangs.

(iii) SHEBEENS AND STREET GANGS

There are, of course, some shebeens that do not hire or retain gangsters to protect them. This would apply to the small-timers who have resorted to selling a little liquor because the main breadwinner is for any of a host of possible reasons no longer providing the necessary income to reproduce the working class family.[53] Also a fairly common phenomenon is a family in which a number of individuals work in formal employment, but who augment their family income by selling liquor

over weekends. In such cases there are usually some friends that can be relied on to help in times of trouble.

The shebeener who forms the subject of my case study also started off selling liquor without the help of a gang. I shall call him Joker in order to safeguard his identity.[54]

Joker began his career as a gangster, like so many thousand youngsters on the Cape Flats, for his own protection.[55] He was nine years old at the time, lived in Heideveld with his parents and siblings in a small semi-detached house. They had found themselves uprooted from their former home in District Six in the early sixties and dumped in "No-Man's Land", knowing hardly anyone living around them. Shops were a long walk from their new home, and he remembers the nearest police station being Athlone, some 5 km away. Very few houses had telephones. To avoid being robbed repeatedly of the price of a loaf of bread on his way to the shops he joined a group of lads who called themselves the Terrible Josters (TJ). At that stage there was no great stigma attached to being a member of a defence gang. Joker's father had told him many stories about the legendary Globe Gang of District Six, of whom he had reputedly been a member. The aura of the Globe was that of the gentlemen gangsters, with strong touches of a Robin Hood ethic.[56] The TJ's were simply a group of inexperienced youngsters who hung out together at a particular spot, protected each other from attacks by the more experienced gangsters, smoked

a little pot together, and performed a couple of pranks.

Hardly anyone who grows up in working-class areas of the Cape Flats is immune to exposure to big-time gangsterism. If youngsters like Joker didn't actually see the big-timers operating, they certainly heard about them from older boys, or men who had more experience. Anyone who had done time in prison would have learnt prison language and had internalised some of the ideology and mystique of gangsterism. Even if he had not joined a prison gang such an individual would have learnt of their power both inside and out of prison.[57]

Joker and his TJ's were exposed to a lot of man-talk and gang-talk. As they grew older the defence dynamic changed a little. The late sixties and early seventies were epitomised by struggles for turf. Not only living territory, but also market delineation for informal sector activity.[58] The TJ's defences needed to be sharpened if they were to survive, and that involved a modicum of aggression.

As Joker and his TJ's approached school-leaving age, survival became an ever-stronger theme of their togetherness. They had long since learnt to 'earn' some money by shaking up youngsters and relieving them of money or goods on the way to or from the shops. Drunks were also easy prey for a few coppers. And of course they kept their eyes open for anything left negligently lying around too long, or a nice shirt or pair

of trousers, hanging on an unattended line. They had also rehearsed their shoplifting techniques well, some members occupying the shopowners attention whilst others would nick a few items and beat it. All of this was, however, little more than fun and games. Their petty-crime activities could not sustain them, and did not need to sustain them while they were still dependant on their parents and at school.

The transition from school into some form of survival is at best, traumatic. It is all the more traumatic if, as a 14-16 year-old youngster, one is between two and four years behind the average child in terms of school performance. In the case of Joker's TJ's their educational backwardness was not necessarily a case of lower intelligence. According to Joker, they just didn't see the point of all the nonsense they were being taught; it did not seem to equip them for anything they were likely to have to cope with in later life. And besides, the fun they were having after school was far more important than fiddling around with homework.[59] Joker's parents did not care much about his school performance, and were indifferent as to whether he should continue or not. They left the decision up to him. He had his eye on the style of a big-timer in his area. This big-timer wore flashy clothes, owned a car, was respected by some and feared by most people in the neighbourhood. He was the local big-buyer[60] and merchant;[61] and the leader of the Total Pipe Killers in Heideveld, an awesome lot.

The Josters as a group were under pressure at that time. Some members were encouraged by their parents to look for work, and a few of them actually succeeded in finding mainly labourers jobs, 'shit-work'. Despite their lack of qualification for anything better in the formal sector, the gangsters look down on low-paid, physically exacting tasks, particularly if it involves racist employers. Gang ideology imbues them with a sense of manhood which relies on sharpness of mind, dexterity with weapons, proficiency at fighting, shrewdness in business and sexual prowess. The hierarchies they experience in gang structures retain traces of mystique and ritual, particularly when projected onto prison gangs. Gang laws demand, in theory at least, rigid adherence and unquestioning submission in the interests of solidarity. In prison gangs this rigidity finds its reality whereas it is somewhat diluted in the street gangs. It depends on the quality of leadership as to how closely each gang follows the rules. Working for a gang (or being a member) involves, in the eyes of Joker, getting something of value beyond mere money in return for one's efforts. There is solidarity, friendship, protection, ego-boosting, power, and shared spoils. Above all, there is excitement, the thrill of danger and daring. They feel a sense of purpose, seeing the fruits of their own labour rather than working towards enriching an employer.

By comparison, those TJ's who succumbed to parental pressure to find formal employment were seen as having chosen the worse deal. The naked

brutality of the employer-employee relationship, the low pay, insecurity of tenure, yes-boss-manship, and non-existent psychological rewards constituted, in Joker's opinion, outright capitulation to the 'powers of evil'.[62] His ambitions lay beyond working for the 'Boere'[63] and being their dog. He aspired to riches, power and respect - and that was not a package obtainable through unskilled employment.

Joker's choice (his rational choice), was to offer his services to the Total Pipe Killers (TPK's). The respect which his father commanded as an ex-Globeite smoothed the transition from one gang into another. Joker was not the only TJ to do so. Those who had not found, or chose not to look for formal employment were also absorbed as 'Laities'[64] into the TPK's. They were initiated, tattoed and taught the TPK 'book', the unwritten laws which circumscribe TPK ethics. They swore their allegiances to the leader and obedience to the book. They had made their career choice.

Ten years later Joker had served several prison terms, usually of fairly short duration (none exceeding 3 years) for theft, housebreaking and robbery. In prison he became a 'man of the number', a member of the 26 Prison Gang.[65] That membership entrenched him in a very large family of men who undertake to be of assistance to each other both inside prison, and also after their release. In prison he was a dealer, buying and selling whatever the confinement of men in an unnatural environment turns into commodities.[66]

On his release from prison, he collected the spoils of his last 'job' from a friend who had kept the R300 for him. With this opening capital Joker started off his own, independent shebeen venture, assisted only by his wife. The scale of their business was of necessity small, as they could not be seen to be competing with the TPK's in Heideveld, who by that stage (1980) had grown to be a considerable force, as Joker claimed, of 800 men. Furthermore, they were working from his parents' semi-detached house he had grown up in which constituted a further restraint to successful business expansion.

Only once he had somehow (he does not divulge how) obtained a semi-detached house for himself and his wife in a different area, could he start building up his empire.

There were many problems to contend with. Firstly, the other shebeens in the vicinity, to whom he constituted unwelcome competition. Not only were the bigger operators protected by gangs but they had also made the necessary deals with the police and traffic police who allowed them to exist. Finally, they had demarcated their market areas and had their clientele sewn up. Joker had to tread carefully. Furthermore, he would have to offer his customers a better deal than the opposition, either in terms of better prices, longer credit terms, more comfortable or safer drinking environment, friendlier service. Then there were also the police to contend with.

His strategy was to build up the liquor side

slowly. He concentrated initially on 'broking' (buying and selling) groceries, vegetables, cigarettes and sweets, buying at local supermarkets, and then selling in small quantities[67] mainly on short-term credit until payday, usually Fridays. This process was, of course, also illegal as he did not possess the necessary licence.[68] Needless to say, although he was charging his customers sales tax, he kept it for himself, and would not have dreamt of paying income tax. Throughout these sales of household necessities, his customers were constantly made aware of the availability of liquor on credit as well.

Within six months liquor volumes had overtaken the other commodities, and Joker's business became more noticeably a shebeen enterprise. He had established a clientele who, because they could never settle all their debts with him, were so to speak dependent on his continued business. His business had reached a scale at which further expansion could, under the circumstances, only take place with the help of protectors, bouncers, informers and debt-collectors, in short a private police force.

The local defence gang happened to be a group of youngsters, between the ages of 11 and 18, who called themselves the Dobermans (DBM in tatoo language). They were an unusually sizeable crew with a core of 15-odd members and approximately 20 peripheral laities.[69] They were a rough, tough bunch - of necessity, for Elsies river is one of the most dangerous areas to survive in.[70] Some of them had acquired the hard-earned title of

'Doberman Dog',[71] an accolade denoting a breakneck, fearless attitude. In order to qualify for that title a gangster has to perform some rather gruesome deeds, including eradicating opposition gangsters and winning the woman of a feared opposition member.

The Dobermans, primarily a juvenile gang, belong to the Mongrels - Born Free Kids alliance of gangs, which follows the line of the 26 Prison Gang.[72] Both BFK's and DBM's have their origin in the reformatories, where to a lesser degree of intensity, prison gang ethics and structures are emulated. It is not unusual for a DBM to also wear the BFK tatoos and when he gets older, into his twenties, to also acquire an MG, or MG$. Two of the fifteen core members originally wore BFK tattoos and, during the four years of my association with them, graduated into "Full-Force Born Free Kids" (FF BFK), bearing the same distinction as the "Doberman Dogs".

At least ten of the fifteen had graduated from the reformatories; six of them had simply run away, whereas the others had spent a minimum of two years being 'reformed'.[73] The tougher members, who at that stage of their lives had no intention of 'making it' in the formal sector, had tattood even their faces with a variety of words and symbols.[74]

This crew seemed to have the necessary job-qualifications that Joker was looking for. They were familiar with gang-lore, and were juveniles in the eyes of the courts and the law, all of which was to Joker's advantage, although

their age rendered them less experienced at business and hard-time gangsterism. From that point of view they were less of a physical and business threat to him. Moreover, they were likely to be financially more dependent on him if they got into trouble, so that he could trade bail-money and legal fees for loyalty and obedience. Of course he would also pay them a wage, but that only constituted the equivalent of a labourer's wage (R45,00 a week at that time, Oct 1981). Outside of 'employment' hours, they were free to earn their 'perks' in the customary gang fashion.

In the case of a conviction on any charge, the likelihood of juveniles receiving whippings rather than prison terms is fairly high.[75] For Joker that meant that he was seldom deprived of a full labour contingent for long periods. Besides, the reserve army of other Dobermans/BFK's/Mongrels in the area would be there to fill any vacancies.

Joker's position as an ex-TPK member, however, caused him some problems in controlling his labour force. He had hired six of them to start off with; two per eight hour shift in this 24-hour-a-day-operation. The rest of the gangsters had agreed to be on standby in case of trouble. But TPK's and DBM's are not the happiest combination of gangs. Although they both belong to the same prison-gang alliance, which theoretically should supercede street-gang differences, that rule did not yet operate effectively amongst the DBM's who had not experienced prison. Although Joker tried hard to 'pull' them he only had limited

success. 'Pulling' (om die manskappe te trek) refers to that process of ideological reinforcement which a gang-leader treats his underlings to from time to time, to teach/reaffirm the ethics and rules of gang existence. In his case it was necessary to mystify the nakedness of the employer-employee relationship by superimposing gang ethic onto it.

Although he succeeded to a limited degree, which allowed business to improve to the extent that he was in a position to purchase a second-hand car within a short while,[76] it was still a relationship fraught with tension and conflict. The DBM's could often not account for the mysterious disappearance of small quantities of liquor or money, to which they had helped themselves, and on one occasion while Joker was out augmenting supplies,[77] his house was raided by the rest of the DBM's/BFK's, who cleared out what liquor there was. This raid was attributed to the opposition gang/shebeen by his employees on his return.

The tensions and conflicts found their solution in the release from prison of one of Joker's ex-26-brothers, whom I shall call Scarface.[78] He was a 'Pumulanga', a high-ranking leader, of the BFK's to whom Joker's private police theoretically owed structural allegiance. He became a partner in the business, and was able to 'pull' the gangsters far more successfully than Joker was able to, lending far greater legitimacy to what was basically an exploitive relationship.

With tighter command over their forces than had previously existed, they were now in a position to muscle their way into a greater market share in the area.

That involved a three-pronged attack. They needed to break the power of the big buyer who was their main opposition, and push the smaller fries, who were a lesser problem, out of business. Secondly there were the police to contend with, and thirdly, the consumers of their wares needed to realise that it was in their best interests to buy from Joker and Co.

They mobilised all the manpower at their disposal, including the reserve army of laities. They began by spreading false rumours in the neighbourhood about an imminent police clampdown on shebeens.[79] Their intention here was to force the other shebeens to either go easy for a while by buying smaller, less incriminating quantities of liquor, or not to buy at all for a while. Joker and Scarface, however, bought larger quantities than usual, so that when the others ran out of supplies, their customers would possibly buy from Joker's shebeen. At the same time their gang was given instructions to harrass clients using the opposition shebeens, preferably very late at night or when the clients were drunk, so that identification of the gangsters would be more difficult. To this end the ballaclava, which forms part of the gang 'uniform' came into its own. It can be converted into a face cover and reconverted into a hat within seconds. Their instructions were to harrass the clients as close

to the site of the opposition shebeens as possible, so that they would acquire the reputation of being unsafe places to buy liquor.

Apart from these tactics, actual raids were launched on the small-timers, smashing bottles or carrying them off, beating up the shebeener, touching up or harrassing the women and girls, smashing windows and furniture.

Throughout all these operations, Joker and Scarface kept a low profile, adopting a business-as-usual attitude, in fact letting it be known that business was picking up due to the safety of their shebeen. They attempted not to allow the link between the raids and their instruction to leak out. To this end the six rotating guards who were in constant attendance were not involved in the raids. On the face of it, therefore, the raids and harrassment could have been interpreted as the work of the 'independent' gang in the area.

Their attack on the big buyer and his gang was more subtle. He was protected by a group of Sicilian Kids and remnant stragglers of the Cisko Yakkies, who belong to the opposing gang alliance, Cape Town Scorpions (CT$) who all link up with the 28 prison gang. Joker and Scarface elicited the help of the police to do their dirty work. The drug squad, which is a separate, specialised unit of the police, was repeatedly informed by anonymous phone calls from callers imitating indignant female voices, that this particular shebeen was turning all their innocent youngsters into criminals and rapists from all the drugs

procured there. Information was divulged to the drug squad about the times of the week at which 'things were worst'. Having set the wheels of 'justice' in motion on that front, Joker and Scarface made their overtures to the local police and traffic police.

As a result of their efforts, police surveillance, road-blocks and raids for both liquor and drugs as well as other crimes reported at the police station, increased at the opposition shebeener/merchant. The pressure was on him and he either had to increase his handouts and services to the accessible branches of the police, or slow down his operations a little. He did both, partly out of necessity, as some of his gangster guards had been caught in possession of drugs, and partly to lie low for a while to create a good impression of being a 'manageable' shebeener for his police-contacts.[80]

Joker and Scarface exploited this lull in trading by branching out into buying and selling dagga. Nine more laities were deployed at five 'poste' (outposts) where they "off-loaded" their "zols"(sticks) to the public. They did not sell or keep drugs on the premises. The connection between the laities manning the 'poste' and their employers were kept as secrets from anyone enquiring who the supplier happened to be. To this end Scarface was able to invoke the sanctity of the brotherhood oath, so that betrayal could be met with the severest of penalties.

Initially, most dagga sales were on a cash basis,

but in time reliable liquor customers were allowed to buy drugs on credit as well.

Hardly three weeks after the commencement of dagga-dealing they found a reliable source of mandrax tablets (buttons) which were then also 'off-loaded' at the outposts.

This rapid expansion of their product range, and the higher mark-ups on dagga and mandrax had a dramatic effect on the style of their business dealings. On the one hand, they were making considerably more money than when they sold merely liquor. The greater liquidity facilitated the expansion into moneylending at vastly usurious rates of 30% a week! Despite the high return on money by comparison with the going formal sector interest rates at the time (12-14% per annum), Joker explained this as merely a service to the community. In his opinion he could treble his money within a week if he invested it in either dagga or mandrax, so that his moneylending rate was a relative loss. What Joker did not verbalise, however, was that the moneylending side of his business increased his control of and power over the members of the community.[81]

Once Joker and Scarface had started lending money, it was a question of time before they augmented the credit with durables such as transistor radios, tape recorders, TV sets and other household items which other specialists in the informal sector, the housebreakers and car-thieves, need outlets for.[82] In this case they did not 'stock' the items

themselves but merely served as a channel for ordering, advertising, or viewing the items, which were kept at a variety of locations. Joker and Scarface only supplied the credit on their own terms and earned a commission from the 'owners' of the goods.

On the other hand the extended product range imposed increased dangers on their business enterprise, from the police, the community, their own gang and opposition gangs. The reproduction of their means of survival necessitated a broadening of the alliances and a simultaneous strengthening of coercive controls over those who threatened them.[83]

Their own gang, by this stage numbering fifteen men in full-time employment, was at once one of their most important assets as well as a potential threat to their livelihood.

The gang needed to be kept in training as to how best to perform its functions ie. where to hide the drugs, whom to sell to and whom to avoid, how to avoid arrest, how to deflect police attention from Joker's house, the stronghold of the enterprise, how to keep secrets, how to strategise attacks and assaults on their enemies, whom to harrass, and whom to leave in peace. Scarface was best equipped to impart this kind of information, relying strongly on his hierarchical seniority, which carries an aura of wisdom derived from even higher realms in the gang hierarchy. He continually inculcated them with those attributes which would perpetuate

the existence of the shebeen: loyalty, obedience, discipline, fearlessness, a sense of gang pride (akin to a team spirit, but very much stronger). These "pulls" were held frequently either to the whole group of employees or to individuals, whenever Scarface felt it necessary. They were often accompanied by a mutual indulgence in a pipe, either green (dagga and tobacco only) or white (a mixture of dagga, mandrax and cigarette tobacco).[84]

The pipe constituted a broken off bottleneck into which a 'diamond' (rolled up aluminium foil from a cigarette packet) was inserted to prevent the burning mixture from being inhaled. Sharing a pipe constitutes an important moment in the existence of a gang. On the one hand it is a unifying process by which all share equally in this intoxicating source of pleasure, while at the same time implicitly rejecting the mainstream middle-class values against which gangsterism is a partial response.[85] With each pipe smoked the gang anchors itself to the things that bind its individuals together. On the other hand the quasi-rituality of the process reaffirms the hierarchies of gansterism. The Pumulanga may decide as a special favour or as a token reward, who is to have the privilege of preparing the pipe, and even greater honour, who is to take the first draw. Then, too, the white pipe smoking process separates the men from the boys, giving those who can handle the burning throat and spinning head, a feeling of worth and achievement.

Petty competitiveness develops around the pipe-smoking. Toughness is attributed in ever-increasing stages to those gangsters who can suck a pipe so hot that firstly, their hands burn dark brown from it, and secondly, the seeds in the dagga are made to 'pop', and thirdly they crack the bottleneck from the intense heat.

Once the pipe has travelled around the circle, and the intoxicants start taking effect[86] (some gangsters ease the burning throats with beer, wine or 'burns' (spirits)) the competitiveness usually escalates. At those occasions when I was present, some 15 times during the three-month period, the gangsters would exhibit increasing bravado by recounting memorable fights, stabbings, break-ins, rapes, deals, escapes from potential arrest. In short, they would try to impress each other as to how good they were at their job. They also at these occasions continuously issued challenges to each other to perform some outrageously daring act, which, given the increasing level of 'stonedness' and mutual incitement, would sometimes result in otherwise subdued antipathies between some of the members surfacing. Small scuffles would then erupt which had the surface appearance of mock-fights but bore out the lack of consensus and absolute brotherhood amongst these supposed blood-brothers.[87]

Scarface suppressed the mutual bickering without much ado most of the time. He was constantly conscious, as he would tell me after these smoking sessions, of building unity and obedience amongst

his gangsters by a process which involved their consent. The 'nice times', a term that comes across as a gross understatement in its English usage here, were essential stages for Joker and Scarface towards masking what was an otherwise exploitative relationship in which the laities were worse-off.

The laities after all, constituted the frontline of the shebeen, as its most visible, vulnerable and low-ranking 'employees'. They were the ones vulnerable to police predation. They could be beaten up, arrested, and once processed through the Justice machine, imprisoned or whipped. They also formed the frontline against other gangs in the area. Clashes with other gangs could result in more severe injuries and degredation than police action, particularly if they happened to be on the losing side. Yet such clashes were seen by the participants as preferable to crossing swords with the police. Lastly, the conduct of the laities also epitomised the worst excesses of the informal sector to the members of the community, some of whom were caught in the contradictory trap of needing the gang for its goods and services, yet being dominated by it.

All of these negative attributes of the laities' job coupled with their low monetary remuneration, needed to be counterbalanced by the 'nice times' and other perks by Joker and Scarface. Among these was an understanding that the shebeen would support employees who got into trouble with the law. The first stage of this support involved

encouraging all the laities to purchase a good-luck charm from the local Doekom.[88] Not only the laities, but Joker and Scarface, on commensurately different scales, paid this seer-cum-mystic-cum-spiritualist,(a well-known persona in working-class areas,) a regular fee for protection against evil. In the case of the laities protection took the form of a medicine bottle containing what looked like salt, which they purchased for R1,00 each week. This they carried on them all the time, believing it would go some way towards keeping the Boere off their backs. Joker and Scarface never revealed to me the amount they paid, nor the form which their protection took. They were reluctant to talk much about the Doekom except to illustrate that whenever one of them got into trouble with the law, they first consulted the Doekom as to procedure and strategy before deciding whether to consult attorneys or not.[89]

In the event of the laities being charged with an offence, they usually procured the services of a Doekom only (it was cheaper than an attorney) but in more serious cases they employed both. The Doekom 'worked' from his home only and made no public appearances. The second stage, then, was formal legal services. Apart from this type of assistance Joker and Scarface allowed the gangsters, during times when they were not on duty, to earn their own perks provided that it did not interfere with the interests of the business.

These activities were a little more serious than Joker's when he was a Terrible Joster.[90] They

exploited whatever opportunities people gave them in the neighbourhood: a window left open and unguarded enabled the gangsters to slip in and help themselves to whatever was useful at the time. Transistor radios and portable tape decks (preferably stereo) were favourite items on their shopping list. Car radios (and CB radios) were also easy to sell quickly. On Fridays they hung out on the routes that people used returning from station or busses, robbing them of their paypackets. More often than not, these robberies did not involve overt force. Most people whom they accosted knew that it was wiser to hand over whatever they had without a fight. The gangsters were armed, mainly with knives, but sometimes one or two of them carried guns. On a lucrative Friday at the beginning of December 1981, the BFK's in a group of seven laities succeeded in robbing 18 people of their paypackets. Their haul was worth R400,00, which was divided, after considerable squabbling, equally amongst them.[91] Only three victims resisted and one of them was stabbed for his efforts.

When their extraneous activities did clash with the shebeen's interests, it was up to Scarface to pressurise and cajole them into toeing the line. This was the case when, in February 1982, they robbed one of the regular customers of the shebeen, who subsequently complained to Joker. Such incidents jeopardised the shebeens clientele and elicited strong reprimands from Scarface. The client's money was returned to him, and he received free liquor for himself for a whole weekend as compensation, paid for by the gangsters.

Throughout the duration of my three-month intensive observation there was a constant undertone of tension between Joker and Scarface on the one hand and the gangsters/guards on the other, although Scarface kept a fairly tight grip over the gangsters they still had periods of relative autonomy during which his influence was felt less. It was plain to everyone that the gang could physically overpower the two shebeen partners had the necessity arisen. A factor which considerably increased the tension was Joker's associations and dealings with the local police and traffic police. Those meetings and visits gave rise to suspicion amongst the gangsters that Joker was doing a 'big five' act on them. This term originates from the name of a prison gang which acts in collaboration with the authorities. Whenever a gangster was arrested, one of the suspicions which the rest of them harboured was that he had been sold ('pimped' in gang slang) to the Boere by Joker.

Privately the two partners expressed quite some concern about the conflict but considered it inevitable. They were both conscious of the inequality pervading in the relationship between them and the gangsters, yet knew that without it, they could not accumulate money or goods at the fast pace they were. In answer to questions about how previous big-timers they had worked with or for had operated, they both reaffirmed a hierarchical modus operandi. In their opinion, there was no possibility for a more egalitarian structure, where both spoils and profits were

shared more equally between them as gang-leaders, and the gangsters as underlings. They believed in firm leadership, spiced with gang ethic and ideology to justify the hierarchical structures in terms of which they were being enriched at the expense of the laities. They both had experienced various attempts at co-operative gangsterism, that had always broken down because of feuding over payout proportions and leadership problems.

The structural differences between the partners and their gang were compounded by an age gap of at least 15 years. Not only did that place them in different 'generations' of gangsterism, but it also reflected their different styles of action arising out of the stages in their respective developmental cycles. Both Joker and Scarface had established themselves as 'men' within the system of values in which they aspired to succeed; now they desired to settle down to good 'business' and enjoy life. They took fewer drugs than those of the laities, smoking more for relaxation (afkoel) than for hyped-up kicks. The high level of drug-intake among their gangsters was simultaneously a source of distrust and a cause for guarded contempt.

They had family commitments to their wives (neither of them had any children), and despite the fact that Joker's wife worked at the shebeen and would probably continue to do so for as long as she could, he desired a 'normal' housewife's life for her.

The laities,[92] by comparison, were still at the early stages of their careers, having already passed through their corner-kid and defence gang phases.[93] In a very competitive manner they were bent on being 'in' - accepted and respected, hopefully even feared - in their gang environment. They were continuously attempting to establish their manhood as fighters,[94] playboys-cum-studs,[95] 'shrewdies', and wheeler-dealer confidence tricksters. They hadn't yet 'made it' and displayed an urgent drive to do so.

Towards Joker and Scarface they showed ambivalent attitudes. On the positive side, they acknowledged that the shebeen provided them with an enterprise, 'fixed' jobs and a modicum of security in times of hardship or trouble. It also provided a springboard from which other activities within their survival strategies could be launched (eg. robbing etc) as well as the fence through which pilfered or stolen goods could be marketed. Belonging to a rapidly growing successful operation filled them with a sense of power and relative impunity.

On the negative side they distrusted Joker, firstly for the lack of formal 'relation' to them but more importantly because of his dubious relationship with the 'Boere' which jeopardised them, the frontliners, most of all. They regarded the deals he made with the police as a sell-out tactic, realising however that it was most probably an unavoidable strategy. But in their view it tainted him as a true gangster, having lost the stoic purity of values and action which

the BFK book demands of all good members.

Their attitude was compositely expressed in the term, which ended up as his nickname amongst them, Plastic. He was a plastic gangster, not for real, an imitation.

Their attitude to Joker was the cause of a lot of secessionist talk amongst them. They had the advantage of knowing the area and its inhabitants 'intimately'. What they lacked, however, was capital and the support infrastructure which keeps every shebeen in business. To secede successfully they would have to taint themselves by making advances to the Boere, a thought which was still very distasteful to them. The other restraint to secession was their relation to Scarface: as their mentor and leader he commanded considerable respect. He was a good strategist and enjoyed their trust in the execution of their duties. He constituted their structural link to the rest of the vast brotherhood of men, both inside and outside of prison. That, in itself, was like a passport to a certain style of survival.

They detected a little of their own attitude towards Joker in Scarface, which drew the bonds between them closer. Scarface epitomised the role model to which all but three aspired. Even if it entailed having to spend several years behind bars, they would have been prepared for that by all the prison-talk.

On balance the gangsters thus continued to work

for and support Joker's and Scarface's shebeen enterprise. But it was not an unquestioning support, it was overlaid by a distrust and partial contempt for one of their two leaders.

Reduced to its essentials, the relationship between shebeen owners and gangsters was one of wage labour in the context of gang membership. Notwithstanding the dangers involved it was a form of employment which was far preferable to the gangsters than anything the formal sector could have offered them with their qualifications. Considering their background and future aspirations, it was their rational choice to survive by illicit means. Such employment promised them far greater material rewards and 'job satisfaction' than their contemporaries in the formal sector were experiencing. In this sense it can be said that they were more ambitious in the short term than their formal sector counterparts.

In the early eighties this 'rational' choice to survive by illicit means had been made by a considerable number of youngsters on the Cape Flats. Competition for physical territory as well as market share was intense. At all levels of gangsterism a considerable amount of energy was spent working out covert and overt strategies of attack and defence to secure individual gang living and market space.[96] Joker's gang had the CT's, the Cisko Yakkies, the Sicilian Kids and the Virgin Breakers of Elsies River to contend with. It was against the CTS28 Alliance gangs that their energies were directed. The BFK-

26 alliance was handled more amicably by market territorial delineation. Needless to say, Joker and Scarface's successful expansion during the six months following October 1981 was not tolerated passively by the businesses whose livelihood they had threatened or temporarily destroyed. The small-timers had few resources at their disposal with which to strike back. I am not aware of any approaches they made to the other big-timer, but Joker surmised that he would not have been interested in such temporary alliances with potential opposition small-fries. All that the four small-fries could do was cower and wait for opportunities when Joker and Scarface became more vulnerable. In the meantime, according to Joker's police contacts, they pursued the policy of complaining to the police about the shebeen.

The big-buyer's strategy was far more aggressive. He attempted to pursue the same tactics as Joker had in launching his composite assaults on him. The local police and the drug squad were thus continually receiving gratuitous potential evidence about the two biggest shebeen operations in a small enclave of Elsies River. This information was of course of immense value to the police in deciding which operation to support and which to 'bust'.

Other tactics involved repeated testing of the boundaries between the gang territories and attacks on individual gangsters or small groups of gangsters on their outposts. Harrassment of

Joker's customers was of course also part of the repertoire.

A low-scale ongoing guerilla war was thus the constant reality of both shebeen operations, both sides simultaneously wooing the police to take their side and tip the balance.

(iv) SHEBEENS AND THE COMMUNITY

It is, of course, no mere coincidence that Elsies River has, probably, the highest density of shebeens in the Cape Peninsula.[97] The profile that Pinnock draws of the area demonstrates that it was inhabited by families of whom 49.6% were sustained, if one can call it that, by heads of households earning under R100,00 a month in 1978.[98]

Escalating costs of construction, combined with the inability of the residents to shoulder the increased interest rates on Government loans which the developing authority - the Divisional Council - had procured, forced the DC to reconsider its 'development' strategy. Rather than commit itself to additional loans it decided, in 1978, not to provide some of the planned amenities that would have made the area more 'livable'. So plans for the following amenities found themselves scrapped in Elsies River: "6 community centres, 6 libraries, the swimming pool, the fire station, several old age houses, creches and schools, and a landscaping project to beautify the area".[99]

By 1980 the 'development' of Elsies River was still way behind the projected schedule. Only 5 783 families of the projected 15 000 families had been re-housed by 1978.[100] By the end of 1981 thousands of people were still living in the overcrowded shanty yards (described by Pinnock) in Epping Forest, Clarke's Estate and Louw's Bush areas.[101] Next to these the four storey flats were being constructed and people sardined into them on completion. It was an area experiencing a considerable degree of flux in which many new families had not yet set up the formal and informal reciprocal and mutual support structures which tend to cushion periods of hardship and calamity.[102]

Given the low level of earnings and the high unemployment rate,[103] competition for income opportunities in the formal sector was intense. The most lucrative opportunities were colonised by the likes of Joker and Scarface, which left the less rewarding opportunities to the rest of the aspirant army of self-employed survivalists.[104]

Elsies River was characterised further by a high percentage of its population originating from the rural areas,[105] where the intake of considerable quantities of liquor is institutionalised in the Tot System.[106] The increased difficulty of coping with scarce income opportunities in an urban ghetto setting did little to reduce people's tendency to resort to liquor for a temporary escape. One of the lasting legacies of the Tot System is that it provided a precedent of generations of rural labourers in whose value system high volumes of liquor intake were perfectly

normal, indeed even structurally approved of and encouraged. As Chapter Five will demonstrate, drinking constituted the major recreational activity on farms in the Stellenbosch rural areas on up to 80% of all farms. Coupled to the drinking habit, was the role expectation that once drunk, a person is not accountable for his/her actions, an attitude approximating to condoning anti-social drunken behaviour.[107]

Another factor doubtlessly contributing to high alcohol consumption was the danger of open spaces and the streets. This ethnograhic account of the manner in which Joker and Scarface's shebeen 'ruled' their beat will reveal how dangerous Elsies River was to pedestrians. Given the absence of alternative recreational facilities supplied by the State, the residents were literally forced to spend considerably more time indoors than they would have, had the streets been safer. The likelihood of these factors contributing to high alcohol consumption, I would argue, is considerable. No wonder, then, that a survey of 1971 revealed that "more than 60% of the people in Elsies River had no recreation at all apart from drinking".[108]

Some of these were among the 600 - 1 000 residents who fell within the 'jurisdiction' of the shebeen run by Joker, Scarface and their gang. Not all the residents in their beat were serious drinkers, however, nor were they all from the poorest of the residents in Elsies River. Those families that had more than one breadwinner in regular

employment, and whose aspirations included giving their children as good an education as circumstances permitted were less likely to spend a considerable percentage of their income at Joker's shebeen. There was clearly a body of residents whose response to their predicament in Elsies River in 1980 did not entail escape into liquor and other drugs. Their response or that of their children was more aggressive in challenging the State to provide adequate collective consumption items such as better schooling, and to provide them in a way that would not reproduce 'Coloured' and Black pupils in the apartheid mould.[109]

The school boycotts of 1980, boosted by the red meat boycott and then the bus boycotts clearly demonstrated that different groupings in the community had different strategies of coping with their situation.[110] The school-children challenged the State to meet their demands by organised, restrained political action, whereas the gangs exploited the momentary inability of the police to cope with any contingencies in a glut of opportunistic materialism.

When I questioned them about their role in the unrest, Joker and his entire gang gleefully responded that "Wanner die studente politiek maak, dan doen Gam free shopping".[111] They had 'worked' very hard during the nights of the worst confusion, carting trolleyloads of cigarettes, sweets and other groceries out of the damaged shops. In principle they agreed with the process of slamming the State - a very powerful theme

permeating gang ethic is striking back, in a material sense, at the haves of society and the bearers of power regardless of colour. But they did not in the early eighties envisage such an abstract, long term form of retaliation as boycotting or work stoppages. They were, of course, in no structural position to do so in any case. Politics was then still considered 'dirty' and 'really criminal' as opposed to their 'honest' property crimes and illicit dealings. Some of them had internalised Government propaganda that labelled all political dissent as Communistic.[112]

The gang was thus more preoccupied, in a 'business' sense, with that sector of the Elsies River community which had not chosen to challenge the State overtly and through organised action. It was usually, but not always, the poorer sector of the community that found the goods and services that Joker's shebeen offered as a crutch to survival. The crutch was mainly procured on credit. Whenever cash resources had been depleted, and whenever the nearest grocer refused to sell more goods "on the book" (if he/she sold on credit at all) Joker's shebeen became the last resort for groceries, liquor, drugs, money-loans, or select durables.

The price to be paid for extending consumption beyond their available means, however, entailed more than mere repayment in currency, it involved becoming subject to Joker's rule. In this sense the gang literally became the police, albeit the private police, of the area.

Most obviously, when credit payments became due, Joker either summoned the debtor to the shebeen by sending a gangster to fetch him/her or instructed the gangster to collect the money. Failure to pay invited a whole repertoire of measures ranging from subtle threats regarding the withdrawal of protection offered by the shebeen enterprise through to direct or indirect violence. The maintenance and reproduction of the shebeen's market necessitated the physical protection of its clientele and their families from the more predatory and hedonistic exploits of the off-duty gangsters. To the families most prone to victimisation of the gangs by virtue of poor defences[113] (eg. non-assertive characters, strongest member working night shift or returning from distant work-place late at night, insufficient reciprocal support networks with neighbours and friends, physically exposed living quarters) this constituted a very real incentive to becoming regular customers, and once established to remain so.

The few memorable examples of 'debt collection' which marked the shebeen's rise to power and credibility were vivid enough, and fearsome enough to ensure a low rate of debt default. Scarface and his men had struck on four occasions during my observation period: the mildest example involved breaking down the door of the flat, shattering all the windows, confiscating or appropriating a few chairs, beating up the debtor and threatening his woman and seven year old daughter with rape. The more serious incident

resulted in the debtor being hospitalised suffering from several stab-wounds and head-injuries, all three females in the house raped, two other males, aged 13 and 39 badly beaten up, and their furniture smashed. No-one was reckless enough to lay charges against Scarface and his crew.

The second element of Joker's rule was his continuous attempt to enlarge his sales volume. Existing customers were constantly encouraged to buy more of the same, or a wider variety of goods from the shebeen. Although I was not aware of any overt pressure I detected a strong undercurrent in Joker's selling technique, that it would be advisable, or better for the customer to purchase more from his shebeen. He created the understanding that better customers were 'looked after' better than casual buyers of small quantities.

Closely related to this element, but containing a larger modicum of threatened violence, was the injunction to existing customers not to purchase from any other shebeen marketing the same goods and services. The gang had instructions to keep community members' purchasing habits under surveillance and report to their leaders about buying patterns not in the interest of the shebeen. I have already referred to the gang members having greater licence to attack residents not buying from the shebeen and those buying from the opposition.[114]

This low-key civil war happened on a reciprocal basis at the fringes of the delineated market

areas. Both shebeens in the area attempted to push their sphere of influence beyond their existing borders. The residents of these zones were subjected to the uncertainty of not knowing whose power extended over them and whom to buy from without inviting retaliation. For the duration of my observation, the borders were never static, nor were any agreements reached between Joker's shebeen and its opposition. Joker's power and sphere of influence was slowly but surely expanding throughout 1982, and only began to suffer serious encroachments towards mid 1983.[115]

The remaining two elements of Joker's rule relate to the strategies the shebeen was forced to adopt in order to survive under conditions of illegality. Both relate to information, in police parlance, - evidence.

The community within which the shebeen operated was being subjected to at least two conflicting value systems each imposed by an organisation arrogating to itself the 'right' to use force to implement these values. Joker's organisation with its private police force generated a style of survival, the rules of which the community disobeyed at its peril. Their rules, known to most residents in the area, enjoyed legitimacy at the level of consent only to those who became economically dependent on them. To the rest of the residents their rule was sustained by force or its continuous threat. In opposition to this was the value system imposed by the State

whose most visible representatives relating to enforcement were the police. They too, as could be expected at that time, enjoyed only limited legitimacy in Elsies River. Theoretically speaking, at least they had the greater power of the State backing them, although I noted continuously at the time, that the residents were not sure of which of the two forces actually ruled their beat.

Of vital importance to the shebeen enterprise in its eternal battle for survival was a strong grip, if not a near monopoly, on the amount of information/evidence, about both the shebeen operation and other activities in the area, reaching the police. The residents soon learnt that 'pimping' (informing) about the shebeen's illicit dealings and the gang's exploits was dealt with far more ruthlessly than debtor defaults. Information about the gang's rules and edicts were mostly conveyed through the street kids, all those non-gangsters, aspirant gangsters and others who spend most of their daytime on the streets. They would then inform the adults later in the evenings when they were confined indoors due to the danger of the streets at night. Logistically speaking it was impossible for the gang to identify all sources of betrayal, even if that source was within their area, for it did not have its informers deployed everywhere, but the youngster network was relatively efficient, far more efficient than any network the police had built up.

As the next section will demonstrate, the conflict in value systems, as epitomised by the police and the gang, did not lead the one to attempt to suppress the other entirely. Instead they coexisted in an uneasy alliance, bartering with their assets to achieve their respective goals.[116]

The intimate knowledge of their confined beat, the extensive network of informants, their hold on many of the occupants, and their ability to 'squeeze' information out of chosen victims by 'unorthodox' means gave Joker and Scarface an important bargaining device when negotiating with the police. It was seldom necessary to resort to violence, according to Scarface, because of the knowledge amongst potential victims that it would be extracted anyway, so that it was sufficient in most cases to put up a fearsome threat and a 'light squeeze' to extract at least enough information to start building on.

These, then, were the elements which the shebeen's rule exerted over its customers. In a sense they are the consequences of the 'formal' relationship between the two parties under the circumstances. At the height of their power towards the end of 1982 the two shebeeners estimated that roughly 65% of the residents in their beat were customers.

Towards their non-customers their attitude was one of wary surveillance. They were usually families who were slightly better off than the customers, either by virtue of better skills, fixed jobs, religious beliefs, a greater number

of members at working age - or a combination of these factors. These were often families whose attitude towards shebeening was not supportive and who regarded themselves a cut above the shebeeners and their clients, if not materially, then morally. This was Joker's interpretation of their stance. He in turn, to my surprise, expressed less contempt for them than for his customers. Ironically, he despised his customers for their dependance on all the intoxicants he marketed, for their lack of business enterprise, their submissiveness to ruling class authority, their stupidity. They had sold out to the system ("hulle het gevriet verkoop"), was an oft-repeated saying of his. He felt perfectly entitled to use them for his own enrichment and power. If he did not, someone else would - that is how he saw it.

The moral charge towards his lifestyle issued by the non-customers did have some, if only minor, impact on Joker. More than reacting on a moral level, he resented their smug righteousness emanating from the 'safe' position of law-abiding citizens. It created in him, who constantly had to be on his guard and could seldom relax, an urge to smash that holy complacency. He often rationalised their disapproval as envy, for he and Scarface were probably, at the peak of their power, by far the wealthiest men in their beat. What Joker resented the most, however was his inability to bring them within the ambit of his power through any process of negotiation. The only means open to him was actual or threatened

coercion.

An even greater source of discomfort to him were those residents and their offspring who were involved in the budding community organisations which took up the impetus of the 1980 school boycotts. Their cause was one against which Joker had little objection, he himself expressed anti-State sentiments and maintained that Blacks in this country were getting a rough deal. His response to his position as a 'Coloured' was, however, expressed at an individual, or small group level of street gangs. But he failed to mention that it was mainly his fellow-'Coloureds', not the State, who were the target of his dirty games. Moreover, his collusion with the police, which for him was a necessary compromise towards survival, certainly did not dovetail with the aims of grassroots civic organisations. He was after all part of a distribution chain which facilitated people's individualistic inward escape into an induced selfish consciousness. The emerging civics were intent on achieving exactly the opposite response an outward, organised mass consciousness which challenged the State.

During my three month period in and around the shebeen the degree of Joker's discomfort on this score was still relatively insignificant. Organisation was still at an early phase and popular consciousness had not been generated enough to constitute a major problem for him and his crew. But he already realised at that stage that successful mobilisation of popular

consciousness would in time diminish people's dependence on his most lucrative wares, liquor and drugs. After all, none of the civic organisers and families of politically conscious students were customers of his. His gut feeling was that his regulars were likely to remain more attached to intoxicants than organised ideology; and even if there was a shift, it would be extremely gradual, sufficiently gradual that it would not endanger his livelihood. Yet this did not dispel a feeling of ambivalence about civic organisations at the time.[117] I was not aware of any instructions that he gave to the gangsters to keep a particular eye on the politicos or even harrass them. The surveillance exercised over them was simply part of the routine information gathering ensuring survival of the shebeen business. Nor was I aware of Joker 'selling' any of the politicos to the police. He maintained a waiting and watching stance.

The 'formal' relationship between the shebeen and both its customers and non-customers of the beat arising out of the necessary strategies of reproducing an illicit business was, however, not the only relationship impacting on the community. Outside of their employment by the shebeeners, the gangsters enjoyed relative autonomy, provided it did not damage the shebeen's survival chances.

Apart from their power to 'squeeze', 'lean on', and in a sense police people by virtue of their shebeen functions, the gangsters established their own kind of rule, predominantly at night

and over weekends. It was not solely confined to the 'recreational side of their lives, it embraced the whole ambit of activities and values inherent in gang ideology. Certainly it contained strong overtones of 'nice times', 'lux lewe' or 'afkoel' as they referred to it.[118]

These would involve primarily the communal indulgence in a single or several white pipes if they could afford the 'button'(the opening price varied between R7,50 and R15,00 per tablet at that time), green pipes if they couldn't. (Described on p.100-102 above). Depending on their morale or idiosyncratic inclination of the moment, the pipe-smoking, or desire for more pipes often motivated small forays into some mischief to buy more dope. Depending on the opportunities that presented themselves at the moment, the quest for cash or goods easily convertible into dope sometimes took the form of a conned 'loan' from a sucker whom they happened to come across, or a host of possible non-violent means of getting some cash quickly.[119] Failing that, the laities manning the outposts were often approached to take some dope on credit themselves, having its cost docked off their pay at the end of the week. Then, of course they were also prone to using varying degrees of coercion, depending on how each potential victim responded.[120]

Once doped and excited an air of highly charged volatility developed through the taunting and boasting and dizzy competitiveness.[121] Several times during the observation period these taunts resulted in action by the challenged gangster/s

in order to save face. Thus he/they would attempt to settle an old grudge against some community member by insulting or assaulting either him or someone close to him, or damaging their belongings, and at the same time helping themselves to money, weapons (if any) and easily convertible items. Much of this aggression was also aimed at the gangs adjoining their territory but no major spontaneous forays were conducted during the observation period. Occasionally an individual opposition member was caught and 'cleaned up'[122] but no unsanctioned attacks were directed outside of Joker's and Scarface's orders.

Apart from individual harrassment related to group drug-taking the gangsters had established sufficient precedent of attacks and molestation to establish a common sense rule: Whoever is out on the streets after dark is considered legitimate prey to their whims. The rule firmed into an absolute law over weekends. They controlled the streets quite literally by roaming around looking for opportunities for perks and kicks. Women, under 18 or thereabouts were considered to have 'asked for it' or quasi-consented to sexual predation if they were caught out at night.[123] Most pedestrians were checked out as to who they were, what right they had to be there, what their status was vis-a-vis the shebeen, and whether they were likely to be fruitful targets of a frisking.

On weekends the gang frequently attended discos if they were held not too far outside of safe territory. Here again a whole web of relations

and expectations were common knowledge to most occupants of the hall and surrounding territory. Only part of the purpose of attending was actually to dance. For the rest it was an attempt to establish relative power of rival gangs who colonised certain areas of the hall, on the one hand, and to establish their style and power to the other teenagers attending the disco on the other. A perennial theme of their togetherness was the symbolic and actual demonstration of their power to the community and their rivals.[124] For the most part though these public demonstrations were usually clandestine, under cover of darkness, or to victims who where substantially outnumbered. They did not in any way overtly challenge organisations and institutions other than that of their own calibre or level.[125]

While their grouping as a gang signalled a differentiation from the rest of the community in terms of survival strategies and the consciousness which represented their unity, it must not be forgotton that they are theoretically cast within the informal sector in this study. Wilkinson and Webster emphasize that the unit of reproduction and consumption should be conceived of as the working class family, or household and that it should therefore be

"located conceptually within the web of kinship relations, social networks, voluntary associations and community and class relations which condition its role as the basic unit of individual consumption and reproduction in capitalist society".[126]

In this context an examination of the gangsters' relation to their own family as well as their surrogate family (the gang)[127] seems apposite.

Pinnock has argued that the majority of gangsters are from families whose conventional structure has been interfered with in the process of shaping the working class to the needs of monopoly capital.[128] In the cell of BFK's/Dobermans of Elsies River that I observed, fourteen of the fifteen core gangsters belonged to households/families that did not feature a 'normal' makeup of relationships; four gangsters' households had no father-figure at all; six had a 'sat' or 'pap' (ie. weak or spent) father-figure, and a commensurately poor relationship with him. The predominant comments were that he was not a man, a 'pop' (literally doll but with female, whorish, sell-out, traitor connotations).[129] Four others had fathers who had been gangsters in their time but had cooled off and taken up employment if they could find it. The relation to these fathers were not spoken of very enthusiastically among the gangsters, as the old generation, while having a certain mystique surrounding 'old Cape Town' around them, were considered rather lame or tame by the youngsters of the eighties. The single exception who had a strong father-figure was doubly exceptional because she was the only full-time female 'accredited' member of the gang.[130] Her father had been the leader of the Sly Corners gang of Elsies when it was still a sea of shanty yards.[131] He was still highly respected, and his children were allowed safe passage in the beat. He now

worked as a temporary cook on commercial cargo vessels and spent intermittent periods of three months at sea.

By comparison, two of the fifteen had no mother figure, seven of the mother-figures were in full-time employment and six stayed at home or worked in temporary jobs only. In the majority of cases (nine) the mother-figure was considered the dominant household member by the gangsters, despite all the chauvinistic attitudes and prejudices they harboured. Eight of the gangsters maintained that their parents knew about their gang membership, while the rest, including the girl, claimed that their parents didn't know that they were fully-fledged members - they simply thought that they hung around with 'bad company'.[132] As can be expected, those whose parents didn't know about their membership were supposed to be looking for work and contributing to the household income. Nine of the gangsters actually did contribute fairly regularly, but when they did, it was a far lower proportion of their earnings than children in formal employment were expected to. At that level of family subsistence children up to their 21st year (and quite often beyond) are expected to hand over their full wages to the family (usually the mother-figure) and are given pocket-money in return. None of the contributing gangsters forfeited more than R20,00 a week to the household although they were averaging, perks included, at least R70,00 a week, which was relatively high for that neighbourhood.[133] Their contributions were normally

R10,00 to R15,00 and only given when they were nagged for it.

Occasionally they brought home durables such as gas cookers and kitchen utensils, spoils from 'jobs' they had pulled. In the families that were ignorant of gang membership, the origins of these gifts were disguised.[134] If contributions to the family/household were less than the desired amount, then contributions to their own offspring and mothers of their offspring were negligible. The gangsters regarded their non-support or abysmally meagre support of their offspring as both a signal of power over their 'kinders' (literally children, but here referring to the mothers of their children), reinforcing their playboy, carefree studdish image of themselves, and a defiant stand not to comply with the law of the Boere. They regarded the fact that the girl had benefited by their power, aura, protection and stud-services ('sy het volgeraak' - literally she was filled up) as being sufficient reward without[135] needing regular material support.[136]

This low level of financial involvement in the family was paralleled by a generally low commitment to the other aspects of family life. With the exception of the girl member of the gang, and to a lesser extent the others whose parents didn't know, they did not attend meals regularly - only when it suited them. Their rendering of emotional and material support to various members of the family was too erratic to contain any discernable trends. They usually simply used the household as a place to sleep and keep their clothes and

other meagre belongings. They continuously presented the family with an erroneous version of their survival methods and gang activities, and kept stringing insistent parent figures along with promises about changing for the better and attempting to look for work. If the pressure increased, they either pandered to the parents for a while by bringing home larger weekly contributions, or alternatively withdrew for a week or more, staying with a gang-brother, if that was possible.

By contrast their involvement in the gang as a surrogate family evidenced a far higher level of commitment. They spent as much time as they could wrest from their household with their brothers and the aspirant gangsters and hangers-on as described above.

(v) SHEBEENS AND THE POLICE

The attitude of the police and their 'management' procedures towards shebeens crucially shape the strategies which shebeeners have to adopt in order to survive. Neither of these elements are static phenomena, nor do they necessarily follow uncontradictory patterns. The manner in which liquor is distributed to the working class is the outcome of a host of converging and sometimes contradictory motivations of people and bodies on either side of the divide. The aim of this section is to demonstrate how Joker's shebeen served the aims and interests of a small group of policemen who were responsible for his beat, and how his cooperation with them diminished

his credibility amongst the gangsters and the community to such an extent that it ultimately broke his business.

Some of the facets that demonstrate the interactional milieu between Joker, the community, the gang and the police have already been covered above in the previous two sections and will only warrant a mention here. Moreover, this section needs to be read in conjunction with Pinnock's analysis 'Policing the Apartheid City' in the South African historical context.[137] Without it the following interactional account loses its broader relevance or validity for further generalisation.

By the time he had moved to Elsies, Joker had gathered enough experience both on the street and in prison to know that 'playing' the 'Boere' was a fine art that achieved good results. Central to this handling technique, he assured me, was the ability to get what you wanted by making the Boere believe he was deciding things for you and what's more, getting more than he was giving. Joker had to feign submission, co-operativeness and above all manageability. If his gang's activities or the fraças surrounding the shebeen attracted too much attention, the police would have felt obliged to demonstrate their power by closing him down for a little while. Manageability was the key consideration which influenced the police decision as to which shebeen to back, and which to close down.

There were two branches of the police whose blessing he needed in order to operate safely. The traffic police, and the local beat-men. Initially the traffic police weren't a problem, as his supplies were procured by hired taxi, whose driver had made his own deals with the traffic police. But once he drove his first second-hand car, questions such as the validity of his drivers licence and his registration papers needed some interpretative contortions before they were satisfactory, and to this end it became necessary for the traffic police to consider it advisable not to prosecute him. Gifts, goods, promises of good behaviour and low-key operations did the trick and they chose to overlook the questionable roadworthiness of his station-wagon into the deal. In turn it became the task of the two patrol-men concerned to somehow convince their colleagues that any problems with Joker would be dealt with by them, or should be referred to them.

The other branch of the police, perhaps more important, were the local patrol-men. At the time he set up business, the nearest station was some 2 km away from his home, but one of the 'Coloured' constables inhabited a council semi-detached house not far away from Joker's home. He was logically Joker's first acquaintance, and required a bolder approach than a white policeman would have necessitated. Initial offers of a case of favourite drink were followed by 'long-term loans at favourable interest rates', augmented with offers of information about 'trouble' in the area. This contact led to the

patrol-man notifying the local detectives about this potential source of valuable information. A meeting took place in August 1981 at which Joker undertook to act as an information channel for crimes in his area. At the same time the police tacitly allowed his shebeen to continue provided it remained low-profile. This deal was not reported to Joker's underlings, it remained his personal trump-card. He made a regular habit of getting the latest news about people in his locality both from the gangsters and his customers. He developed a special habit of extracting more than usual information from customers who were behind in their payments to him, and were obviously keen to ingratiate him with information rather than money. This knowledge in turn reinforced their dependence on his goodwill, which could always be fostered by buying more goods and liquor from him.

Joker built up a very useful store of information about people, relationships, secrets, crimes in the area within a fairly short time. By the end of 1981 he was meeting with the CID Officer on a weekly basis, exchanging information for protection and sometimes for money in more serious cases. To him it was a method of extending his power over his 'jurisdictional' area. People who were a threat, nuisance, or a source of disloyalty to him were easier to 'sell' to the police than residents on whose custom he relied for his profitable existence. He obviously chose his victims carefully so that it did not interfere with the business.

Three developments complicated this straightforward relationship. Firstly, Scarface's arrival towards mid-November 1981 and their branching out into dope dealing. Scarface was a far greater purist in terms of gang ideology than Joker, and was considered more dangerous and less manageable by the police. This compromised Joker a little but he assured them that he would attempt to keep Scarface under control. Scarface on the other hand got to know about the police liaison and was very wary of it.

Secondly the dope dealing exposed them to a third branch of the police force, which they considered inaccessible from the point of view of 'deals' - the Drug Squad. Joker's police contact found out about it through opposition gang informants and expressed great irritation about it to him, because the Drug Squad often don't even inform either the patrolmen or CID of an impending raid - allowing no time for tip-offs.[138] His irritation was probably motivated by the Drug Squad's interference in his information networks and carefully nurtured relationships - all of which would have to be rebuilt after a successful drug-raid. As it happened, the Drug Squad did not strike until late August 1983, despite probably receiving information about Joker's shebeen from the opposition shebeeners.

Thirdly, the expansion of the shebeen heightened the street-presence of the gangsters in its service, as well as the off-duty activities of the laities. Furthermore, the attempts at

weakening the opposition shebeens created sufficient public show of violence to warrant police interference. The local police stepped up their daytime mobile patrols of the area in an attempt to convince the residents that they still ruled that part of Elsies. Whenever they came across some of the laities, they'd be stopped and frisked for drugs and weapons. Flashy looking jackets or watches were an immediate cause for suspicion and the laities were expected to prove the legitimate sources of such items. Most of them did not wear watches for this reason and usually bought their clothes at one or few places only, so that shop assistants would recognise them when they were brought into the shop for merchandise identification and confirmation of a legitimate sale.

This increased policing did not diminish the shebeen's turnover. It did, however, place a larger burden on Joker to ingratiate himself and his crew to the police by offering more concessions or services.

One of these was cooperating with the police in identifying opposition gang-members. Some of the laities told me how Joker instructed them to travel with the police in the patrol vehicles (with their balaclavas disguising their identities) pointing out and identifying members of the Cisko Yakkies and Sicilian Kids to the police. This service, they said, earned them a short-term respite from the continuous frisking and police harrassment.

The second was far more dangerous to Joker. It was the source of potential rebellion against his leadership, and ultimately led to the break-up with Scarface as a partner. It was the process of 'selling' select laities to the police, particularly for crimes committed independently of the shebeen's range of activities. These were usually cases of housebreaking or robberies involving larger amounts than usual. Joker was, however, shrewd enough to divulge the information in such a way that neither Scarface nor the laities were absolutely sure that it came from him. Three factors sustained this uncertainty. Firstly, Joker was adamant that he did not sell his own brothers to the Boere. He acted extremely hurt when suggestions were made that he had pimped. He frequently flew into raging tempers at such suggestions; the two such outbursts that I witnessed were excellent displays of acting (if he was feigning). Secondly, he insisted that no witnesses, not even Scarface, be present at these meetings with the police on the pretext that the police insisted on that format.[139] To my knowledge I was unaware of his divulging the specific content of these to anyone although he spoke frequently about his style of handling/placating the police. Thirdly, he did manage to 'rescue' some of the laities from time to time when they were picked up for suspected crime. What is commonly referred to in gang slang as "om die saak te tol" (to trick oneself or one's friends off a charge or case) was Joker's method of demonstrating his power over the police to drop charges or pursue a different suspect. Whether

these rescue demonstrations were set up right from the outset by arrangement with the police, remained uncertain. No-one could say so definitely, but both Scarface and the laities suspected very strongly that at least some of the rescues were rigged. During the three months of my close contact with the gang altogether nine successful rescue bids were made.[140] During the same period eleven additional laities were arrested and charged.[141] Six of them were rescued by a process involving Doekom, Attorney and "om die saak te tol"(in this context: 'cooking' the evidence). The others received a range of punishments from lashes to prison sentences.

Joker thus managed to walk the tightrope between credibility with the police and the gang by keeping both parties supplied with partial information, and partial demonstrations of this usefulness to each side.

The police, in turn, reciprocated by giving Joker tip-offs; whether these which were given by Joker's contact patrol-men (fairly low-ranking policemen), were supplied with the knowledge of their superiors is difficult to say. It is possible that the raids were conducted in good faith by some members of the raiding contingent without their being aware of the tip-off. Two such raids were conducted between October 81 and January 82, but in both cases they were unsuccessful in finding any incriminating evidence. Both times Joker had received at least 12 hours notice and was able to manoevre his way out of trouble. Of course the contact men were handsomely rewarded for their

tip-offs.

How much contact existed between the local police and the Drug Squad is again impossible to assess with certainty. But it is strange that Joker's shebeen was allowed to exist for nearly two years before it was raided by the Drug Squad for the first time in May 1983. Prior to that they must have been receiving repeated leads from opposition shebeens about both dagga and mandrax dealings. It is indeed puzzling as to why they responded so slowly considering the speed with which they reacted to Joker's orchestrated complaints when he launched his campaign against the opposition big buyer.[142] One possible explanation is that they were requested by the patrol-police and detective branch not to destroy their source of information (and unofficially, 'perks').[143]

If one compares the police harrassment of the shebeen itself with non-shebeen policing, then the laities were the recipients of (by far) the greater proportion of attention. This was not solely attributable to Joker's liaison with the police, his financial muscle, and his usefulness as a source of information. It was influenced also by the function of the laities in the shebeen business and their extraneous activities. They were the most visible manifestation of the business through their guarding functions, manning of outposts, squeezing debt defaulters, fighting opposition members, smashing opposition shebeens and extracting information by unorthodox techniques. These activities were still tolerated by the community, or so it seemed, as quasi-official

functions relating to the shebeen. They affected predominantly the community members who were in the business, or customers of the business. They were understood to constitute the hazards of choosing to be a customer of a trader in the shebeen game. Consequently the level of complaint to the police about this range of activities was far lower than about extra-shebeen exploits such as housebreaking, theft, robbery and assault. This was partially attributable to Joker's power and partially due to the potential complainant's complicity in illegal dealings. But the extra-shebeen activities were not a logical concomitant of shebeening. There was therefore a greater feeling of being outraged and wronged on the part of the victims of such crimes.[144] As Joker was not directly accountable for these deeds and didn't take it upon himself to restrain the laities (except when it affected his customers), the only power group residents could resort to were the police. The exception to this trend were the rape-victims, who more often than not had no-one to turn to other than their immediate family.[145]

In this sense, the gang's extra shebeen crimes contributed towards legitimising the police in a community that had little reason otherwise to see the police as its protectors.[146] Processing laities through the justice machine (police, courts, reformatory or prison) kept up the facade of maintaining both law and order. It also contributed towards the police being seen as exercising a modicum of power over that community, making up the more formal component of what was considered township rule. The informal component was exercised

by the likes of Joker in this uneasy alliance of power.

The gang's predation on the community was an important source of bargaining strength to Joker in his dealings with the police. Not only did it deflect attention from his own illicit business, but it provided him with a lever of power over the laities, he could trade information about their break-ins and robberies, etc. for protection of his shebeen and in addition could claim that he was doing the community a service.[147] The importance of this power is highlighted by the discretion which he himself was able to exercise in deciding which of his laities to 'sell' to the justice machine. After receiving complaints or charges from residents, the police developed the habit of consulting Joker regarding the case. He was thus in a position to exert some influence over the course of the investigation through his recommendations, protestations, or 'advice'.

He was obviously loathe to lose good guards or gangsters, and was more inclined to make a special effort to 'rescue' those whom he and Scarface needed most. On the other hand the less controllable laities and those most hostile to his poor gang relation to them were more dispensible. These gangsters were more likely (than Joker's faithfuls) to face complete processing through the justice machine with his blessing.[148]

The shebeen's continued expansion was predicated on a level of sacrifice of information and manpower which contained the kernel of its demise. The

growth continued, albeit at a slower pace, after January 1982, until major feuds started developing by May 1983 over Joker's pimping. By that stage I was no longer intensively observing developments and it became too dangerous for me to return to the shebeen.[149] My information about this phase of developments is derived from my main contact, guide and protector - one of the laities (19 years of age in May 1983).

Increasing circumstantial evidence about his pimping resulted in a loss of allegiance from the gangsters. Twice,[150] when Scarface was absent,[151] a secessionist group of the laities cleaned out the shebeen, held Joker at gunpoint, robbed him of all his loose cash and threatened to kill him and rape his wife. Scarface's leadership was substantially compromised by Joker's actions and he withdrew from the partnership after the second raid. Joker was left with some of the more dependent stragglers of the gang as guards. Scarface had taken with him three of his most trusted 'brothers' when he left. Joker's sales must have dropped substantially after the split. His diminishing usefulness as an informant and source of perks to the police could have something to do with the timing of a drug-squad raid for dagga and mandrax in August 1983. Although, according to my informant, they found sufficient quantities to sustain a successful prosecution for dealing, Joker managed somehow to squirm out of it. One can only speculate about the disincentives to prosecution that he might have offered.

Shortly after the raid Joker deemed it advisable to move out of the dangers he had landed himself in, both in terms of the gangs and the police. He found a house to rent in Garden Village, Somerset West,[152] where he commanded his, by now familiar cycle of setting up business as a 'broker'. By May 1984 the small community had mustered enough support against him and his shebeen to have him evicted.[153] His destination, as was the case with so many gangsters from many Cape Flats Townships, was Mitchell's Plain, where , I am told, he has started up his shebeen yet again.[154]

This case study of Joker's shebeen reveals a style of illicit distribution that is by no means unusual in the Western Cape. Evidence led in the gang-murder case of S v Lionel Foster and six others, augmented by taped interviews I was able to do with three of the accused in the court cells, demonstrate substantially similar relationships and processes happening on the opposite side of the Cape Flats. This case seemed to be 'engineered' by a shebeener, and reputed gangleader, Daniel Jacobs, whose gang nickname is "Kaffir Des". What is distinctive about his style of operation, is that he operates on a far larger scale than Joker did (he has three houses, selling from two of them, 'employing' over forty gangster-guards), and recruits his guards from the reformatories, both Porter and Ottery (shool of industries). He is the reputed leader of the BFK's in the country, and has, according to the interviewees, a similarly contradictory relationship to the police. The fact that the accused were tried at all was

attributable to Des's 'selling' six of them, all former or current employees of his shebeen, to the detective branch and offering his three henchmen as State witnesses to complete the deal. The main purpose of the 'sale' seems to have been an attempt by Des to implicate an opposition shebeener, accused No 1, in murder and thereby diminish competition. An indication of the size of his business was given by the three BFK's I interviewed. One hundred four-and-a-half litre cans of wine and one hundred cases of quarts of beer constitute the average sales volume at one of his two outlets each Friday night.

From Grassy Park (the location of Des's shebeen) to Elsies River and Mitchell's Plain, the style of shebeening, above a certain scale, in 'Coloured' townships of the Western Cape is substantially the same as that described in the case study above. The control methods adopted by the police are thus likely to be replicated in their material characteristics, allowing for nuances of stylistic differences arising out of personality factors. Thus, when we talk about policing illicit liquor distribution in 'Coloured' areas, the pattern is generalisable from this single case study.[156]

D CONCLUSION

The style of liquor distribution (peculiar) to the population inhabiting the 'Coloured' townships of the Western Cape has been shaped by the interaction of four major forces, each experiencing conflict in its own terms and in its own sphere. They are: firstly, the economically and politically

important representatives of liquor capital, both primary (the grape-farmers, hop growers, grain growers, etc), secondary (wine makers, distillers and breweries), and tertiary (the distributors), all intent, though at times by contradictory methods, on securing continued accumulation. Secondly, there are those groupings who, for religious or moral-cum-philanthropic reasons, oppose unlimited distribution, and are joined by fractions of non-liquor capital from time to time when their own accumulation is being threatened by the effects of too liberal a distribution dispensation. Thirdly, there is the State, having to negotiate its way through the process of shaping the working class to the sometimes conflicting demands of capital in general, while constantly ensuring that its range of cooptive and coercive measures enables it to sustain control over the regionally variable manifestations of working class resistance. Fourthly, there is the target population itself, by no means an unidentified entity, (since the inhabitants of the townships), respond to their material conditions by a range of sometimes conflicting organisational and individual means.

Legal liquor distribution in 'Coloured' townships came to be vested in 'Coloured' hands as part of the State's cooptive strategy to foster a 'Coloured' middle class following the Sharpeville and Langa disturbances in 1960. However, the number of legal retail outlets in 'Coloured' areas which were ultimately allowed, and the regulations applying to opening hours, credit, etc. which

were applied, after due consideration having been given to the vociferous anti-distribution lobby, was such that the existing illicit distributors were left with considerable scope for lucrative income opportunities. Since these opportunities provided one of the few and certainly most lucrative possible ways of making a living for the large number of unemployed people who constituted the reserve army of labour, considerable competition developed for control of them.

Beyond all but the most insignificant scale of distribution shebeening could only function by means of organised groups - the street gangs. Only they were adequately equipped in terms of manpower, fighting strength, and negotiating shrewdness to sustain illicit distribution under conditions of stiff competition.

The manner in which these gangster-shebeeners conducted their businesses took on a form by which their henchmen, their gangster-guards, became like a private police force which wielded considerable power over the shebeen's market territory - the residents of the 'Coloured' townships. The nature of this power was such that it favoured frequenters of the shebeens with physical protection whereas it exposed non-customers to physical and material predation. This coercive control substantially inhibited mobility within the township and probably contributed to a retardation of organisational activity of a political and recreational nature that would otherwise have occurred. By confining residents

to their dwellings to a greater extent, the gang-rule limited their recreational options and probably contributed to a higher reliance on intoxicants, both liquor and other drugs which the shebeens purveyed. Slightly less coercive in nature was the method of locking customers into a perpetual cycle of financial dependence by means of credit sales. Shebeeners often consciously encourage customers to over-purchase at the shebeen so that they acquire greater power over them which can then be used to extract favours and information.

Some of the functions which shebeeners' gangs perform in the course of reproducing the shebeen business overlap with the interests of the State in keeping township residents under control and disorganised. It is therefore not surprising that the police do not attempt to eradicate shebeens wholly, but enter into uneasy alliances with them in terms of which they cooperate on matters of common interest. Central to this cooperation is the understanding that in exchange for information, 'manageability' and perks, the police will allow illicit liquor dealings to take place. By this process of selective enforcement, liquor distribution to the working class acquires a status of quasi-legitimacy. The liquor law relating to distribution in working class areas adopts the character of symbolic legislation only.[157]

This alliance between shebeens and the police, however, functions in a contradictory manner. On the one hand it entrenches the power and influence of the shebeener, because he becomes an important source of information to the police about crimes

committed in the area and the activities of opposition shebeeners. The discretion he exercises in the course of choosing suspects is obviously to his benefit, as he is hardly likely to report people who are important to him. Indirectly therefore he uses the police to prosecute people who are a nuisance to him and his business. On the other hand, most large shebeens also deal in other drugs, which fall under the responsibility of a less accessibly bribeable unit of the police force - the Drug Squad. Although I suspected some liaison between the police and the Drug Squad in the case of the shebeener in the case study, it was impossible to verify. The conflicting methods of arriving at their specific goals often results in the Drug Squad destroying painstakingly nurtured alliances between shebeeners and the police.

The criminal activities of the street gangs outside of the immediate shebeen-sphere are a source of major conflict between shebeener and the gang. It is these crimes such as housebreaking, robbery and assault which the police pursue with the greatest seriousness in order to gain legitimacy within townships where their image is tainted, to say the least, by their invidious position as the most immediate manifestation of the apartheid state. It is for information about these crimes, not for illicit distribution, that they exert their greatest pressure on the shebeener. It is for these crimes that he sacrifices one or more of his henchmen from time to time in order to ensure the perpetuation of the shebeen. But it is this very betrayal which, if it becomes

apparent to the gangsters, is potentially disastrous for him and his shebeen. It runs counter to the fundamental tenet of gang ideology: - solidarity. Yet it is the platform of shebeen survival.

Illicit liquor distribution therefore takes place in a manner which is not only divisive of the working class itself, but of the gangs that are its major vehicles. These divisions are encouraged by the methods the police employ in controlling the 'Coloured' working class.

CHAPTER 5

THE REPRODUCTION OF AGRICULTURAL LABOUR AND THE TOT SYSTEM

A INTRODUCTION

The winefarmers of the Western Cape have, since the beginning of wine production some 330 years ago, obtained and controlled their labour by means that can only be described as coercive.[1]

Despite the effective abolition of slavery in 1838, winefarmers have prevailed successfully on the incumbents of State power for a set of legal controls by which their labour force would remain occupationally and spatially immobile, unorganised, underemployed, dependant, underskilled, and poor. Numerous historians have commented that little change seems to have taken place in the conditions under which the labour force has worked for the last 150 years.[2] While this remains a truism for the majority of farmers in the area under consideration, Stellenbosch-Somerset-West a growing minority (roughly 20% in 1984) have realised that co-optive methods have their merits.

Coercive control is exercised through a host of structures and practices, some facilitated by legislation, others by practices the farmers themselves have developed. One of the main practises facilitated by legislation and applied electively by the farmers, is the provision of liquor on a regular daily basis to the labour force. The tot system is notably absent among farmers who have chosen the cooptive methods of maintaining and reproducing their labour force.

The tot system's major advantage to farmers has customarily been interpreted as facilitating spatial immobility of the labour force - countering the lure of the towns. The institutionalised alcohol dependence of the labourers has also provided the means of motivating labourers to work. "They won't work without their dop", is a common retort of the farmers.

The prospect of locking cheap labour onto the farms also motivated farmers outside the winegrowing area of the Cape to utilise this cheap, convenient method of control. The apple-growing area, Elgin, as well as the wheat-growing areas around Caledon have a sprinkling of farms that "goei dop" [3]

The same rationale was used by Transvaal farmers experiencing labour supply problems in the late 1920's. They urged the select committee investigating liquor legislation to recommend the extension of the tot system to other provinces. However, they could not muster enough support for their stance. Consequently the potential application of the tot system was curtailed in the ensuing legislation, the Liquor Act (No 30) of 1928.[4]

Again in 1951-2 a select committee was instructed to investigate the extension of the tot system to northern farmers.[5] In 1957 more than 100 Transvaal farmers admitted at a conference of the Transvaal Agricultural Union to have defied the law and introduced the tot system there. "The sooner native farm labourers were supplied with liquor, the sooner would there be a stable labour force on the farms" was the gist of their argument.[6]

The ensuing legislation, the 1961 Liquor Amendment Act (No 72) contained an artful avoidance of the issue of paying labour with wine. On the face of it, the tot system was outlawed as part of the wage, but there was no prohibition on the free dispensation of liquor.

The drafters thus satisfied both the abolitionists and the farmers.

The tot system's effect, however, reaches far beyond mere procurement, retention, and motivation of labour. It influences the skilling process of both the totted labourer and his whole family, and it constitutes one of the important ideological pillars on which labour control rests. In short, it is a key element in both general and extended reproduction of agricultural labour. Herein lies part of the explanation of its efficacy even into the eighties.

One needs to be reminded that there are several substantial differences between the reproduction of rural as opposed to urbanised labour. In an urban environment it is usually the State that is called on by capital to bear the major cost of supplying collective consumption items, such as housing. In the rural context, where the site of production and reproduction is the same farm, the farmer as employer carries a far larger burden of reproduction than his urban counterparts. Not only does he have to house the labourers and their families (unless they are migrants), he has to educate them on the job. Even the education of the children is subject to greater farmer control through the farm schools.[7]

Any demands the urban working class may have against the ruling class are usually fragmented into different organisational channels such as trade unions, student's representative councils, and grassroots civic organisations. They address the employers, National Government's Education authorities, and local authorities respectively. The struggles are thus dispersed. But

in the farming context all these struggles are usually compacted into one single polarity between capitalist, farmers and labour.

Farming capital, having to carry a comparatively heavy burden, has prevailed on the State to equip it with control mechanisms by which the individual farmer and his family can keep the many labourers and their families docile, and disorganised, and dependent. The way in which the tot sytem operates contributes to the success of all three of these attributes. For those farmers to whom coercive control is the only perceived option the tot system has been and still is essential. For them it is the ideological device by which coercive measures are concealed behind the labourer's own addiction. It is they who have manoeuvred and lobbied to keep the system in operation against all the mounting opposition.

The opposition to the tot goes back a long way. The Temperance agitation under the auspices of missionaries and templars in the 1840's was energetic and met with some success in curtailing distribution in general, but had no success against the tot system.[8] For the ensuing years agitation against the tot seems to have always been only a spin-off of a larger debate - the prohibition of liquor consumption by Blacks. By 1915 the Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church recommended that the tot system be curtailed by limiting the quantities of wine paid to labourers. The Baxter Committee of 1918, investigating drunkenness in the western districts, came close to recommending the abolition of tot as wages, but could not achieve the necessary majority. The Liquor Act of 1928 limited the amount of daily wine as wage to one and a half

pints (approx. 852 cc).[9]

The Cape Coloured Commission of 1937 recommended its abolition, as did the 1945 Meaker Report.[10] The 1960 Malan Commission's tenor was toward the deregulation of the tot. Farmers should be free to decide for themselves whether to administer the tot, and if so, how much.[11] Since then the Erika Theron Commission recommended that no liquor be supplied to labourers before or during work days.[12]

Even certain sectors of the liquor industry are opposed to the tot. Predictably they are those fractions whose livelihood does not directly depend on it, namely the Breweries, and those who are in the low-price wine market, to whom the tot acts as considerable competition.[13]

During its unillustrious existence the Coloured Persons Representative Council made continued efforts in its liaison with the Cape Agricultural Union to recommend the cessation of administering tot to farm labour.[14]

All these efforts have had some impact on most of the farmers in the area under consideration. In 1976 when I first commenced making superficial inquiries amongst the labourers on 16 farms, it was still fairly common to find farmers administering five dops a day plus a bottle at night. The dop frequency was then 'invaldop' at clock-in time (varying seasonally from 6 am to 7 am), 'brekfisdop' at 8.00 am; 'teetyd' dop at 11.00 am; 'smiddagsdop' at lunchtime; 'vieruur' dop at 4 pm, and 'tshailadop' whenever they knocked off (between 6 pm and 7.30 pm). On weekends each labourer was given a dop and a bottle on Saturday.

All overtime and special favours, as well as regular weekend work was paid for by dop, but since this work fell outside of the normal working contract, it was considered immune from the 1961 Liquor Amendment Act's prohibition on payment in liquor. Most farmers customarily classified overtime as voluntary work for which the free gift of liquor was volunteered in return!

Women were, in 1976 still fairly frequent recipients of the tot. Whenever they worked full days they received two tots during work and a half-bottle at night. Children under sixteen were not, to my knowledge, given any wine as payment, but stories abound of how some farmers, as a joke, give wine to the children (between seven and sixteen) occasionally, just to see them floundering about.

These 1976 quantities already signal a substantial reduction in the quantity of liquor given to labourers. Interviews with old labourers indicate that in the 1940's, particularly if the farmer still made his own wine and brandy on the farm (ie. he had not yet joined the cooperative movement) far higher quantities were administered. Firstly the size of each tot was larger. The pilchard-tin, today's standard measure, was then represented on five of nine farms by the 'beeshoringdop' - literally the ox-horn. Secondly, apart from males getting their regular five, and women a regular three, the tshailadop was usually not only a single beeshoringdop, but several, depending on how well-disposed or generous the farmer felt. The labourers talk about staggering home at night drunk, still armed with their full bottles.

By 1984 dop quantities have diminished considerably. Only one in eighteen farms surveyed administers five-a-day plus bottle. Six give three, six give two, three give one dop a day plus the nightly bottle containing 750 mℓ. The remaining three only give a bottle at night. It is interesting to note that all those giving more than one tot and a bottle are exceeding the legal limit of 820 mℓ. None of the 18 farms surveyed had abolished the tot altogether.

The reduction in dop-amounts needs to be contextualised within the broader social and economic forces operating in the Western Cape over the last decade.

B LABOUR SUPPLY, MOBILITY AND THE TOT

It is too simplistic to analyse the dop-labour supply dynamic in terms of more dop - more labour and conversely less dop - less labour. While the tot system is an important pillar of labour supply for 'Coloureds'it must be contextualised within the totality of forces that have a bearing on social representation.

Firstly the area under consideration is situated roughly half way between Stellenbosch and Somerset West and is in relatively easy commuting distance of the two. It is even within commuting distance of Cape Town,(approx. 35 km) even if that is more expensive and time-consuming.

Although it is an area with a relative abundance of agricultural labour compared with the more outlying areas, the proximity to the towns and the city constitutes a continuing tension.[15] Not only in terms

of labour supply but the tensions are experienced in the different values that operate in the towns and countryside. In the value-system operating in the towns farm labour is regarded as dead-end, low-pay and entails a worker-employer relationship which degrades the worker. In addition, "the farmers buy their labourers' submission with wine".[16] Young school-leavers who grew up on farms are reluctant to work there, and will usually only resign themselves to it if the whole family's tenure is jeopardised.[17]

This trend should result in an increasing average age of regular 'Coloured' farm workers. The statistics, however, do not bear this out. But there is a cogent explanation for this skewing. The Theron Commission surveys found the average age of all 'Coloured' farm-workers to be 36 in 1973-4.[18] My calculations done in 1984 from four of the farms using coercive methods was an average of 29, 36, 34, 38 respectively, an average of 34.2 years. This is explained by the composition of the young contingent on each farm. At least 50% of that contingent are 'genuine' labourers who grew up into farm labour, and started working from the age of 13 to 16 years. The other half, roughly, are 'rejects' from the system. These are youngsters ranging from 18 to 30 who have either graduated from reformatory or prison and for a variety of possible reasons have chosen not to reintegrate into street gangs but moved out or back to their relatives on the farms. Quite naturally, they seem to help each other finding accommodation/employment, so that small pockets of ex-gangsters are found on some farms. Two of the four above farms each have five such individuals in their labour contingent, the others have four and two respectively.

Another attribute of the young contingent is that a high percentage of the 'non-genuine' labourers have attempted to escape from farm employment, but again for a host of possible reasons, have 'bounced back' onto the farms.[19] Seen together with the ex-prisoners, at least half of the labourers in the research area are the more volatile part of the labour force. They are more mobile than the other half of youngsters.

Thus, notwithstanding an apparent stability in the average age of the 'Coloured' labour force, there is a strong argument to support the contention that most farmers in the survey area who adopt coercive control measures are experiencing, and will experience increasingly, a shortage of regular 'Coloured' labour.

This becomes particularly apparent at peak-demand periods. During the 1983 wine harvest (February to April) six of the 18 farmers had to change their picking programme as a result of labour shortages. They either had to 'borrow' labour from their neighbours or friends once these had hit temporary lulls[20] or otherwise recruit urban labour from Macassar, Kleinvlei, Sarepta (Kuils Rivier) or Langa (Cape Town).

By the time of the 1984 harvest nine of the farmers were forced to augment their picking teams with outside labour. This was compounded by the ever decreasing size of the 'picking family'.

Each labourer contracts, when he takes on agricultural employment to make his family available to the farmer at peak periods. The norm eight years ago was an average picking family of five. By 1984 it had dwindled to three, mainly due to young males working in the

towns.

The farmers have usually attempted to overcome these seasonal fluctuations by taking on migrant labour, 'joiners', for the picking season. Notwithstanding the fact that migrant employment contracts are for a minimum duration of a year, there are enough loopholes in the law, and enough sympathetic officials at the labour bureaux for a farmer to declare them redundant and send them back to the homeland (in this area, usually to Hershel) after the three-month harvest.[21]

Even the changing composition of the regular labour bears out the 'Coloured' labour shortage. The Theron Commission averages the number of inhabitants per farming unit to 58,6 'Coloured' and 2,23 Blacks, but that does not reflect the labourer to labourer ratio.[22]

The table below shows how great the variance can be between some of the farms in the survey area. The predominant explanation, from the farmers' point of view, for a high percentage of Black labourers is simply personal preference. Labourers on those farms, however, aver that it is due to the farmer's heavy-handedness and unreasonable demands that most 'Coloured' labourers are not prepared to work for them.

TABLE A PROPORTION OF BLACK & 'COLOURED' REGULAR MALE LABOURERS ON TEN STELLENBOSCH/SOMERSET-WEST FARMS 1983

FARM NO.	TOTAL REGULAR MALE LABOURERS	BLACK LABOURERS	% OF TOTAL	'COLOURED' LABOURERS	% OF TOTAL
1	16	6	37.5	10	62.5
2	17	10	58.8	7	41.2
3	31	0	0	31	100.0
4	9	0	0	9	100.0
5	13	0	0	13	100.0
6	30	0	0	30	100.0
7	16	8	50.0	8	50.0
8	13	10	76.9	3	23.1
9	19	9	47.3	10	52.7
10	12	7	58.3	5	41.7

Not all Black labourers are hired merely as auxiliary workers during the picking seasons. It is usually only a small proportion of them whose contracts are prematurely terminated, usually the 'difficult' ones, ie. those who 'don't know their place', and insist on their rights, or who work poorly.

The tot system, although administered to the migrants, usually has a different impact on them than on the 'Coloured' labourers, who were literally weaned onto it. The major difference is the length of time it takes to recede into alcohol dependence. The Blacks who are not 'joiners' ie. who have been working in the area for

more than 10 years have, with few exceptions, lapsed into the same state as the 'hooked' Coloured labourers. That entails focussing their aspirations on the short-term gratification of experiencing oblivion through drink as often as time, money, circumstances, and employers will allow - and often even more frequently. Their drinking then goes beyond the bounds of the tot system. They procure more liquor over weekends either in the towns, the farm shebeens, or co-workers - and in the summer make their own 'mos'.[23] Their mobility is substantially impeded by their dependence on alcohol. Doubly so because they are, for influx control purposes, only allowed to work in agricultural employment within a restricted area. Some of these workers have their rights to work in the area limited to one employer only.

The joiners, unlike their more experienced compatriots, still have their obligations to fulfill to families in the homelands, and quite often augment their remittances with proceeds from small scale shebeening. Although they do engage in drinking beyond the tot, which often results in brawls and squabbles over pettynesses and women, they usually do not, within a year's contract period become addicted to liquor. Their mobility is tinged strongly by their 'foreignness'.

The Coloured labour force, on the contrary, experiences a very different dynamic. Nurtured on the tot, paternalism, coercive management, and narrowed horizons, their mobility is usually limited to moving a few farms away to another farmer, who also administers the tot. For those who are hooked even that is usually far too ambitious a course to execute, and it lapses into being a well-nurtured and oft-repeated fantasy.

Groenewald's argument seems to reflect the true position; viz. that labourers move into the Stellenbosch area from smaller towns and more outlying areas, in the possible hope of making it to the towns or city at some later stage. The places of origin of labourers interviewed on four farms bear out the first proposition. They were born, and grew up in places such as Wellington, Worcester, Wolesley, Ceres, Malmesbury, Moreesburg, Upington, Paarl, Grabouw, Caledon, Pniel, Riebeeck Kasteel, and the 'permanent' Blacks usually the Transkei. But the second part of their ambition seems to have been arrested by, amongst other factors, the tot sytem. The average length of time worked on the same farm, 5.28 years belies the fact that the older hooked generation has been on the farm for upward of ten years. At the same time this figure does not reflect the relatively high labour turnover of young labourers. A breakdown of times lived and worked on a farm is given in the following Table B.

TABLE B. AGE, LENGTH OF RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT ON A STELLENBOSCH-AREA WINE FARM - JULY 1983

LABOURER NO	APPROXIMATE AGE	LENGTH OF RESIDENCE	LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT	ABSENCE FROM FARM DOING OTHER WORK
1	55	17	15	
2	39	15	10	5 years
3	21	21	6	2 x 1,5 yrs
4	18	18	3	
5	35	10	10	
6	21	9	2	3 years reformatory
7	20	8	0.25	3 years reformatory
8	29	0.18	0.18	
9	30	0.18	0.18	
10	29	20	20	
11	50	5	5	
12	38	9	9	
13	14	14	0.5	
14	13	10	0.5	
15	27	0.5	0.5	Migrant
16	28	0.5	0.5	Migrant
	Average 29.1	Average 9.83	Average 5.28	

These data are taken from farm No 1 in Table A which has 16 labourers, six of whom are Black, ten of whom are 'Coloured'. The mobility rate, taken in July 1983

shows a far higher degree of stability than if it were taken between February and March. Harvest-time is the period of highest mobility. Firstly because labourers are virtually guaranteed to find employment and accommodation, as well as farmer's assistance in transporting their belongings. Secondly, the farmers are in a weaker position to be too choosy about the quality of labour taken on. Thirdly, there is usually a higher dismissal rate during harvest-time than during the rest of the year. Paradoxical as this may appear, the brawling rate, stabbing-and-injury rate, and the absenteeism-due-to-drunkenness rate are markedly higher during harvest-times than at any other time of the year. Pickers work in teams, usually families, and are paid collectively. Considerable squabbling over how the bulkpayment is to be divided up is a common phenomenon. It is compounded when a labourer outside of that family-team has to be contracted to carry and tip that family's baskets (due to age or weakness of the males in the family-team). Partly attributable to higher liquidity from piece-work picking, and partly to the 'mosblik' custom, intoxication levels run high for those three months on most of the farms in the survey area. The farmers are caught in the difficult paradox of choosing a smaller, more disciplined labour force or a larger, more problematic one.

Before the 1983 harvest, for example, farm no. one took on an additional four labourers with their women and families. The first labourer, engaged on a Friday, did not make it to work on the Monday. His woman, who picked on her own (and had to pay one of the other labourers to carry and tip her filled baskets for her), claimed that he was ill. On Tuesday the farmer went to investigate, and found him to be inebriated, and summarily dismissed him and his wife.

The second labourer was initially an excellent picker. To make things even better he had a wife and three children picking with him. On good days that family alone cut four tons of grapes. The farmer was pleased to have made such a good 'catch' and couldn't work out how anyone could have let that labourer leave his services. After the fourth week of the harvest the labourer was involved in a weekend argument over beer -purchases at the shebeen on the farm. In the ensuing brawl he seriously injured one of the older labourers, thereby ending his working career.[24] The old man's son, who attempted to intervene was also put out of picking-action for a week. The offender left the farm with his family the next morning to escape both the labour reprisals and arrest.[25]

The third labourer was informed on by the 'witvoet' (the informer) of the labour contingent. He was seen, midway into the harvest, attempting to pay for fish-purchases from one of the itinerant hawkers with grapes and butter-nuts stolen from the farm. The farmer gave him the choice of a beating or arrest. He chose the former and was given six lashes with a length of hosepipe and dismissed. The witvoet was rewarded with an extra half-bottle of Vaaljapie.[26]

The fourth labourer brought with him into employment five children ranging in age from seventeen to seven. The eldest worked for a building contractor in Somerset West - a source of irritation to the farmer. The rule for this farm was that no male may live on it unless he works for it. Being harvest-time, and needing the other members of the family, the farm-manager chose to deal with that problem after the harvest. He nonetheless expressed his displeasure about it to the male head of the family. The rest of the family picked

in a team. Three weeks into the harvest the fourteen-year-old son, who had absconded from a Cape reformatory, broke into the farmer's store in which the sixteen Vaaljapie containers (20 litres each) were kept, and decanted the contents of two. His ensuing inebriation, and that of his friends made the identification of the culprits easier, duly aided by the witvoet's betrayal of sworn secrecy - bought with some of the stolen wine. The family head and errant son were summonsed to the farmer and severely reprimanded. The son received a hiding with a fan-belt, and was banned from the farm. As a punitive gesture the eldest son was also banned from the farm. The rest of the family was allowed to stay. The witvoet received an extra half-bottle of Vaaljapie.

The stories related to me by numerous farmers and farm managers at the cooperatives during harvest time were in the same vein as the examples cited above.[27]

It is clear from the above that the influence of the tot on horizontal mobility is mediated by a number of factors. It still, however, remains a valid proposition that the older, addicted labourer is restrained from moving by a combination of factors : one of the strongest of which is his own unwillingness to move due to a dop-induced lack of motivation in general. The second major consideration is his age, which determines strength, and hence employability. The many years of exposure to alcohol renders most labourers 'useless' in the eyes of the farmers beyond the age of 45.[28]

It is also clear from the examples cited that some mobility is actually induced by excessive alcohol consumption, and the conflicts which arise out of it. Without having

done a detailed study of dismissals, I confidently estimate that 70% of mobility among labourers over the age of thirty arises out of dismissals. The majority of these dismissals are due to drink-related actions: absenteeism, violent incidents and thefts from the farm.

Whether it is the pull of liquor-addiction which keeps labourers locked onto one single farm, or the push that liquor-related incidents gives them off the farm, the fact remains that totted labour remains locked into the farming cycle. Upward mobility is, for the great majority of farm labourers who work within the tot system, a near impossibility.[29]

C SKILLING AND THE TOT SYSTEM

Interpreted narrowly, the tot system entails giving male workers an average of one litre of wine a workday, and less on weekends. That alone, already carries strong consequences in terms of health, motivation, attitude to work , recreation, productivity, reliability, and notably, attitude to drinking. It also has a bearing on the type of relationship that is structurally reinforced by the tot, between the male worker (who comes home with a bottle every night) and his family. It virtually predetermines the level of mental and emotional support and guidance a man can give to the family.

If that, alone, were all that the tot system implies, it would already constitute a searing indictment of those who institutionalise it. But it is not all. The tot system is nearly synonymous with below-subsistence wages coupled with coercive-management and poor housing.

One of its major concomitants is the received notion, entrenched by generations of winefarming labourers, that heavy drinking is an acceptible recreational activity. The implication of this notion is that the tot system not only has a profound impact on the labourers themselves, but also their women, their children, and even their unborn children. It is therefore impossible to talk only of skilling for the job. It is rather more realistic in the farming context to talk about skilling for life. In short, general and extended reproduction of the labour force.[30]

The skills needed by the common labourer are extremely slight. Probably the most exacting task is pruning, which takes up between two and three months of the annual cycle. But that does not take more than a few hours instruction and demonstration to learn, even for the dullest of labourers.[31] For the rest of the tasks involved in the winefarming cycle it is usually strength and stamina that is required: spadework, picking grapes, tipping baskets, shifting irrigation pipes. Lesser tasks do not need much strength or stamina: tying shoots onto trellisis, digging holes for trellising. Many tasks in the winefarming cycle have been mechanised or substituted by chemical means during this century: the move from individual wine-making to cooperative winemaking means that most labourers have nothing to do with wine processing. Other de-skilling processes are the substitution of tractors and mechanised implements for animal-drawn contraptions, tractor-driven crop-spraying, weeding, composting and sowing processes. Grafting of cultivars onto the wild root-stocks is nowadays performed by specialised nurseries.[32]

The average farm usually requires between one and four labourers who are capable of driving tractors and handling the implements. The rest of the labour force needs no skills other than the basics. The back-up labour force of women, and sometimes children, need only be able to pick grapes, bind vines onto trellises and and participate in weeding.

There is little, if any scope for advancement for a winefarming labourer. The common labourers use the same or lesser skills, than they did twenty-odd years ago. There is, according to most farmers, little, or any, need for the skills that conventional schooling imparts, and 70% of the Coloured labourers over 30 years are illiterate on four of the farms surveyed.[33] Even if they have had some schooling, or were able to write fluently at some stage, the infrequent application of these skills has diminished their erstwhile competence.

For those under the age of 30 on the same four farms the literacy rate was substantially higher. 58% Could actually write out their names and haltingly read a little Afrikaans. However, only three percent of all the labourers were in a position to competently complete the application form for their Book of Life.

This low literacy rate is a substantial inhibition on upward mobility. Fewer of the farms surveyed had 24 labourers capable of driving tractors, and one of these had tractor licences entitling them to use the public roads; the truckdriver also had a licence. Of these 24 drivers the farmers only allowed 17 to work tractors/trucks. The remainder had at some stage committed some misdemeanor while driving, and grounded.[34] Table C, spells out the figures for each farm.

TABLE C FORMAL QUALIFICATIONS AND ACTUAL ABILITY OF TRACTOR/TRUCK DRIVERS ON FOUR FARMS IN STELLENBOSCH/SOMERSET WEST AREA

FARM NO	NO OF LABOURERS WITH THE ABILITY TO DRIVE TRACTORS	TOTAL NO OF LABOURERS ON THE FARM	NO OF LABOURERS USED AS TRACTOR DRIVERS	NO OF LABOURERS WITH LICENCES
1	8	16	4	nil
2	6	17	4	1 (truck)
5	3	13	3	1 (tractor)
9	7	19	6	2 (tractor)
Total	24	65	17	4

A further contribution to the illiteracy, is the general reluctance of the coercive-management type of farmer to support the process of formal qualifications. A licence renders the labourer too mobile and subject to more lucrative offers from other farmers (eg. those who produce vegetables or raise livestock). Note from Table C that only four out of 24 have formal qualifications. These farmers discourage any marked differentiation on the basis of skills by paying only marginally more for the tractor drivers (R26,00/week for a common labourer; R28,00/week for a tractor driver; and R30,00/week for the tractor drivers with licences, September 1984).

The same absence of marked differences obtain in the realm of experience. The only distinction made on the four farms is paying labourers who are under 18

R2,00 a week less than all those above 18. A labourer who has worked for three years is paid the same wage as one who has worked twenty years.

A typical example: a labourer, aged 55 who has been a regular tractor driver on the farm for 17 years, can drive medium duty trucks but has no licence, is a fairly competent bricklayer (he built the farm-manager's garage and the pigsties), received R12,50 a week in 1976 and has been given annual increments. In 1984 he earns R28,00. With formal qualifications for either of those two skills he could earn four times the amount in towns. The farmer has never encouraged him to do so. He is on the tot but not an alcoholic. His expenditure on liquor is a relatively low R6,00 a week. He procures it either in Somerset West on weekends or at the shebeen on the farm at any time. His wife is an alcoholic and spends most weekends in a near-paralytic state. During the week, she looks after other labourer's children (for a fee) while the able-bodied women are out working. She has on average 17-25 toddlers to six year-olds to care for each day. She is totally dependent of the farm's shebeener, for whom she does odd domestic chores in exchange for a dop (tot). Her alcoholism has reached the stage where she needs only one glass to virtually 'knock her out'. He talks incessantly of getting 'papers', the necessary qualifications, for his skills and then moving up in life. He promises to leave the farm every year as soon as the annual bonus is paid out and he has cleared his debts for groceries at the farm store, run for his own account by the farm manager. Whenever the annual bonus is paid out, R50,00, something always prevents him from clearing his debt. Leaving the farm has, over the last four

years, become like a well-nurtured dream that will remain one. His weekends are spent talking, drinking (he does not get excessively drunk nor does he become violent) and playing guitar. Of their 11 children, six are still at home in their three-roomed house. Together with their children the total population in the house is 17, of whom seven are over 14.

In this case alcohol dependence and the resulting motivationlessness, coupled with the farmer's active retardation of any signs towards advancement, have kept him locked into farming, and his static future.

But alcohol dependence does not only retard the potential advancement of the labourers themselves. It also retards that of their children in a variety of ways.

Drinking mothers run the risk of damaging the foetus during pregnancy and either suffering a case of stillbirth, or giving birth to a child suffering from the Foetal Alcohol Syndrome, or lesser defects.

In a survey conducted in the Stellenbosch area during 1983, statistics were extracted from all sectors of the population, both urban and rural. A comparison was drawn between the incidence of a variety of indicators reflecting poverty. The three different 'Coloured' townships housing the labour force were compared to the farming areas. The still-birth rate for the farms was 12,7 compared with an average of 11,5 for the 'Coloured' population of the whole survey area.[35] The infant mortality rate for the farms was substantially higher (64,6) than the average for the 'Coloured' population as a whole in the area (47,94).[36] By comparison, the infant mortality rate for Blacks

in the same area was 27,71 as opposed to 19,6 for whites.

The researchers comment that

"A high still-birth rate is associated with the low socio-economic status of a population. The nutritional status plus the associated factors such as maternal infections, alcohol consumption and smoking can be the cause for the high rate of prematurity and low birthweight for gestational age. This in turn has a direct bearing on the number of still births."[37]

Although the researchers do not give an exact percentage they allege that a large number of farm labourers live far under the primary household/domestic subsistence level. With few exceptions, the farm labourers in the Stellenbosch area are still part of what they call the culture of poverty.[38]

There is no study known to me that investigates the Foetal Alcohol Syndrome in the Stellenbosch Area. In a general study of this relatively unexplored phenomenon it was ascertained that the most common defects of the Foetal Alcohol Syndrome include "growth deficiency, brain dysfunction, craniofacial anomalies and cardiovascular and muscular-skeletal problems".[39]

The incidence of Foetal Alcohol Syndrome in South Africa could be extrapolated from the following table:[40]

TABLE D PERCENTAGE OF OFFSPRING AFFECTED BY FOETAL ALCOHOL SYNDROME

ALCOHOL INGESTION BY MOTHERS	OFFSPRING AFFECTED BY FOETAL ALCOHOL SYNDROME
2-4 drinks per day	11%
4 and more per day	19%
10 drinks per day	100%

No data were collected for this study on the drinking frequency of specifically pregnant mothers. but the drinking-rate of women on two of the farms was ascertained by asking their men and correlating that against the responses of their children. There is an inherent difficulty in compiling such data because firstly, farm labourers do not habitually quantify things, processes and the time-spans as much as middle class individuals are wont to. Therefore attempting to ascertain data such as age, periods of time for which certain habits have persisted, years in which salient events happened, will render sparse results. Such measuring processes are of little significance within their frames of reference. On the other hand, money matters are treated with meticulous detail, and quantities of liquor consumed can be deduced from how much was purchased. Secondly, broad references such as much, not so much or little, are relative to the quantities consumed by the respondent. An eleven-year old girl, who answers that her mother drinks a lot, is not necessarily contradicting her father, a heavy drinker, who says she doesn't drink so much.

The data for drinking women was collected over a period of three years, between 1980-1983, backed up by my personal observations over weekends from time to time.

TABLE E DRINKING PROFILES OF WOMEN ON A SELECT WINE-FARM STELLENBOSCH AREA

NO	APPROX AGE	NUMBER OF CHILDREN STILL ON FARM	DRINKS DURING WEEK	DRINKS AT WEEKENDS	QUANTITIES OVER WEEKENDS	CHURCH	TYPE OF DRINKER
1	44	(1 miscar-riage)	yes	yes	2 bottles	yes	medium drinker
2	55	1	yes	yes	2 bottles	no	alcoholic
3	60	1	no	no	-	yes	teetotaller
4	24	(1 miscar-riage)	yes	yes	3 bottles	yes	heavy drinker
5	28	0	yes	yes	3 bottles	no	medium drinker[41]
6	30	(1 misc.)5	yes	yes	3 bottles	no	heavy drinker
7	25	2	no	yes	½ bottle	yes	light drinker
8	29	3	no	yes	½ bottle	yes	light drinker
9	50	0	yes	yes	2 bottles	no	alcoholic
10	50	?	no	no	-	yes	teetotaller
11	50	4	yes	yes	2½ bottles	no	heavy drinkers
12	19	0	no	yes	½ bottle	no	light drinker
13	33	0	no	yes	½ bottle	yes	light drinker
14	45	0	yes	yes	3 bottles	no	heavy drinker

It is not possible from the above data to determine whether the heavy drinkers and alcoholics drank during their pregnancies. The pattern of drinking carriers

seems to escalate with age. I am not aware of any women, or men on the farms for that matter, who could be classified alcoholic under the age of 30. But the above table does give us an idea of the quality of care that these drinking mothers can give their children,particularly on weekends, when the contact-time is the highest. Even if the mother is not a drinker, the children, who usually play around the densely grouped labourers cottages, are on weekends surrounded by people who are inebriated most of the time. The drinking parents' ability to feed and care for their children is substantially impaired. One of the impairments is that the amount of household income spent on liquor, limits the amount spent on other household necessaries, particularly food. Malnourishment is one of the possible consequences. the health survey cited above found the highest proportion (39,4%) of malnourished children in the Stellenbosch area residing on the farms 43% of all malnourished children were between one and two years old, and 59% were below the age of two.[42]

The same survey tested a group of respondents against the group in which malnourished children were located. It was established that the malnourished group spends more on alcohol per month than the control group. Up to 42,7% of the malnourished group spend up to R20,00 a month on alcohol as opposed to 20% in the control group. The researchers also express the opinion that the actual amounts spent are probably higher than those disclosed.[43]

The farm children of drinking parents are handicapped in their school performances in a number of ways. The poor encouragement to go to school which emanates from the parents, the lack of interest or ability

(due to illiteracy) to assist the pupils all contribute to a high absenteeism rate. The long distances which children have to traverse in all weather conditions, more often than not on foot, and the need for them to augment wages during harvest time do not make for regular school attendance. The health study discovered that of 749 children at farm schools in the Stellenbosch area (21 schools were surveyed) 198 (26,4%) were absent. This is a higher absenteeism rate than that in the townships surrounding Stellenbosch - being 11,8%, 17,6% and 6,4% respectively.[44]

Another indicator of the indirect impact of alcohol on the children is stunted growth. Steyn's study demonstrates an extremely high incidence of small for age children. Only 9,17% of pupils between seven and eight years old in the survey area were normal height for their age. All the others were either malnourished but not stunted (6,12%), malnourished and stunted (31,05%) or stunted but not malnourished (53,64%).[45]

Given all these handicaps it is not surprising that farm-children generally do not perform particularly well at school. Moreover, if their aspirations are limited to farm-work, there seems to them to be little need for school education. If they actually do eventually pass through primary school, the costs and difficulties of going to high school in the towns are formidable. The costs are transport and school uniforms, the difficulties are studying in crowded, poorly lit houses with little or no support from the family. Only one male out of 48 children of school-going age on the four farms surveyed reached high school. Then, tragically, an accident left him with

minor brain damage and a family to support and house. That put an end to his aspirations of escaping from the farming situation. He is now the only labourer on farm no. 1 who does not drink his dop. He takes the free liquor and sells it to the other labourers.

One of the most surprising facts to emerge from the school-going children was that none of the boys intended working on farms when they grew up. The reasons offered for this attitude were, in order of importance:

(a) the low wages paid to farm workers;
(b) the farmers belittle the people ("hulle druk die mense af" - this also contains the connotation of oppression;
(c) the work is boring;
(d) farm labourers' compliance is bought with liquor ("hulle word met drank omgekoop");
(e) there is no scope for advancement ("'n man kan homself nie opwerk nie").

Their aspirations were all articulated in terms of town or city life. The type of occupations chosen were: policeman, traffic-policeman, building labourer, artisan, supermarket packer, post-office worker and the likes.

The girls, by comparison, had less ambition and envisaged a higher degree of dependence. Their jobs depended, according to them, on what their families or men needed of them. Roughly a third of the girls resigned themselves to living on the farms, but hoped that they could be allowed to work in towns. The most commonly chosen occupation anticipated by the girls was domestic char. Only four of the 23 girls wanted alternate occupations ie. nursing, teaching and secretarial work.

Seven of the girls on the four farms had been taken out of school by their parents and 'farmed out' to petit-bourgeois 'Coloured' families in the more affluent Cape Town townships as nurse-maids-cum-chars. the customary practice is for the monthly salary (usually approx. R40-R60) to be paid to the parents, who then give the girl roughly R10,00 pocket-money per month.

As far as the children are concerned therefore, they are disadvantaged both physically and mentally by the forces impinging on their development. Notable among these forces is the tot system and its spill-over into heavy drinking. It strongly influences not only the direct material inputs into their development, but also indirectly determines the quality of guidance and emotional support which crucially shapes them as individuals and members of the class. Ill-equipped as they are by their upbringing, it becomes extremely difficult for them to escape from the farming cycle and compete on equal terms with the more urbanised workers. That many of them do escape from the farms is a tribute to their determination and ambition. On the other hand,it is also indicative of negative perceptions of farm labour in comparison with urban labour.

The process of underemployment is yet another factor that inhibits skilling. On the winefarms it is usually the women who are subjected to it. The dynamic of underemployment is dependent on the workload which the farming cycle imposes on each farming unit. Monoculture grape farms have distinct peaks and slumps of labour demand. The availability of the women is guaranteed by the conditions of employment which each farmer stipulates when he takes on a male labourer.

Usually one of the main conditions is that the women have to be 'on call' to work on the farm whenever they are needed. When they do work, they are usually paid on a piece-rate basis. When they are not needed, the farmers do not pay them at all. They are usually allowed to subsidise their income from 'outside' work, either on other farms or more often in the towns. But they remain on call - usually only 12-hours. It becomes extremely difficult for the women to make any reliable commitments for outside employment, as they do not know in advance - except at harvest-time - when they will be required to work on the farms. If a women has, for example, a char-job for each Wednesday in a suburban home, there is no possibility of ensuring regular attendance, nor any reasonable accessible means of communicating any change of availability to their urban employers.

Any attempts at breaking out of the agreement the man makes with the farmer on behalf of his own family is likely to meet with reprisals. Firstly, the farmer will put pressure on the head of the household to dissuade the errant woman from continuing with her employment. Secondly, failing that, the farmer will use a variety of punitive measures such as pay deductions or withdrawal of privileges (such as 'dop'). Ultimately, failing all else, he will threaten the entire household with eviction. No women has any right to live and work on a wine farm, except through her attachment to a male labourer who works in exchange for the house they occupy ("werk virrie hys"). The very few exceptions to this rule are usually special concessions to widows of labourers who have rendered lengthy service to the farmer.

The upshot of underemployment and dependency is that

women are precluded from skilling themselves for anything other than sporadic casual work, and are coerced into submission to male supremacy.

The tot system and its related practices and structures, have, therefore, played a substantial role in creating an underskilled labour force - one whose viability in competition with an urban labour force is considerably retarded. The tot has contributed to the underdevelopment of the children, the women and the men - indeed the whole rural working class. They have been reproduced, with the aid of the tot, to suit the particular needs of winefarming capital.

D COERCIVE MANAGEMENT, 'CRIMINALISATION' AND LABOUR'S RESPONSE

i) COERCIVE MANAGEMENT

The tot system is, on 14 of the 18 farms in the survey area, accompanied by coercive management. This is a compendium of practices and structures which each farmer tailors to his own perception of how best to maintain control over the labour force.[46]

Their control methods are based on a curious inversion: these farmers firmly believe that the persistence of the tot system is attributable to the inherent weakness of the labour force. They blame the labourers for their alcoholic addiction and all the attendant problems which result from it. These perceptions are reinforced in the daily 'handling' of the labourers, and, within the parameters of their common sense assumptions, are capable of empirical

substantiation.[47]

This 'myth of social pathology' reinforces the racial stereotypes which 'forces' the farmers to adopt unusually strict methods of control. As La Hausse remarks, they indulge in "turning the harshness of economic inequality back upon its victims as moral condemnation".[48]

Apart from administering the tot, these farmers continuously attempt to reinforce the labourers' dependence on them and their paternalistic 'goodwill'. Reinforcing this dependence is the attempt to limit the number of deleterious outside influences which may 'corrupt' the labour force. In essence, each farmer is competing with other ideological forces to shape the labourer's perceptions of, and hence responses to their material conditions. Most threatening to the farmer is any attempt to challenge his hegemonic control over his labour force. The threats that he perceives are firstly, that those farmers who do not employ coercive management techniques would lure their labour away; secondly, that there are groups or organisations which attempt to instil in the labourers the notion that they need to organise to improve their conditions; thirdly, the town or city which promises higher material rewards and greater flexibility of movement.

Each farmer/manager attempts, in his peculiar way, to limit the impact of these competing ideologies. The concept of private property and its protection is involved as one of these methods. Trespass laws are used, frequently, even out of working hours, to bar people and organisations

from entering the property on which the labour force is housed. These laws enable the farmer to choose which individuals, organisations, clubs or societies, and churces are allowed to set foot on the property and influence the labour force. I have not gathered data on how frequently trespass legislation is made use of; but it is a common occurrence for labourers to report that they are 'under trespass' on one farm or another.

Similarly, the farmers usually retain a monopoly over the means of long-distance communication. The only means of summoning ambulance, police, or taxis, other than by actually walking there, or taking a bus - both of which are too slow for emergencies - is by telephone. This communication channel is controlled by the farmer, and is used, in most cases, in such a way as to reinforce dependence on him. Most coercive management protagonists refuse to assist the labourers who are injured in weekend brawls. Ostensibly this is an attempt to discipline the workers to behave over weekends, but its effect is to support a situation in which people are inclined to resolve their problems immediately and forcefully. Any labourer who thinks he has been wronged by another, knows that neither the famer nor the police are likely to be of any assistance to him. Consequently he has to devise his own strategies of retaliation.

Similarly, the means of transport are usually monopolised by the farmer. The Public transport on weekends is limited to two busses in either direction per day after midday on Saturday. Any

emergency cases such as stabbings, broken bones, or even maternity cases, have to resort to the farmer/manager for help, even if it is only to phone for a taxi. On nine of the fourteen farms under consideration there exists a rule barring all labourers from even setting foot on the 'werf' (the farmer's yard) for anything other than work.

'Volunteer' work is performed on Saturday mornings for a dop. Either cutting grass for the cows and calves (if there is a dairy cow on the farm), feeding the pigs, sweeping the werf, etc. Most labourers congregate at the cellar to collect their Saturday morning bottle in any case, so for an extra dop they lend a hand in doing something 'personal' for the farmer. Saturday morning work is also interpreted as 'goodwill' work, proving allegiance to the farmer and demonstrating a willingness to help. Those labourers who are still too drunk from the night before are advised not to present themselves for Saturday morning work, as they are usually punished for drunkenness.

Prearranged maternity contingencies are usually the exception to the rule excluding labourers from the 'werf'. But even then there is irritation. "These people always seem to choose to have their babies at inconvenient times", is the tenor of the comments.

Closely related to the farmers' control over access to the property is his right to allow certain recreational activity to take place. The two most common alternatives to drinking

are parties (jols - which actually complement drinking) and sporting activities. The farmer's permission has to be secured before an organised party involving outsiders can take place. Sporting activities involve more long-term liaison with the farmer. If it is a field for either soccer or rugby that is required, that involves putting land aside and all the attendant organisational problems. Such major plans are usually initiated by the farmer, as the labourers are generally not supposed to be demanding of anything other than the 'privileges' they already have. Allowing sporting activities to take place on the farm is already a major departure for the coercive management protagonists. It diminishes their control over access to the farm, and it also vests some initiative towards organising in the labourers. This is a fundamental departure from the state of unquestioning obedience on which mainstream coercive management (CM) relies. It is significant that the only two farms in the total sample of 18 that had sportsfields are amongst those few that do not adopt a primarily coercive management style.

ii) "CRIMINALISATION"

Unlike the city, each farm is the site of both production and reproduction, both of which are largely the responsibility of the farmer. There is a whole spectrum of possible 'styles' in which these relationships can be conducted. The struggle over production and the struggle over reproduction are compressed into one major interactional milieu in which the balance of power is tipped strongly

in favour of the farmer. Common sense would suggest that the balance of power under such circumstances should be tipped against the farmer, but the reality, even in 1984 when unrest in urban areas is reaching 1976 proportions,[49] does not seem to bear that out.

The process of keeping labour poor, disorganised and immobile, involves, apart from the tot system, the criminalisation of every response by the labour force that would jeopardise farmer hegemony. There are two sources of criminalisation: one is formal through the State, the other informal through the farmer.

Much has been written on the formal legal relationship between farmer and labourer.[50] I will confine myself here to the informal 'law' - the 'law' that really matters in the relative microcosm of each farm. At the outset it must be pointed out that there are variations in the degree of coercive management which depend largely on the farmer's own attitude to his labour force and his ability to control while at the same time extracting surplus from them.

The farmer is usually in a position to dictate the terms of employment to any aspirant labourer. In so doing he ties the labourer and his family to job and house. Both can be withdrawn with immediate effect. "Huis leegmaak" (literally 'house emptying') is one of the dreaded phrases that can disrupt a whole family's existence. The time of notice can be anything from three days to a month, the average being a week - by

which time the labourer must have scouted around, usually on foot, to ask for work, and removal transport from the new employer. His bargaining position is substantially reduced by this lack of resources and time constraints.[51]

By the employment contract's tenor, the farmer is also forcing each labourer to ensure the compliance of his whole family to the farmer's wishes. Non-compliance with this contract usually leads to the errant family member being placed under trespass, or the whole family evicted.

In conjunction with the employment contract are the 'laws' which the farmer decrees from time to time. The general tenor of these 'laws' is very similar to those of the old Masters and Servants Act.[52] They deal with the 'criminalisation' of actions which under 'normal' conditions would attract only civil remedies. Disobedience, drunkenness, brawling, absenteeism, collective bargaining, using abusive language to the farmer or his family, using his implements or property without permission are all 'criminalised' by the farmer. These were all part of the Masters and Servants Act which had formally criminalised desertion. That is no longer possible as the farmer has no hold over labourers once they have left his services.

Other 'laws' govern work processes and procedures, such as who is allowed to handle specific implements, chemicals, machines, etc. Then there is another set of 'laws' dealing with recreational activity. One of the largest contradictions

here is tacit condonement of heavy drinking on the one hand, but punishment of drunkenness in the work situation on the other. Despite this, the productivity of the entire work-force is usually reduced by between 30% and 50% on most Mondays. This is most measurable during the harvest season. On farm no. 1, for example, whose daily quota is 35 tons of grapes. The tonnages during the 1983 harvest varied substantially:

On Wednesdays and Thursdays, the most productive days of the week the tonnages for the same grape variety under the same picking conditions and the same picking contingent were generally close to the quota - between 33 and 36 tons. On Mondays the workforce was firstly substantially depleted and secondly very weak. At least two labourers out of the 15 present could not pick up and tip full baskets till around midday, when they had regained some strength. The tonnages picked were, under the same conditions, around 15 and 17. To this tonnage must be added approximately four tons to correct for the picked grapes left standing in the baskets overnight during the rest of the week. Realistically, therefore, 19 and 21 tons on Mondays compares with the 33 - 36 on normal days.[53]

The process of 'criminalisation' is only valid within the parameters of the interactional milieu between each farmer and his labour force. In fact it is more accurate in this context to refer to the process as recrimination. 'Criminalisation' by definition elevates the level of interaction

to one of conflict. It is intrinsically punitive rather than conciliatory or cooptive. It vests almost dictatorial powers in the farmer who is at the same time the originator of the rules and their enforcer, in the most literal sense. The common feature on all the 14 farms in the survey is a high threshold of internal problem solving before handing a transgression over to the police.

The punitive enforcement measures vary from farm to farm. Physical punishment and containment are commonly reported in the press,[54] and respondents on the four farms intensively probed in this survey reveal varying degrees of force. Objects such as sjamboks, beespiele (literally a bull-prick - the sjambok's little brother) hose-pipes, canes, fanbelts, pickaxe handles, belts and spades are, apart from fists the punitive weapons labourers claim to have been hit with. But the frequency of their use varies widely. The comparison between two of the farms, both employing coercive management strategies shows how one farm manager combines physical with structural coercion whereas the other relies more on structural.

FARM NO 2

The manager, an ex bank clerk and one-time amateur boxer is very liberal with his fists and spade handles in the organisation of daily duties. He is continuously abusive and deprecatory towards the labourers, and suffers from acute xenophobia. Of all the farmers surveyed he uses trespass

most to isolate outside influences from his farm. He is quick in temper and quite impulsive in terminating employment contracts with minimal notice. He witholds dop (considered in a serious light by the labourers), deducts from their wages and, the labourers claim, continuously cheats them at the farm store where they buy on credit. He has a high propensity to solve conflict and problems himself rather than calling the police. Decisions, or rather judgements are summarily given without much discussion or explanation from the labourers. Punishment is most frequently immediate. The labourers continuuously claim a high degree of inconsistency in both judgement and punishment. They indicate that labourers who are less compliant and humble towards the manager have the roughest time. He allows the NG Sendingkerk to minister to the labourers. He also usually allows some males of each household to work out but charges a R4,00 a head per week rent. The right for non-farm-workers within the labouring families to stay on the farm was summarily withdrawn in August 1984 for no apparent reason. There is no scope whatsoever for collective bargaining, and any hint of organisation results in identification and eviction of the initiators of such processes. Parties are occasionally held, but no sport.

The manager tacitly supports the shebeen on the farm, run by his domestic worker who, in return acts as his main informer. She, ironically, does not drink at all. Her standard of living is <u>way</u> above the rest of the labourers.[55]

The farm has a high labour turnover (approximately

25% per annum) and a high 'conflict-frequency'.

FARM NO 1

The manager, an ex police reservist is not nearly as violent as his neighour (farm no. 2), yet adheres to the same doctrine of baasskap. He only beats labourers in extreme cases and when they violate the ban on weekend intrusions into his private space. His language is less abusive yet in his opinion the labour force is still in a relatively early Darwinian phase! He is also very protective towards the labour force regarding outside influences, and does not allow parties or sport to take place on the farm. The NG Sendingkerk is allowed to minister to the labour force - in the shed. His judgements in conflict cases are also summary without much room for discussion or explanation. Punishments are also executed on the spot (if physical) or at the end of the week (if a deduction) or at the end of the month (if eviction). He also has a high threshold of problem-solving before turning matters over to the police. The labourers also claim a high degree of inconsistency in attitude, which increases their insecurity. There is no scope whatsoever for collective bargaining, and any attempt at organisation results in the immediate identification and eviction of instigators.[56] There is no farm-store as such but the manager slaughters pigs, and his wife makes soaps, preserves, and knits woolens, which are sold to the labour force.

The manager frowns on shebeens on the farm, but

has been unsuccessful in eradicating them totally. In the last six years he has evicted eight labourers for selling liquor illicitly, and severely punished (without evicting) another six for selling liquor to the labourers. He was equally concerned about the low productivity due to drunkenness, and about the enrichment of the shebeener outside of the parameters of 'hard work'. Shebeening, nevertheless, still continues on the farm, albeit on a smaller scale than on farm no. 2, where it is virtually institutionalised.

The farm's labour turnover is slightly lower (approximately 19%) than farm no. 2 and has a slightly lesser conflict rate.

Given conditions such as these one would expect worker consciousness to be high. But a combination of liquor dependence coercive management and ideological battery inhibit organisation.

iii) LABOUR'S RESPONSE

The examples of organised worker response to the winefarming dispensation are few and far between, or so it seems from the literature. The only reported occurrences took place in the late 1920's and early 30's when the ANC attempted to spread its organisational base into the rural areas. The farmers with substantial State backing soon put an end to that with their violent response.[57]

What was notable about this situation was that

it was an outside, urban-based organisation taking up the plight of the rural workers, rather than the rural workers themselves organising.

The only other occurrence I am aware of was a stayaway from work on one day on 16th June 1977, Commemoration Day of the beginnings of Soweto uprisings. I was unable to ascertain how many farms responded to the call for solidarity brought home by the schoolchildren. There was definitely a full stayaway on farm no. 2 - an act of immeasurable bravery considering how vulnerable the workers are. Judging by the speed with which the farmers responded with civil defence organisation, it must have been more widespread than just the one farm. But again it was urban organisation exerting its influence on the farms, not farm based consciousness rising.

The reasons for this apparent apathy in the face of extremely harsh conditions lie in liquor dependence, coercive management and ideological battery. Farm labour's commonest response to its material conditions on wine farms is escape rather than confrontation. The primary course of escape is into liquor; the second, physical escape off the farms.

Upward mobility of labour through organisation is impeded by the introversion and self-centredness that liquor dependance leads to. Drunkenness becomes the solution of the problems - by dissolution. It is a temporary escape that needs to be repeated frequently to make it seem real

in the long term. On the four farms under investigation roughly 70% of the male labourers are heavy drinkers, 20% are alcoholics, 8% are light drinkers, and 2% don't drink at all.[58] Thus by far the commonest response is escape into liquor.

The farmers/managers support this process by tacit condonement of shebeening in some cases, and encouragement of informing by offering liquor rewards in others.

A very clear example of how liquor dependence and coercive management inhibit organisation is offered by M's case:

M, an African worker, had been on the farm for 11 years. He had taken a local 'Coloured' woman by whom he had two children, but also had a family in the Transkei. A good labourer, according to the farmer, but both he and his woman were very heavy drinkers. They fought regularly over weekends and frequently stabbed each other with knives and similar objects during these fights. His injuries kept him out of work on many a Monday. The manager kept him on because he was a good worker. During one fight at harvest-time 1982, he nearly lost the use of his arm, and was out of action for three weeks. That seemed to shock him sufficiently to rethink his situation. He succumbed to the preachings of some Zionist group that he visited on another farm, and became converted. In a while he stopped drinking, so did his woman. He took it upon himself to improve the work-situation for himself and his fellow

labourers. Every day, out in the field, he would talk to them,not only on religion but also worker awareness. Slowly but surely he brought out attitudes in them that were ordinarily deeply suppressed. The attitudes spilled over into action. For the first time on the farm the workers as a group became conscious of what they considered to be their rights. They downed tools and went off for lunch at the designated times. To the manager this was rather puzzling and he attempted to find out who was behind this. He had noticed that M had of late become a less pliable worker. He had also noticed that M had become a self-styled leader of the labourers, and would set the pace of their work. Whenever there was conflict between the manager and any of the labourers, the manager noticed that the working pace of the whole team had slowed down. He had also noticed that the labourers muttered, but did not articulate openly, things about pay increases with greater frequency than before. He cornered the witvoet of the farm, laced him with wine, and found out that M had been talking to the labourers about their rights. Maybe it was only a coincidence of images, but the way the manager expressed this process was:"M het die volk (meaning the workers) se koppe dronkgepraat" - M talked them into a drunken confusion. What is interesting about this expression is that it defines worker consciousness as an intoxicant, an opiate. By implication that is false consciousness as opposed to the correct consciousness epitomised by unquestioning submission. Totted consciousness thus stands in diametric opposition to worker consciousness.

M was summarily dismissed and labour relations restored to 'normal'. None of the other labourers took up M's impetus towards improving their lot.

Perhaps another expression of how liquor is used to inhibit labourer's progress, and ultimately pay increases comes from D, one of the labourers on farm no. 2.

"As 'n man 'n slag iets wil opbou en voorentoe kom, en hy werk goed, en hy sê virrie Boer: 'Baas, hoekom doen ons dit nie só nie'. Dan sê die baas vir hom: 'O, my klong, jy hou jou slim'. En as ons tshaila, dan sê die baas:'Jy, kom hier, my klong, laat ek jou iets gek as jy so slim is'. En hy gee die man 'n dop en hy gee die man nogga dop. En die man sê: 'Gesondheid baas'. En die Boer sê: 'Die klong is 'n slimjan, laat ek hom nog 'n dop gee'. En die man se:'Gesondheid baas', en hy drink. Die ander oggend, die man skrik wakker, en hy's 'n bobbejaan".[59]

The second type of escape is away from coercive management farmers to cooptive management farmers. There is a growing trend away from coercive management, although by 1984 I estimate that only approximately 20% of the farms in the Stellenbosch area had made the transition. Of the 18 farms surveyed 14 (77,7%) were still reproducing the labour force by means of coercive management. On four of those farms roughly 55% of the male labourers expressed the wish to work for a less offensive (onbeskofte en oorlamse) farmer/manager. 30% Expressed the wish to work in towns for more money, and the remainder (15%) were resigned to staying on their farms. I have already referred to the aspirations of the children of the labourers.[60]

On cooptive management farms the wages, the conditions of housing, recreational facilities, and the quality of the relationship between manager/farmer and the labour force,[61] all seem far preferable to the labourers who desire to make that transition. The trend on these farms seems to entail raising the standard of living of the labourers in the hope of offering a dispensation which can favourably compete with urban labouring conditions. The increased productivity which is anticipated in return will compensate in the long term for the higher cost of reproducing the labour force. The tot system is incompatible with the aims of this programme. Indeed, social workers are usually contracted to plan a programme which will decrease over-consumption:

"The planning of a prevention programme for this community must aim at the total upliftment of the entire community. Prevention of alcohol abuse and the establishment of a healthy, independent community will be the long term objectives. In this way, the farm-owner will be assured of better production and the community of farm workers will achieve greater independence in determining their own needs, as well as in decision-making and problem-solving".[62]

Bearing in mind that there are differences in the style of cooptive management, there are nevertheless some common features which emerge: they recruit workers who have a higher education, not only in terms of schooling, but notably skilling on the job. They prefer workers who are prepared to shoulder responsibility, and offer incentives to encourage it. To this end they differentiate markedly in rewards for the differing skills levels.

(Tractor drivers get R60,00 a week as opposed to labourers R48,00). They encourage worker committees and the process of airing grievances by negotiation. They encourage workers to occupy their recreational time constructively and make facilities (TV-rooms, halls, movie-shows, sports fields) available to them. The level of housing provision is far higher than on coercive management farms. They usually have full electricity, 3-4-roomed dwellings, indoor bathrooms and toilets, indoor running water as well as water heaters/ either electric or solar).

They encourage labourers to cultivate their own vegetable and flower gardens, for which land and water facilities are made available.

The tot system does usually not operate on these farms, and heavy drinking is penalised. Education of the children is encouraged and the training centre for labourers (Kromme Rhee) is more frequently utilised than in the case of coercive management farms.

The cooptive management farmers are usually more receptive to requests for emergency assistance than their coercive counterparts. In general there exists a more congenial atmosphere indicating mutual respect rather than antagonism and conflict. Conflict is diffused by negotiation rather than by punitive measures. One farm, I am told, even has a 'people's court' where transgressions are adjudicated by way of a vote of the labourers themselves, under the chairmanship of the farmer.

looking. Then there is outright breaking and entering. The cellar containing the wine was broken into five times in eight years. One of these break-ins has been described on p.165 above. These attempts at getting liquor are in addition to making their own 'mosblikke' during three of the summer months. All the serious drinkers make mosblikke.

Grapes and vegetables were also a source of income subsidation. They were either stolen and sold to itinerant hawkers in exchange for other groceries or to pay for credit. Often they were donated to friends/relatives or employers in the towns. This excludes, of course, the grapes and vegetables they consumed themselves. The same applied to the honey, although it was more difficult to harvest.

A particularly enterprising labourer, who had volunteered to care for the pigs had a side-line of piglets and pig-food. These he sold to labourers on a farm (a cooptive management farm) where the labourers were allowed to keep limited numbers of livestock for themselves. He explained the diminished numbers to the manager as deaths due to injury (a sow quite frequently injures a piglet when attempting to stand up or roll over). This side-line continued for a number of years before the information leaked to the farmer.

Another lucrative side-line this labourer, a tractor driver, devised, involved 'borrowing' a battery from one of the tractors and then hiring it out to power a TV-set. The TV-set-owner in turn, a post-office worker who rented a house from a neighbouring

farmer, charged other labourers 20c an evening for viewing, and sold a little liquor at the same time. The labourer was caught out when he was too drunk to return the battery by sunrise.

Cheating the farmer at harvest time also helped to augment meagre wages. Particularly when picking was paid for on a piece-work basis, the number of baskets picked was inflated when the farmer clipped the family's card.

In all of these cases the labourers justified their actions as necessary. There were, according to them, so few other means of 'making a little extra'. In the case of inflating basket numbers they expressed it more cogently: "Die Boer force ons on 'n paar maandjies by te sit, anders kan ons nie by bly nie" (the farmer forces us to add a few baskets, otherwise we can't keep up (with living costs)). Very little stigma is attached to these transgressions in the eyes of the labourers. These 'crimes' are considered normal means of redressing the wrong of underpayment. All labourers on all the 14 farms complained bitterly about the low wages and the cost of living which escalates faster than their wages.[64] Over the last eight years they have received an average annual wage increase of 11,5%.[65] Statements such as "innie ou dae wassie lewe nog goedkoop gewees" bear out their impression that there has been no progress, no advancement in nearly ten years. Yet some of them realise that the farmer's wealth emanates from their labour:

"Se vir my, S, wiese hanne werkie wingerd, hie? Kan die Boer allie drywe self sny? Kan hy self wingerd sny en skoffel en pype skyf? Help die Boer se vrou lote vasbind? Wie sit oppie trekker? Dis dié twee hanne (shows his hands) wat die Boer ryk maak. Kyk daa koep hy hom weer 'n nuwe kar en die ou ene's nog nuut. En daar's nie eers 'n badkamer innie blok vir onsie!" [66]

This statement must be seen against the continuous denunciations on the part of coercive managers that the labourers are hopeless drunken fools who keep their houses like pigsties and break all the windows, that they are stupid and will never be able to uplift themselves or ever survive if left on their own, that it's by the grace and goodwill of the farmers that they can eat at all.....

In an interview in April 1983, an English-speaking farmer who considers himself 'open-minded', but whom I would classify as a coercive management protagonist, expressed himself as follows:

I'd be very happy to pay these bastards more if it would improve their productivity, but it just makes no bloody difference. They just spend more on booze and I sit with the bloody problem..... I've never had as many problems as in the last two years from these drunken shits. If it isn't from the H (a bottle store) then it's from the shebeens that they get it. I've cut them down to a bottle on Friday nights but they go to they shebeen and get more. At lunchtime the sods go there and end up bloody fighting in the vineyards in the afternoon. And my driver drunk on the tractor..... I reckon the only way to get these Coloured bastards to work properly is to work them hard - treat them like shit and take no nonsense!..... I'm thinking of kicking all these drunken idiots off the farm and getting me a bunch of Blacks...".

Under the circumstances of these opposing perceptions of each other it is not surprising that the labourers, not in any organised fashion - we have seen that that is too dangerous - lash out at the farmers both directly and indirectly:

During the six years that I was in charge of transporting the grapes to the winery there were numerous incidents of stones and pairs of scissors in the baskets. These hard objects were capable of severly damaging the de-stalking machines at the winery and usually held up the grape delivery process of <u>all</u> the farmers delivering to that co-operative for anything up to two hours. These incidents were usually interpreted by the farmers as negligence on the part of the labourers, or the deeds of children playing with stones amidst the pickers. But as I became more familiar with some labourers, it became clear that some of these incidents were not mere oversights but conscious attempts at resistance (toe-wrecking.) It was the easiest, safest, most anonymous way of expressing unorganised anger not only at the farmer who 'owned' them, but at all the farmers delivering to the co-op ("allie Boere").

The same motivation applies to some of the other 'accidents' that involved damage to the farmer's property: driving a tractor into a ditch, vandalising a borehole, letting animals out of enclosures to run onto the road, dismantling a pump, opening up dam-sluice taps to let the precious water out, injuring animals (nearly fatally). All of these incidents took place on farm no. 1 in the last four years. On farm no. 2 some

unidentified labourer/s broke into the manager's store, and apart from helping themselves to some of the contents, vandalised it and defecated on the counter. This action was met with awe and approval by the rest of the labour force once it was discovered, despite the fact that they depend on the store for groceries and credit. They felt that it had been deserved by the manager, who, they claimed, was continuously cheating them. (Most of them could not read the prices, and the long calculations of how much they still owed the farmer were too much for their innumeracy).

The following incident which became elevated to a legend on farm no. 2 is told and retold with great relish by the labourers: the manager, the ex-amateur-boxer, had the habit of 'challenging' labourers to boxing matches in the barn on rainy wintry days when outside work was impossible. They were firstly not in his weight division and secondly not as experienced as he, and thirdly, given the power balance were in no position to refuse the challenge. By making it seem like a 'fair' sporting match he was actually 'legitimately' beating them up. What's more, he had the habit of starting to knock the labourers around while they were still busy changing gloves. The entire process was very humiliating and enfuriating to the labourers. One day, however, a Black worker became so enfuriated with the manager, that he felled him with one blow (so the legend goes) to the great jubilation of his fellows. The boxing matches ceased from that day onwards.

In less heroic terms farmer no. 1 has had stones

thrown at his truck out of the darkness. A less direct, more symbolic incident was breaking into his house and depriving him of the symbolic source of power - a revolver.[67]

All these crimes have very strong overtones of resistance. They are sporadic, usually anonymous examples of lashing out and lashing back at coercive management strategies. In the context that I have attempted to describe above they can be seen as alternatives to organised resistance.

C CONCLUSION

Burdened with a far greater financial load and 'managerial' responsibility in reproducing their labour force than their urban counterparts, most farmers have chosen the cheapest, and, in their opinion, the most effective way of doing so: coercive management. This is a method, constituted by a host of structures, practices and attitudes, whereby a labour force, indeed the entire working class of that agricultural sector, is reproduced to meet the perceived needs of capital. The State has, for its part, largely refrained from interfering with this method. In fact, through the absence of substantial legislative intervention, it has actively condoned the coercive management. Winefarming capital has, therefore, been allowed to extract surplus from its labour force largely by establishing its own labour relations. The relative importance of these primary producers in the economic and political make-up of the ruling class has been of substantial assistence in bringing about this situation.

This has been most notably the case with the State's

refusal to outlaw the tot system. The tot system, one of the most important elements of coercive control, institutionalises heavy drinking, and in some cases, alcoholism. The effect of perennial high alcohol intake on the labour force is physical, mental, psychological underdevelopment. This effect does not only apply to the labourers themselves but, to their entire families - indeed, to the greatest part of the rural labour force.

Considering the skills that are required of winefarming labour, this process of underskilling through overconsumption of liquor is not contradictory. In the system of coercive management: a poorly-skilled workforce is what the farmers desire. Liquor dependence, therefore, also contributes to locking labourers into farming, making it impossible for them to compete successfully with urban labourers.

Equally important is the effect that the tot system has on shaping the labourer's perceptions of themselves and their situations. The craving for liquor, historically induced by the winefarmers, mystifies the use of liquor as a control mechanism. By craving it and continuously consuming liquor the labourers are perpetually consenting to their own subjugation, and underdevelopment.

Lastly, this section has also attempted to show how liquor, and other practices, inhibit organisation, thus allowing farmers to reproduce their labour force cheaply.

The responses which coercive management has evoked have been predominantly escapist. Those few actions

which entail lashing out and lashing back at the system have been and are sporadic and unorganised. They do not compare with the organised rebellion of adolescent 'primitive rebels' so revered in the literature.[68] Farm labourers who strike back at the system are not caught in the transition from precapitalist to capitalist modes of production, nor have they recently been proletarianised. Their actions are, given the circumstances of their bondage, the only viable form of resistance they visualise at this stage.[69]

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This study has shown that the ambivalence of liquor as a commodity can be, and has been, exploited by liquor capital and the State to play a part in reproducing the Black and 'Coloured' working class to their respective needs. The overtness or subtlety by which such exploitation has occurred has depended on two factors. The first factor has been the extent of the recognition by the respective parts of the working class of the manner in which liquor was used 'against' them. The second factor has been the intensity of the opposition to such use of liquor from other fractions of capital whose labour force was being undermined by excessive drinking. The fractions of capital opposed to the excessive use of liquor entered into alliance with religious and moralistic groupings. The ambivalence of liquor lies therein that it is at once an accepted recreational commodity, which helps workers to relax and enjoy themselves after work, and at the same time it is potentially destructive of productivity if its leisure use spills over into the workplace.[1]

The implications of this ambivalence are numerous as well as complex. For if liquor production is to take place on a capitalist basis, and producers are to strive to expand profits then they will have to enlarge production and distribution. As soon as this deleteriously affects the accumulation potential of other fractions of capital, they may change their erstwhile tolerance, or even support of liquor production, into opposition, and they will put pressure on the State to intercede. The strength of the contending forces at the time will substantially

affect the intensity and efficacy with which the State will intercede.

There are numerous examples in our history in which varying levels of intercession were undertaken by the State. Thus chapter two has revealed partial prohibition of consumption by the working class, total prohibition of consumption by sectors of the working class and State control of production and distribution of certain alcoholic commodities. Even, at times, liquor production has been criminalised.[2]

But the complexity of the conflict between fractions of capital is deepened by the fact that the State is no mere impartial arbiter over this feud. Its task of reproducing the working class to the needs of capital in general is fraught with contradictions:

Firstly, the State has to ensure conditions under which capitalist production and reproduction are favourable.

In the case of the Black urban proletariat that implies:

a) securing a labour supply by prising subsistence farmers off the land and proletarianising them.

b) criminalising most forms of independent survival so that people are compelled to sell their labour.

c) providing collective consumption items at minimal cost to the ruling class by exploiting the consumption expenditure on liquor by the Blacks themselves.

d) ensuring control through dependence and coercive management.

In all of these four aspects liquor production and distribution can, and has been used by the State itself to shape the Black urban working class.

Secondly, the regional requirements of capital in general are dependent on the composition of capital in each region, the type of production undertaken there, and the labour relations demanded by the dominant form of capital in that region.

Thirdly, the State is itself no mere body over and above capital ministering to its needs. It is penetrated by capital and ideological groupings in such a way that it becomes itself an agglomeration of different factors whose strategies relating to liquor matters may at times conflict.

It is argued that this complex and contradictory situation is not one capable of a clear resolution. At best, measures can be introduced from time to time to ameliorate the flagrancy of some contradictions or adverse affects.

The Soweto uprisings of 1976 starkly revealed the contradictions which underlay both the production and distribution of liquor, and the deeper rifts in the society as a whole. The reaction of the State to the uprising were clearly visible efforts of social engineering. Other interventions by the State have been less visible. However, they have been found to be equally far-reaching in their effects on parts of the working class. Indeed the dramatic events of 1976 and our understanding of the reshaping which followed provided a convenient theoretical handle with which to grasp the complex interrelationship between capital, the State, and liquor.

Thus, in the case of urban Blacks, the crucial reshaping

device relating to liquor was the decriminalisation of shebeens. Its effect was:

a) to allow liquor capital to expand its markets;

b) to shape the urban Black population to antagonistic classes. Shebeeners will become petit-boureois;

c) to mask the blatancy of liquor distribution as part of an ideological repertoire;

d) to change the basis of finance for the reproduction of urban Blacks.

These and other reshaping processes are by no measure a solution to the problems which motivated the uprisings. Those contradictions run far deeper. But they did demonstrate the overall dynamics amongst liquor capital, the state and the urban working class. Moreover, it demonstrated that the structure of the liquor industry necessitates a distribution dispensation which will allow increasing quantities of liquor to reach urban Blacks, unimpeded by over-zealous policing measures.

The structure of the liquor industry is, however, no mere coincidence. It exists in its present form because of the peculiar relationship it has had to the incumbents of State power throughout its history. This applies particularly to primary liquor capital in the wine-growing Western Cape.

These farmers, were the first and most important grouping of capitalist agriculture at the Cape. They consequently enjoyed considerable access to the rulers who, at times, were accommodating in their legislative enactments. This

was particularly so once the winefarmers organised themselves into an economic and political pressure group in the late nineteenth century. This grouping, the Afrikaner Bond was the forerunner of the Afrikaner Broederbond which, in the early two decades of this century, launched itself into a trajectory that would ultimately secure State power for itself and its ideological allies.

The winefarmers were an important component of this alliance. They were the first manifestation of indigenous capital, Afrikaner capital. With their resources constituting the initial capital, Afrikaner finance capital was launched. They were advantageously placed to benefit from moves towards extending the role of capitalist agriculture. The liquor industry was structured in such a way that, despite perennial surplusses the wine-farmers were guaranteed accumulation by fixed prices and monopolised marketing. But while production was structured towards efficiency, distribution was hampered by prohibitionist legislation.

The fact that the State extended its approval to the 1979 agreement whereby the liquor industry was monopolised even further than had been the case prior to 1976, is enough evidence to demonstrate that the capital-State alliance that was the basis of reform initiatives was working in favour of liquor capital.

The interaction between liquor capital, labour and the State took on a different form in the reproduction of the Western Cape 'Coloured' working class.

In a region where primary liquor capital was at its strongest, and where the 'Coloured' labour force was

and is the consumer of by far the bulk of wine produced in the country, prohibition did not seem apposite. Yet the legal distribution allowed to 'Coloureds' prior to 1962 was limited to white-owned outlets in the white areas, and the ubiquitous tot system on the farms. 'Coloureds' were in 1962, by a similar process of cooption as is currently happening to Black shebeeners, allowed to become legal distributors. Again, a petit - bourgeoisie was 'created' through liquor distribution.

Despite the strength of liquor capital in the region prohibitionist pressure did not allow for 'satisfactory' distribution. By a process of collusion the State and liquor capital generated a situation whereby symbolic policing allowed vast illicit distribution to take place, while at the same time maintaining a facade of deference to the prohibitionist lobby.

Gusfield has argued that the legal restrictions on liquor distribution in the USA were promulgated in the knowledge of their unenforcability. Consequently their main purpose was symbolic from the outset.[4] While this argument has some merit if applied to Blacks in this country it would be wise to look to the symbolic import of enforcement process as well. Burman has clearly shown that the way in which legislation is applied and interpreted substantially affects its symbolic and instrumental efficacy.[5]

The case study in this thesis on 'Coloured' shebeens has demonstrated that symbolic enforcement of restrictive distribution legislation has a profound impact on the method of maintaining State control over the 'Coloured' townships. By a process of selective enforcement the State, through its police force, allows some shebeens to exist on the condition that they allow themselves

to be coopted into an uneasy alliance with it. The shebeens and their gangs are allowed by proxy to police the townships in such a manner as to maintain and reproduce their illicit liquor dealing. The arbitrariness of selective enforcement, however, usually precludes long term accumulation and hence, class stratification from taking place in case of shebeens and gangs.

In the process of policing the townships by unorthodox means the gangs firstly lend legitimacy to the police in a situation where it would otherwise be hard-won and secondly, retard political organisation and recreational activity. In so doing selective enforcement contributes towards keeping the urban working class relatively docile while at the same time encourages greater liquor consumption. Both the needs of liquor capital and the State are thereby met.

The case study of the manner in which the winefarming labour force is reproduced reveals yet another different dynamic. In this case there are no other major capital groupings directly affected by the method of general and extended reproduction. The role that liquor is allowed to play is far more instrumental and far more overt than in urban situations.

Farmers have been able to demand greater latitude from the State because of their relatively heavier burden in reproducing the labour force. Collective consumption items such as land, housing, water and occasionally electricity and recreational facilities, are largely the responsibility of the farmers. They, too, have to 'police' their labour force. The method the majority of them have used successfully for this purpose is, what I have called coercive management.

Quintessential to coercive management is the tot system, the administration of which was deregulated by the State and vested in the discretion of the farmers themselves.

Not only does the tot system and its resultant heavy drinking contribute towards the underdevelopment of the labourers themselves, but it also substantially reduces the chances of their entire families of moving up in the world, and out of farming. The tot system can thus be seen as suitably skilling or rather deskilling a whole population to the perceived needs of agricultural capital.

But the ambivalence of liquor has a consequence which is most blatant in the farming situation . The alcohol dependence which is structurally induced in the greatest part of the labour force provides an ideological hold on the labourers. Their craving for liquor implies that they approve of its effects. Their desire for it masks the fact that it is institutionally administered. What is more their resultant moral and economic impoverishment is used as a rationale for keeping them underdeveloped, poor and dependent. The tot retards if not the desire, then the ability of farm labourers to organise and improve their conditions. In so doing it contributes to their remaining occupationally and spatially immobile.

The second aspect of coercive management is a combination of criminalisation and recriminalisation. Garland and Young have contended that it is too simplistic to see the State as the only source of punishment[6] or, as they call it, penalty. Other institutions too wield, albeit sometimes informally, the power of criminalisation with the same effect. The farmers of the Western Cape are a blatant example of its efficacy. Indeed, the process

of recriminalisation takes Burman's argument a little further. The formal abolition of the Masters and Servants Act, and the subsequent recriminalisation of most of its provisions, serve the farmers on a symbolic level. On the face of it, the law is repealed, whereas in reality the farmers' hegemonic position is so powerful that the repeal has no instrumental effect. It merely has a symbolic advantage to them.

In its manipulation of liquor in the developing South African social formation, decriminalisation, selective enforcement, criminalisation[7] and even recriminalisation have been used by dominant social groupings as conditions have changed. Any intervention designed to deal with the undoubted social problems surrounding liquor would have to address itself to the full social matrix that this thesis has sought to portray.

APPENDIX I

DETAILS OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED FOR AGRICULTURAL SECTION - CHAPTER 5

NUMBER OF INTERVIEWEES	DESCRIPTION
48	Young men living on five winefarms but working in towns.
48	Children on four farms at school-going age (25 boys, 23 girls)
80	Farm labourers, both men and women on nine farms
17	Drivers (both tractor and truck) working for 17 farms
7	Girls no longer at school; working as chars and nursemaids in middle-class Cape Flats families. These girls live on four of the farms.
18	Farmers or farm managers of 18 farms
2	Winery managers
2	Assistant winery managers
6	Winery labourers (migrants)

APPENDIX II

DETAILS OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED FOR SHEBEEN SECTION - CHAPTER 4

NUMBER OF INTERVIEWEES	DESCRIPTION
15	Gangsters in Elsies River BFK, DBM
14	Peripheral part-time gangsters in Elsies River
2	Shebeen-owners in Elsies River
4	Managers of Elsies River retail liquor outlets
1	Social worker - Thea De Vrouw
4	Girl-friends and mothers of gangsters interviewed en route to prison-visits
11	Garden Village gangsters BFK, DBM
3	SANCA employees
4	Employees of Stellenbosch Farmers Winery
1	Ex-employee of Stellenbosch Farmers Winery
1	South African Breweries employee

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

1. Kane-Berman, J. Soweto - Black Revolt, White Reaction. Ravan, Johannesburg 1978. p.19.

2. Financial Mail 17.7.81 p.332

3. Hansard Parliamentary Debates Col 7554, 19th May 1980.

4. Fourth Report of the National Advisory Board on Rehabilitation matters for the period 6th December 1976 to 31st December 1979, Government Printer, Pretoria.

5. Van Onselen, C. "Randlords and Rotgut 1886-1903" in Studies in the Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand 1886-1914. Vol I. p 51-4

6. "Blacks" in this thesis refers to Africans, whereas I reluctantly use the word 'Coloured' in line with the official nomenclature. The parenthesis indicate the fact that the label is used under protest.

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19. See Foreword to Schmidt J J 1980.

20. Schmidt J J 1980 p.94-100.

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24. O'Meara, D. supra p.14

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30. Butters, S. supra p.261.

31. Butters, S. Ibid. p.259.

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4. Orffer, D J. op cit p.100.

5. Ross, R. op cit p.5.

6. Orffer, C J. op cit p.105.

7. Marais, J S The Cape Coloured People 1612-1957. Wits University Press, Johannesburg 1957. p.165,166.

8. Marais, J S op cit p.165-6.

9. Rayner, M. "Slaves, slave-owners and the British State; The Cape Colony 1806-34." Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Post-Graduate Seminar Paper, University of London p.3.

10. Marais, J S. p.116. The Khoi could only own land on mission stations which could only cater for a very small number.

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16. Rayner, supra p.3.

17. Venturas, D A E. Economic Aspects of the Development of the South African Wine Industry in the Twentieth Century p.5.

18. Rayner, M. Idem.

19. Worden, N. "Cape Slave Emancipation and Rural Labour in a Comparitive Context" p.3.

20. Marais, J.S. p.111.

21. Marais, J.S. p.196 and 197.

22. Marais, J.S. p.199.

23. Cape Coloured Liquor Commission of Inquiry, 1945 (Chairman R Meaker) p.13.

24. Marais, J.S. p.197.

25. Worden, N. supra p.11 and 12.

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27. Trapido, S. "Origins of the Cape Franchise Qualifications of 1853" in Journal of African History 1964 p.42.

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32. Venturas, D.A.E. Appendix p.4.

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43. Bor, J. p.9.

44. Bor, J. p.7 and 8.

45. Bor, J. p.14.

46. Bor, J. p.9.

47. Bor, J. p.32.

48. Bor, J. p.24.

49. Davenport, T R H p.51. and: The Memoirs of Kohler of the KWV by Joelson, A (ed) p.32.

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52. Orffer, D J. p.126.

53. Venturas, D A E p.23.

54. O'Meara, D. Volkskapitalisme, 1983. p.35.

55. Venturas, D A E p.31.

56. Leipoldt, C L 300 Years of Cape Wine 1952 p.181-2.

57. Cape Coloured Liquor Commission of Inquiry, 1945; Chairman R Meaker p.5.

58. Report of the Wine Commission, 1937, UG 25 p.34.

59. O'Meara, D. Volkskapitalisme p.99.

60. O'Meara, D. Volkskapitalisme p.43-8.

61. Venturas, D A E p.39.

62. Venturas, D A E p.40.

63. Venturas, D A E p.45-53.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 3 - LIQUOR DISTRIBUTION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE WORKING CLASS

1. They often allied themselves with the perennial anti-liquor lobby made up of largely religious groupings.

2. Cape: See the battle leading up to the 1898 Liquor Amendment Act above. p 35-36

3. Transvaal: See Van Onselen, C. Randlords and Rotgut in Studies in the Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand 1886-1914 Vol. 1, Ravan, Johannesburg 1982.

4. National Scale: See the lifting of prohibition below p52-56

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11. The doctrine became enshrined in the Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923.

12. In an amendment to the Urban Areas Act of 1937 (Bloch and Wilkinson's Footnote 4 on p.36).

13. By the provision of the Native Administration Act of 1927, as amended in 1936, after which Africans were represented in Parliament by White Senators only (Bloch and Wilkinson's footnote 5 on p.36).

14. The Johannesburg City Council only exercised its right in 1937 when its first brewery was opened - Lewis, PRB supra p.20.

15. Kane-Berman, supra p.57-58.

16. Section 34 of the Urban Areas Act No 25 of 1945. The exception to the rule was that sorghum beer could be consumed off the premises, but the consumers needed to procure a permit for this to be legal.

17. Lewis supra p.20.

18. Lewis Idem

19. House of Assembly Debates, Hansard Parliamentary Debates col 4943, 3 May 1962.

20. There was, of course the Bantu Service Levy Fund, established in 1953, paid for by employers who did not house their labour, and the Bantu Transport Service Levy of the same year. They contributed R1,7 million and R0,67 million to the Bantu revenue account in 1969 compared with gross Bantu beer sales of R6,6 million (with a profit of R2,8 million) - Lewis supra p.43. Some exceptions were eg. the mining industry providing a R6 million loan - Kane-Berman p.58.

21. Dikobe, Modikwe The Marabi Dance reviewed by Pinnock in Janus - Journal of the History Society, University of Cape Town 1980. And Abrahams, Peter Mine Boy, Heinemann, London 1980.

22. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the General Distribution and Selling Prices of Intoxicating Liquor UG 55/1960 p.3 (Malan Commission, hereinafter).

23. House of Assembly Debates, Hansard Parliamentary Debates col 8302, 16th June 1961 - Mr AI Malan; and col 5023, 4th May 1962 - Mr Martins.

24. Malan Commission supra p.7; Liquor Act offences constituted one fifth of all prosecutions nation-wide - Bunting, Brian. "Liquor and the Colour Bar" in Africa South 2,4 July/September 1958.

25. House of Assembly Debates, Hansard Parliamentary Debates col 8286, 16th June 1961 - Mr Erasmus introducing the Liquor Amendment Bill.

26. Venturas, supra p.49-50; The actual surplus for the year 1956, announced at the Annual General Meeting of the KWV in June 1957 was 36½% of the total harvest. Bonus payments to farmers were thus only a fraction of bonus payments of previous years, farmers claiming that they were worse off than in 1932. There was even a strong move to extend the Tot System to Transvaal agricultural labour, with many farmers admitting that they had illegally already done so. - Bunting, Brian "Liquor and the Colour Bar" supra.

27. Yawitch, supra p.206.

28. Idem p.207.

29. Yawitch, p.214, 219.

30. South African Institute of Race Relations Fact Paper No 10, 1961 "A precis of the reports of the commissions appointed to enquire into the events occurring on March 21st 1960 at Sharpeville and Langa". And Roux, Edward Time Longer than Rope - The Black Man's Struggle for Freedom in South Africa University of Wisconsin Press, 1964 p.412-414.

31. House of Assembly Debates, Hansard Parliamentary Debates col 5012, 4th May 1962 - Mr Streicher speaking during the Debate on the Bantu Beer Bill.

32. House of Assembly Debates, Hansard Parliamentary Debates col 8332-3, 19th June 1961 - Mr SJM Steyn, Member for Yeoville.

33. Pass Law convictions exceeded Liquor Law convictions, cost the taxpayer millions, broke up families, were difficult to police and created a lot of racial bitterness.

> "To hear Police Chiefs and Nationalist politicians provocate the abolition of colour discrimination in any sphere would be remarkable enough. But why is their enthusiasm for equality of treatment confined to the question of liquor? From the point of view of the police, one would imagine a far more convincing argument could be made out of the abolition of the Pass Laws."

Bunting, Brian "Liquor and the Colour Bar" supra

34. House of Assembly Debates, Hansard Parliamentary Debates col 5016, 4th May 1962 quoted in Mr Oldfield's speech.

35. Memorandum issued by Soweto Taverner's Association (The Shebeener's Guild) in 1980.

36. Lewis, supra p.20 referring to Beer Hall Boycotts.

37. Gordin, Jeremy "The most public criminals there ever were" in Frontline, May 1981 p.11.

38. Kane-Berman supra p.66.

39. Kane-Berman p.61-66: This was in pursuance of a hardening of the temporary sojourning doctrine. Any major development was to take place in the Homelands so that urban Blacks would be encouraged to make the Homelands their permanent base. And Seventh Interim Report of the Committee of Enquiry into Financial Relations between the Central Government, the Provinces and Local Authorities 1963-1964. Government Printer s 914 7065 p.43.

40. Lewis supra p.22.

41. Kane-Berman p.61-66.

42. Birch, Sue: Black Market Manageress, Stellenbosch Farmers Winery, Personal Interview 4, 1, 1982. "Blacks account for 70% of beer sales and 50-60% of the spirits market" - Financial Mail 21st August 1981, p.871.

43. Hughes, Dave: Consumer Relations Manager, Stellenbosch Farmers Winery, Personal Interview 4th January 1982.

44. Schmidt, JJ Sjebeens: 'n Verdere Evaluasie met klem op die Ekonomiese en Sosiale Gebied 1980 Human Sciences Research Council s 65 Pretoria p.107.

45. Kane-Berman supra p.19.

46. Kane-Berman supra p.19-22.

47. Saul, JS and Gelb, S "The Crisis in South Africa - Class Defence Class Revolution" in Monthly Review July-August 1981, Vol 33.

48. Moss, Glenn "Total Strategy" in Work in Progress No 11, February 1980 p.1-11.

49. Minutes of the West Rand Administration Board meeting, 18th June 1981. (Made available to me by Stellenbosch Farmers Winery staff).

50. Financial Mail 23rd November 1973, p.149.

51. Financial Mail 12th September 1980, p 200 and pl 256.

52. Financial Mail 7th December 1973, p.57.

53. Financial Mail 12th September 1980, p 200. He controlled two of the top five companies in the country in 1980: Rembrandt Beheer (total assests R981,4 million) and Remgro (R980,9 million) compared with SAB (Rl 121 9 million). In the same year Remgro held 20% of Volkskas' and 20% of Federale Mynbou's Share Capital - Financial Mail 12th September 1980, pl 200.

54. Financial Mail 4th July 1980, p.68, 11, 7, 81 p.74, 12th September 1980 pl 256.

55. Financial Mail 4th July 1980, p.68.

56. Fourth Report of The National Advisory Board on Rehabilitation Matters for period 6th December 1976 to 31st December 1979. Government Printer, Pretoria.

57. House of Assembly Debates, Hansard Parliamentary Debates col 7 554, 29th May 1980. Minister of Justice, Schlebusch.

58. Idem.

59. Gordin supra p.11 and: Minutes of West Rand Administration Board Meeting (supra note 49) 18th June 1981.

60. Gordin supra.

61. House of Assembly Debates, Questions and Replies, Hansard Parliamentary Debates col 7 554, 29th May 1980.

62. Birch, Sue (supra note 42).

63. House of Assembly Debates, Hansard Parliamentary Debates col 7 554, 29th May 1980.

64. Gordin, Jeremy "The Lilies of the Field were put to Shame" in Frontline September 1982 p.46.

65. Minutes of the West Rand Administration Board Meeting, 18th June 1981.

66. Bloch and Wilkinson supra p.15.

67. Sunday Times 25th March 1984.

68. Gordin supra note 65 p.46.

69. Financial Mail 18th September 1981 p.368 - The National Taverners Association had at that date 2 000 members only.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 4 - LIQUOR DISTRIBUTION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE CAPE WORKING CLASS

1. Cape Coloured Liquor Commission of Inquiry 24th March 1945 under the chairperson R Meaker p.6 para 30.

2. 396,6 Thousand hectolitres of fortified wine alone were consumed in 1945 as opposed to 651,2 thousand hectolitres of all grape produce consumed: this figure does not account for tot-wine and other grape produce consumed by the working class - "A survey on wine-growing in South Africa" 1973/4 Rushburn, and Hamman p.56 and 57.

3. Meaker Commission supra p.16.

4. Meaker Commission supra p.2.

5. The Cape Coloured Commission, UG 54/1937; The Commission on Conditions Existing on the Cape Flats UG 18/1943; The Meaker Commission 1945 supra

6. Meaker Commission, p.11.

7. Meaker Commission, p.13.

8. Molteno, F "The Coloured Representative Council: Its Place in the Evolving Strategy of South Africa's Rulers" in Africa Perspective No. 10 April 1979 p.5.

9. Molteno, supra p.7.

10. Commission of Inquiry into the General Distribution and Selling Prices of Intoxicating Liquor UG 55/1960 p.9. (Malan Commission).

11. Act 98 of 1965.

12. Coloured Development Corporation Act No 4 of 1962.

13. Annual reports of the Department of Coloured, Rehoboth and Nama Relations for the period 1.4.78 - 31.3.79, p.3, and 1.04.1979-31.03.1980, p.3.

14. Information supplied by Jaques Roux - low price wine manager at Stellenbosch Farmers Winery - interviewed January 1982.

15. Section 195 (c) and (d) of the Liquor Act No 87 of 1977 creates a presumption of being an illicit

dealer, for any person who has on his premises more liquor than is reasonably required for the persons residing thereon. The same presumption operates when a person buys or acquires more than is reasonably required for consumption by himself, his household, or persons bona fide employed by him. The police could very comfortably simply observe the shebeeners purchasing at the retail outlets and make their arrests there.

16. Sue Birch - Black Market Manageress, Stellenbosch Farmers Winery. Telephone Interview 12.10.1983.

17. Wilkinson, P and Webster, D "Living in the interstices of capitalism: notes towards a conceptual redefinition of 'informal sector' activity in South African cities". Unpublished mimeograph, University of the Witwatersrand 1982. p.1.

18. Van Der Merwe, H and Groenewald C J Occupational and Social Change Among Coloured People in South Africa. Juta, Cape Town. 1976.

19. Wilkinson and Webster p.8-9.

20. Wilkinson and Webster have adapted a table illustrating the range of income opportunities in South Africa from Hart (1973) by Beavon and Mabin (1978)(3). It is reproduced as Table I in their paper.

21. Wilkinson and Webster, p.4.

22. Wilkinson and Webster p.10.

23. This dependency will be expanded on below p.115

24. See below p.123-5

25. I am not suggesting that everyone lives one km away from a bottle store, it is a hypothetical situation which is fairly average in areas such as Elsies River, and Clarke's Estate.

26. KWV Annual Report, 1982 Paarl p.7.

27. Financial Mail 20.2.81 p.720.

28. Njokweni, H M T. "Shebeens: A Contribution Towards A Study in Social Cohesion and Social Disintegration". Paper read at the Annual Conference of the Association of Sociologists of Southern

Africa, Rhodes University, Grahamstown. July 1981, p.6. This speech epitomised liquor industry opinion about shebeens in Black areas. The speaker was subsequently invited to address liquor marketing teams aimed at the shebeen clientele. See also Gordin, J. "The Lilies of the Field were put to Shame". Frontline September 1982 p.46, and "By virtue of the illegal nature of their activities, it stands to reason that shebeeners and runners would be subject to continuous police surveilance. Those involved are not deterred - as far as they are concerned, they cater for the needs of the people who are denied proper facilities". This is an extract from a memorandum compiled by the National Tavern Association (undated but probably towards the end of 1980) p.3.

29. See below p.98

30. House of Assembly Hansard Parliamentary Debates 29th March 1984, Member for Lanlaagte (Conservative Party) Mr S P Barnard column 4026- 4035.

31. Malan Commission supra p.10.

32. Malan Commission p.7.

33. House of Assembly Hansard Parliamentary Debates col 8312 16th June 1961. Mr W C Malan, Member for Paarl.

34. Malan Commission p.4.

35. House of Assembly Hansard Parliamentary Debates 16th June 1961 Minister of Justice, Erasmus col 8284-8304.

36. This is seen as a concession to the abolitionist lobby, or a variation on it, the 'Responsible Distribution' lobby.

37. Many thousands of people who identify themselves as gangsters have found formal employment and have loosened their gang connections a little. (Personal observation from four years of association with street/prison gangsters; corroborated by many 'ourookers', seasoned gangsters).

38. I was assisted by the strongest gang in the area at the time, the Born Free Kids, whose privileged access to information of that kind brought us closer to a 'true' figure than any other research method.

39. One of the five retail outlets on principle did not supply shebeens.

40. Supplied by Jaques Roux of Stellenbosch Farmers Winery - low-price wine manager. There are at least 400 shebeens in Black townships in the greater Cape Town area - Cape Times 26.2.1982.

41. See above p.70

42. All the five bottle-store managers in Elsies River - Clarke's Estate agreed that faster turnover, bulk-discounts, lower overheads, no taxes, and the practice of decanting the liquor from larger containers into the consumer's own container, enables shebeens to sell 750 mℓ of low-grade wine at 70-85c/bottle compared with the 81-87c/bottle at the legal outlets (1982 prices). Decanting was particularly prevalent during the 'Swartvarkie' phase of liquour distribution, when low-grade was sold in 20 litre black plastic containers. Public outcry spearheaded by a faction of liquor capital that was marketing low-cost wine more 'responsibly' (only in 4,5 litre containers) forced the State to outlaw this method of surplus disposal by June 1983.

43. These figures are very difficult to quantify exactly. Firstly, the Cape Wine and Spirits institute, which computes production figures and statistics for the grape-based sector of the liquor industry does not publicise information of this nature, but retains it only for in-industry use. My applications for the release of information were turned down. Stellenbosch Farmers Winery, the largest single producer and distributor of low-priced wine admit that 70% of their low-priced and slightly better than low-priced wine sales are located within a 30 km radius from Cape Town (Stellenbosch Farmers Winery management summary on low-price market manager ± 1980). Managers at 3 co-operative wineries (Welmoed, Helderberg and Eersterivier) estimate the amount of wine consumed by farm labourers in tot-wine to be between 3% and 5% of all wine produced. Peninsula sales alone account for 66% of Stellenbosch Farmers Winery's national low-priced volumes.

44. For the Western Cape in 1980 low-price wine constituted 71% of all grape-derived liquor consumed. (Extrapolated from CWSI statistics made available by Stellenbosch Farmers Winery abovenamed management summary). National figures were unfortunately not made available to me).

45. See above, Chapter 3.

46. Several high-ranking officials at Stellenbosch Farmers Winery, interviewed in January 1982, spoke about their delicate situation (Dave Hughes, Consumer Relations Manager, Sue Birch, Black Market Manageress). Stellenbosch Farmers Winery did not market 'Swartvarkies'. It was predominantly the co-ops which resorted to this 'irresponsible' form of marketing. Also see above, footnote 42.

47. Interviewed with Hugh Solomons - low-price manager 6.1.82 Stellenbosch Farmers Winery. I have not come across evidence to the contrary.

48. eg. Correspondences between businesses and Department of Commerce and Tourism or Department of Justice or eg. Soweto Taverners Association and their Journal E'spotini.

49. Dave Hughes - Interview 4.1.1982 Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Consumer Relations Manager.

50. The Soweto Taverners Association (STA) and (NTA) National Taverners Association, have the appearance of being organised by the shebeeners themselves. In fact, they receive substantial organisational and resource back-up from both sides of liquor capital - grape-based and beer. Interview Sue Birch Stellenbosch Farmers Winery 4.1.1982.

51. The quantity presumption for illicit dealing obviously does not operate in the case of licenced retailers. See above footnote 15.

52. See above p.58

53. The manageress of one of the bottle stores in Elsies River maintained that the majority of her shebeen clients were women whose men had either left them voluntarily, or had been incarcerated, or become injured, unemployed or alcoholic. (Personal interview, October 1981).

54. All other personal names are fictitious whereas the gang-names are real.

I visited Joker's shebeen regularly at various times of day and night at least three days a week for the three months November - December 1981, and January 1982. Thereafter my visiting frequency dropped to a monthly or once-every-two months update visit lasting as long as it needed to. Throughout

the period, from June 1981 to the present, I have been in weekly contact with members of the gang in whose beat Joker operates/operated. They serve as a secondary-source of information.

55. Pinnock, Don Towards an Understanding of the Structure, Function, and Cause of Gang Formation in Cape Town. Unpublished MA Thesis University of Cape Town 1982 p.7 - Defence Gangs.

56. Pinnock, supra p.59-72.

57. See Haysom, N Towards an Understanding of Prison Gangs, Institute of Criminology, University of Cape Town 1981.

58. Pinnock, D supra p.7-10.

59. Compare a British study of working class counter school culture: Learning to Labour (how working class kids get working class jobs) By Paul E Willis 1980 Gower p.57.

60. Big-buyer is the slang term for liquor dealer.

61. Merchant or mert (merd) is the term for drug-dealer.

62. This is not an attempt to be corny, melodramatic, poetic, nor am I venturing into amateur novel-writing. I am attempting to convey the inversion of values where informal sector activity looks convincingly far better from most points of view than formal employment.

63. It is interesting to note the conflation of the ruling White class with their most visible 'instrumental' organ, the police, into the single term Boere. The term is also applied to policemen who do not share the ruling class' pigmentation, or to English-speaking South Africans who display racist or bossy tendencies. Boere, in this context, merely means "Whites", whereas it often includes the meaning of cops, fuzz, racist pigs.

64. Lighties or small-fries.

65. See Haysom, N p.6.

66. The range of goods, services, processes which are commoditised takes on enormous proportions in an environment where 'rehabilitation' involves the institutionalised denial of some of the most basic human needs. Prisoners have to buy their personal

safety from physical attack or sexual harrassment, either by paying regularly for it, or by joining a prison gang (which in itself involves denial of individual action and motivations). This is particularly prevalent in big communal cells, where up to 40 prisoners inhabit a space of approximately eight by six metres. (Personal observation during prison visit at Pollsmore, Victor Verster and Bienne Donne Prisons on 28th May 1984).

67. For example, two eggs, four cigarettes rather than a packet, just enough sugar or salt, tea, coffee to see a family through one meal.

68. In this case it would have been either a hawker's licence or a general dealer's licence.

69. Six further members were serving prison terms ranging from six months to seven years.

70. Common knowledge on the Cape Flats; and Pinnock, D Elsies River. University of Cape Town, Institute of Criminology 1980.

71. DBMD in tattoo language.

72. Mongrels (MG or MG$); BFK = Born Free Kids tattoos. For history of Mongrels see Pinnock, 1982, p.16-17.

73. The reformatories are commonly known amongst the gangsters as the high-schools of crime, prison being the University. See Pinnock, 1982, Chapter 7.

74. See Slabbert, M and Van Rooyen J H Some Implications of Tattooing In and Outside Prison. Institute of Criminology, University of Cape Town, 1978. Facial tattoos in particular jeopardise finding formal sector employment.

75. Midgeley J : "Children on Trial" (a study of juvenile justice) in R Graser (ed) South African Studies in Criminology 1975. Cape Town p.107.

76. He managed to procure forged papers for his driver's licence from an ex-prison contact.

77. He collected his supplies initially by hiring a taxi driven by an old prison-contact.

78. One of his gang nicknames was Vuilgesig (dirty-face) which is descriptive of tattoos all over the face - having the connotation of an old-time

gangster, a long-term prisoner, an adult version of a 'dog' or 'full-force'.

79. Scarface and Joker did not inform their forces that this was merely a strategy. They were deceiving even their own allies by this strategy.

80. This is Joker's interpretation of his response. This information was not procured from the opposition shebeener.

81. More about this aspect below p.115

82. Their expansion into stolen goods only happened in June 1982, but is included in this context to illustrate the themes I am pursuing.

83. Compare the change of style of operations imposed on gangsters once they upgraded their weaponry to guns. In 'Property Crimes and the Poor: Some evidence from Cali , Columbia" by Chris Birkbeck in Crime, Justice and Underdevelopment by Colin Sumner. ed p.162.

84. E M Botha in Daggagebruik In Die Kaapse Skiereiland, Institute for Social Development, University of the Western Cape 1981 p.13 erroneously refers to the mandrax as being called 'sout' in gangslang, whereas sout actually refers to the cigarette tobacco in both green and white pipes.

85. Pinnock, 1982 p.343.

86. Pinnock, 1982 p.362.

87. A gang-brother is called My Bra, or Bla or Biou, or even conventionally Broe, or Broer in gangslang. Some brotherhood affirmation 'ceremonies' involve a wrist-cutting and blood-mixing procedure (interviews with gangsters).

88. Compare Paterson, S. Colour and Culture in South Africa. p.185-6

89. The Doekom's powers were supposed to include, so I was told by the gangsters, 'psyching' witnesses so that they didn't reach the court to testify, or if they did, so that they'd tell muddled stories unacceptable for purposes of convictions. A much-repeated account relates to a Doekom 'magically' converting the incriminating bags of dagga in a dealing case into bags of straw. Court documents

and records are said to go missing as a result of the Doekoms' influence. One of the gangsters told me how a Doekom had helped him secure an acquittal on a murder charge: the Doekom made an incision across the forehead of the accused and let the blood trickle down his face to wash his thoughts clean. He then instructed the accused how to testify and what type of attitude to display to the court. Some procedural advice was given. The accused was then told to leave his shirt with the Doekom and given a precise route to walk on his way home. The gangster recounts that he was overawed by the powerful confidence and seeming wisdom of the Doekom. He followed his advice, which cost him R50,00 (and his shirt) and he was acquitted.

90. See above p.85-9

91. A fair percentage of this was spent on drugs, the remainder on food and clothing.

92. Laities is a relative term. In this context they were laities in the private parlance of Joker and Scarface. Yet they were never addressed as such. The leaders always addressed them as 'manne' (men), broers (brothers), or by their gang nicknames. I have not come across a single gangster who doesn't have a special gang nickname - which is usually the name the police also know them by.

93. I am not suggesting that <u>all</u> gangsters' careers follow this path, but in the case of the laities under scrutiny here, it reflected their career-route.

94. <u>Fighters</u>: Many hundreds of hours of my gang observation time has been spent listening to fighting talk, revolving mainly around provocation strategies, fighting methods, stabbing techniques, types of weapons, means of 'honourable' withdrawal, victory celebrations.

95. <u>Playboys-cum-Studs</u>: Nearly as many hours of gangtime are spent recounting (probably considerably exaggerated) conquests of females, either with voluntary participation of the ladies or without their consent - rape. During my three-month observation period, the 15-man core gang spoke about six rapes their members had 'scored' as individuals and one gang-rape during which eight gangsters all raped a girl several times on one

evening. Their attitude towards it later was one of daring bravado, having established their power over the girl. The concept of consent in this case is a contentious point. In the system of values adhered to by these gangsters, a woman was considered an 'ou breek' (an old break) once she has been been raped once, or has had sex once, with one of them. That gives them the 'right' to demand sexual services from her at any later stage. In terms of middle class values, or even the 'parent culture' working class values this their actions would still be considered as rape. Only one of the six rapes above involved girls whom they didn't already 'know'. This ambivalence about consent is simply one of the factors which accounted for the low level of rape charges relative to the actual rapes perpetrated by this group. Their highest-ranking member, besides Scarface had, by October 1983, 'notched up' 13 rapes for which he had only been charged with two, and, was acquitted of both. Rape was looked on as a form of specially tittillating sport which they took great relish in, particularly if more than one of them was involved. This was unaffected by the fact that at least half of the 15 laities had girlfriends with whom they had sex fairly frequently on a voluntary basis. Six of the 15 had sired at least one youngster, four of the six had two and one had three. These were supported only very erratically whenever a gangster felt like it. The common attitude was that they were under no obligation to support their offspring. Although having a child with a girl gave them a sense of power and ownership over them. Whenever they were imprisoned they expected to be visited by the mothers of their children. Most of their prison letters were addressed to them too.

96. See Pinnock. The Brotherhoods Street Gangs and State Control in Cape Town 1984. David Philip, Cape Town, p.6. Also see Criminology Source Book - Gangs 1982 for pressclips of gang fights - Institute of Criminology, University of Cape Town.

97. Liquor distribution ratios supplied by Stellenbosch Farmers Winery low-price wine manager, Jaques Roux 6.1.1982. The figures for the period April - September 1981 reveal that the five legal outlets in Elsies River/Clarke's Estate together account for 21,5% of low-priced wine sold in metropolitan Cape Town, whereas the two outlets in Retreat manage a close second position at 20%.

98. Pinnock, D. Elsies River, 1980. p.11.

99. Pinnock, D. 1980 p12. He does not specify how many creches' and schools' plans were scrapped or shelved.

100. Pinnock, D 1980 p.9.

101. Personal observation.

102. See Webster, D. The Reproduction of Labour Power and the Struggle for Survival in Soweto, for types of support-structures. Also see Pinnock 1982, chapter 2.

103. Pinnock,D 1980, p.11. "Only 30% of Elsies River people had regular jobs".

104. Prominent amongst these were the hawkers who sold water and wood and building materials to the shanty-people, vegetables and fruit to the wider population, and recycled metal, bones (for glue and dog-food), cardboard, bottles, rags and sometimes plastic. See video documentary "The Scrap Collectors" - Institute of Criminology, University of Cape Town, 1982 by Glover, Schärf, Fredericks, Delport and Von Willich. Other survival strategies entailed mending of all varieties of things (clothes, primus stoves, transistor radios, etc), illicit taxi services, and also the Doekom.

105. Pinnock D, 1980. p.5.

106. See above chapter two and below, chapter five.

107. Compare Jock Young: "Drugtaking, Reaction and the Subterranean World of Play" in Sociology of Crime and Delinquency in Britain by Wiles, P. (ed) Vol 2. p.101.

108. Pinnock 1980 p.14 He draws this information from: Characteristics of the Total Population of Elsies River. Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Cape Town, 1971.

109. See Pinnock D, 1980 p.16.

110. See Pinnock D, 1980 p.18-57.

111. Translated: "When the students indulge in politics, then the poor 'Coloureds' shop for free". In this context they included themselves as poor people.

112. In mid 1983 a similar attitude was still extant amongst the 'Weekend Spoilers' of Riverton, Bishop Lavis, a group of approximately 16 gangsters ranging from 18-24 years of age (personal observation). But when in June 1984 the United Democratic Front launched a blitz on Elsies River relating to their anti-election signature campaign, some gangs agreed to desist from exploiting the opportunity for their own purposes - (personal communication with UDF-workers and the remaining stragglers of Scarface's gang).

By contrast, some gangs in Lotus River had been co-opted by the pro-State 'Coloured' parties to pressurise registered voters to vote in favour of the 'New Deal' (UDF organiser 13.8.84) during the build-up towards the election of 22nd August 1984. See also Pinnock 1982 p.68.

113. See footnote 102 above.

114. See above, p.95-6

115. The biggest set-back was a rift which developed between Joker and Scarface about Joker's pimping to the police. Scarface withdrew, moved out, and took a number of his BFK/DBM's along with him to set up independently.

116. Compare Phil Cohen: 'Policing the Working Class City' in Capitalism and the Rule of Law - From Deviancy Theory to Marxism' by Bob Fine, Richard Kinsey, John Lea, Sol Picciotto and Jock Young 1979. Hutchinson, London p.118 at 135.

117. On subsequent return visits to his shebeen during 1982 and early 1983, during which time organisation had spread more widely, there was still no discernible slackening off of his trade for political reasons. His regulars had not been interested sufficiently to reduce their recreational liquor and drugs intake. What had transpired, Joker had noticed, was that the politicised residents had firmed their opposition to intoxicants. Compare also the Mitchell's Plain residents battle to 'keep the plain dry', Cape Times, 24.2.82; Argus 3.3.82; Cape Times 7.5.82.

118. 'Lux lewe' - luxury life, afkoel - to cool off, really groove.

119. For example, helping themselves to parents

housekeeping money, persuading an aspirant laitie to prove himself as a good potential gangster by conning a parent to send him to the shops to buy food and hand the money over to the gang for dope instead; selling a shirt, pair of trousers or any other clothing off their back or pawning them with whoever would fall for it.

120. When a gangster on his own or in a small group was out for some money under circumstances that were not too urgent, and when they were relatively sober, the opening gambit of this 'robbery' would be 'gee entjie' or 'gee meckie' (give us a fag or a light). Once the victim had cooperated he/she was then 'rationalised' into parting with some dope or liquor money - "kyk hie, 'n man smaak 'n blink vir 'n skyf, man, sien jy my broer" (look here we dig some dough for a pipe, brother). If the victim had any sense at all, and he was liquid, he willingly parted with some cash as a gift, albeit under a little duress. That was then understood as a gift. Female victims usually faced a lot of sexual chatting up or harrassment in the process whilst handing over the money. If the victim resisted or became cocky in any way, he'd/she'd get beaten or stabbed, and robbed more overtly. In more volatile moods or in larger groups the gangsters simply attacked their victim without the attempt of cajoling or persuading.

121. Compare above, p.101

122. The Sicilian Kids - 28 gangs are looked down on as 'dirty', 'sub-human' because of their homosexual practices in prison. Ouside of prison it is not, to my knowledge, practised on a significant scale, the gangsters usually resume heterosexual tendencies. Ex 28-members who have given up gangsterism and take up formal employment are often well-liked by male employers because of a servility and 'closeness' which they display. The 26-Gang Alliance members refer to this as "hy hou hom oepe, soos 'n meid voor die Boer" (he's open, like a bitch, to the Whites").

123. Their girlfriends knew about these sexual exploits which were considered legitimate (although reluctantly so) within their value system. Some girlfriends told me they had actually witnessed gang-rapes, consented to their boyfriends indulging once, but restrained them from going back for seconds by offering their services instead. (Interview

with two girlfriends whilst travelling to prison to visit their 'burks' (stud-gangsters). When questioned about sexual assaults on the streets at night, they took it for granted that the gangsters had that 'right'. Everyone knew that and violated the rule at their peril.

124. Characteristic symbolic shows were eg. asking a woman of a rival gang to dance, which was really a direct challenge to that gang's possession of her. If she was not rescued by 'her' gang, she'd have to be 'broken' by the BFK/Dobermans and would then belong to them. If her gang was too weak to rescue her, this symbolic defeat had implications for their territorial delimitation (presuming they occupied contiguous space) and of course market share with regard to shebeening. on three of the five discos they attended between October and January 1981/82. These challenges ended up in gang-skirmishes in and outside the hall.

125. Apart from, of course the dominant culture which they chose selectively to appropriate to their own survival and stylistic needs. Their rhetoric and some of their actions did challenge the police, but this was seldom demonstrated in an open show of force. Clandestine and opportunistic lashing out at the Boere was, of course, high amongst their priorities but it assumed more of a character of peripheral sniping than frontal assault.

126. Wilkinson, P and Webster, D supra p.6.

127. See Pinnock D, 1982 on the substitution of family structure, chapter 9.

128. Pinnock, D, 1982 p.344-354.

129. This was complicated by the fact that the father-figure was not the natural father of the gangsters in three of these cases.

130. This phenomenon seems to be extremely rare. While there are usually always women around a gang, they usually do not tattoo themselves, nor are they usually accepted into the 'inner circle'.

131. The Sly Corners, according to him were in the mould of a mixture between informal sector survivalists and vigilantes, the community police of the area. They weren't as 'onbeskof' or 'oorlams' (disrespectful and outrageously vulgar) as the

youngsters of the eighties. They were keen participants in the Coon Carnivals in his day.

132. In my initial stage of becoming acquainted with the dynamics of families whose ranks included a gangster or two, I thought that the mother's protestation that their son was basically a good boy led astray by bad company was a mere strategy to secure a lenient sentence or personal judgement. Only quite late into the research did I discover that many of the mothers genuinely didn't know about their son's activities, and that he/they must have been keeping the truth from her/them.

133. They all considered this a very low income, as it was seldom, if ever, received in one batch. As soon as money came in, it was usually used for dope, food, cigarettes and clothes (clothes served both as symbols of style as well as goods that could be pledged or pawned, in the latter context, thus, a form of savings).

134. I became used to being thanked by mothers for goods I had no clue about. These were stolen goods, which they told their parents, I had donated to them.

135. Paradoxically, they clung to the girl and their children once they were in prison expecting them to visit regularly, arrange for food-parcels (if they were awaiting trial), lodge money on their 'property' and provide all the support-structures that can be mustered from the outside (letters, parole, messages, canvassing support from fellow gangsters, favours from friends in prison).

136. I was not aware of any girls who took the gangsters to court for non-support. But they did apply for a maintenance grant once the fathers of their children were imprisoned (same interview as in footnote 123, above).

137. Pinnock, D 1982. p.260-342.

138. To keep up a facade of policing Joker's shebeen was raided by the local police twice between October 1981 and January 1982 but discovered nothing incriminating due to a tip-off he had received a day before .

139. Only once, and then by chance, was I able to overhear one of these meetings. I was arranging bail for one of the laities while Joker was bargaining about

the price for information on a murder case that the police were having difficulty in finding any evidence. Although, as he told me later, Joker had no information about it himself at the time, he feigned knowledge about it so that his relationship with the detectives would not be jeopardised. On returning home he made a concerted effort to find out about the murder from the laities and the people whom they referred him to. Indirectly, thus, he was doing some of the groundwork for the police in the exectution of their duties.

139. Four housebreaking, three robbery and two assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm cases - they were rescued even before being formally charged.

141. Four first offences for possession of Dagga, three robbery, three housebreaking and one theft case.

142. It is unfortunate that a single researcher is unable, for safety reasons, to gather information about the interactional dynamic between two opposition shebeens and the police. The only source of information about the communication between the opposition shebeen and the police was Joker's police contact.

143. Perks are obtainable for policemen at all shebeens - so it is more likely that information was the main reason for protecting Joker.

144. Interview with an ex-customer of Joker's shebeen. Occasionally, residents came to complain about the activities to Joker whilst I was at his shebeen.

145. See footnote 95 above.

146. Compare Platt, Tony "'Street' Crime - A View From the Left in Crime and Justice 1981 MacMillan, London p.27.

147. He was fond of impressing not only me, but customers and visitors as well, with his magnanimity, public-spiritedness, and 'trustworthiness'. The latter was his technique for extracting secrets from community members.

148. Needless to say it was crucial for his survival that the link between his permission or authorisation and the gangsters' processing was not recognised.

149. The danger lay therein that I would become associated with Joker and his sellout strategy, which would have invited retaliation against me on the part of the laities.

150. The first occassion was May 1983 when five laities (with the tacit consent of the others) bust the shebeen; the second occasion was in July 1983 when another six laities broke away.

151. By that stage they had taken to wholesaling dagga to shebeens in rural villages.

152. Some 35 km away from Elsies River.

153. The Garden Village Community was materially far better-off than his Elsies River constituency. A smaller percentage of the population was likely to have constituted his clientele there, whereas the rest probably regarded him as an unwelcome intrusion. A superficial profile of that community derived from a BFK and a schoolteacher indicate that it is a fairly tightly knit grouping of long-established families, many of whom have been living there for several generations. There seems to be a relatively low unemployment rate, and the majority of the occupants are <u>not</u> in unskilled employment.

154. Mitchell's Plain has been prominent in the press since late 1983 with regard to a high crime-rate and an increasing gang-presence. The 'Weekend Spoilers' of Riverton, Bishop Lavis, with whom I had some contact, also dissolved because some prominent members' families moved to Mitchell's Plain in 1983.

155. The case was heard between 4th and 20th September 1984 in the Cape Supreme Court and is as yet unreported. Press reports appear in Cape Times, 6.9.84, Weekend Argus 15.9.84, Cape Herald 22.9.84.

156. It is a pattern common to the First World countries. See Pinnock D, (1983) quoting English and American Studies, p.324 and 325.

157. Joseph Gusfield "Moral Passage : The Symbolic Process in Public Designations of Deviance" in Social Problems 15 fall 1967, p.175-88.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 5 - THE REPRODUCTION OF AGRICULTURAL LABOUR AND THE TOT SYSTEM

1. The Masters and Servants Act, abolished in 1974 only, criminalised most actions which are usually simply cause for civil actions - the normal contractual breaches. See above p.31 ff.

2. Marais, op cit p.266; and Ross, R. The Rise of the Cape Gentry p.12; and Worden, N. Cape Slave Emancipation and Rural Labour in A Comaprative Context. p.12. See above chapter two.

3. "Goei (gooi) dop" - to administer the tot - personal interview with Moravian cleric at Genadendal June 1983.

4. Cape Coloured Liquor Commission of Inquiry (Meaker Commission) p.11 1945 - it was reduced from a daily two quarts (2,27 litres) to one and a half pints (0,82 litres). Also seen Marais op cit p.268.

5. Bunting, Brian. "Liquor and the Colour Bar" in Africa South 2, 4 July/September 1958 p.40.

6. Bunting op cit p.36.

7. Plaut, Timothy. Farm Schools for African and Coloured Children in South Africa - Paper No 17 Saldru Farm Labour Conference, September 1976, University of Cape Town and Theron, Jan Farm Labour in the Citrusdal Valley. Paper No 22 Saldru Farm Labour Conference p.10. "The school is rented by Coloured Affairs from the farmer - implicit in any notion of how far education and 'opheffingswerk' may extend is the fact that the farmer own the land, the school, the house the teacher lives in".

8. Leipoldt, C L 300 Years of Cape Wine Stewart, Cape Town 1952, p.176-8.

9. Meaker Commission op cit p.11.

10. I D, and p.21.

11. Commission of Inquiry into The General Distribution and selling prices of Intoxicating Liquor, UG 55/1960 p.12.

12. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Matters

Relating to the Coloured Population Group. RP 38/1976 p.498.

13. Sue Birch - Black Market manageress, Stellenbosch Farmers Winery, personal interview 6.1.82.

14. See annual reports of the Department of Coloured, Rehoboth and Nama Relations 1974-1980.

15. Groenewald, C J 'n Sosiologies Ondersoek na die Aanbod van Landbouarbeid in Wes-Kaapland. MA-Thesis University of Stellenbosch 1972.

16. These are the central attitudes of all the 48 men I interviewed who were living on five farms but working in the towns. (1981-84).

17. Theron, J op cit bears out this contradiction: schooling is considered of little value for farm labour; it usually only makes them 'uppity'. p.10. Farmers in my research area either force youngsters who refuse to work for them off the farm (splitting up the family) or charge a head-rental varying from R2 - R12,00 a week - the average being R4,00 a week for living on the farm. They sometimes also threaten the whole family with eviction.

18. Theron Commission op cit p.142.

19. Possible explanations for bouncing back:

    a) Redundancy
    b) Feuds with fellow-workers - particularly likely if antagonistic gangs are involved
    c) Arguments with employers
    d) Dismissal for some misdemeanor
    e) Pressure exerted by farmer on the farming people
    f) The lure of liquor on the the farms, particularly in summer when labourers illegally make their own 'mosblikke' - tins or plastic bags filled with crushed grapes left to ferment in the sun for a few days - a highly potent drink.

20. The cooperative wineries stipulate a period within which each grape variety may be delivered to the cellar. A farmer with a relatively low tonnage of an early variety (eg. Steen) may have to wait a day or two before he may commence harvesting a later variety (eg. Cinsaut).

21. Farmers say that ordering migrants is as easy as shopping at a supermarket. They order the number of labourers, age and height to their liking for

a specific date, and then simply collect them at the Labour Bureau on that day - personal interviews.

22. Theron Commission op cit p.140. Another source for the Western Cape in 1959/60 designates Blacks as being 18,5% of the permanent, and 13,3% of the casual Black labour force of 203 676 of which the remainder were 'Coloured'. -Verslag van die Kommittee van Ondersoek na Landelike Hervorming - Deel I, 1975 p.244.

23. 'Mos' is a potent drink made by crushing grapes and leaving them in the sun for a few days to ferment in a tin or plastic bag.

24. He broke the man's jaw-bone, arm, three fingers, badly damaged his hip, and concussed him seriously. The weapon used was a pick-axe handle.

25. It transpired that he had been released from prison recently after serving a long term sentence, and was already being sought by the police for a stabbing.

26. Vaaljapie is the tot-wine which is free of the preservatives (SO_2) which contribute to hangovers. Hence the perennial claim of the farmers that it is healthier than bought bottled wine. Vaaljapie is collected from the cooperatives in 20 litre plastic containers, similar in shape to the containers called 'Swartvarkies' in which cheap wine was sold to the labour force between 1976 and 1982. Farmers in 1982 paid 27c/litre for Vaaljapie.

27. During harvest-time I was free to gather information through my legitimate status as a truck-driver - conveying loads of grapes to the cooperative. The tenor of the stories were the same for six years in succession.

28. They either have to pay someone else to carry their baskets at harvest-time, or if they attempt it themselves, fade early in the day. For physically exacting tasks such as spade-work, or moving irrigation-pipes they function very poorly, if at all. Some of the farmers (particularly those practicing coercive management) are happy to find reasons for evicting them: eg. the old labourer who was seriously injured and rendered incapable of working (footnote 24 above) was only allowed to stay after specific appeals had been made to the farm owner on the grounds that he had been

on the farm for 17 years and had two married sons working on the farm.

29. The Theron Commission op cit states: "Of all the farm workers who left their employment during 1973 and 1974, 27 per cent moved to towns and cities. Of those who were engaged during that period, 69 per cent came from other farms and 11 per cent from towns and cities, while 16 per cent began working for the first time" p.142.

30. This is a point frequently overlooked by writers and analysts of the farming situation. See, for example, Patterson, Sheila. Colour and Culture in South Africa 1953, London Routledge and Kegan Paul p.83: indirectly, she is alluding to skilling when speaking about incentives to better farm labourer's lots: "The motive for not abolishing the system was to find an avenue for disposing of 700 000 gallons of wine a year and keep the cash wages bill low. Possibly it is also hoped by winegrowers that the taste for wine thereby acquired will stimulate canteen and bottle store sales, as indeed it does. Behind both the tot-system and the system of part-payment in kind on farms throughout the country, there may, however, lurk the feeling, conscious or unconscious, that the established status hierarchy is more easily maintained if the labourer is kept on a low economic level, without the independence (and franchise rights) that a higher cash wage would bring, or the incentive to better his lot by hard work".

31. The pruning-courses offered at Kromme Rhee, the only agricultural training centre for the wine industry last either one or five days : in 1979 88 labourers attended the one day course, and 59 the five day course. Between 1964-1979 the total numbers of labourers attending these courses were as follows:

Pruning of vines (one day : 772)
" " " (five day : 770)

Source: Annual Report Department of Coloured, Rehoboth and Nama Relations for the period 1.04.79 to 31.03.1980 p.7.

32. Talbot W J and Talbot A M. Greater Cape Town Region Planning Report No 4. (Cape Provincial Administration 1968) Land Use. Cape Town. p.57-63.

33. Theron Commission op cit states that 52% of all farm labour had no schooling, while 6% had at least Std 5.

34. The reasons for grounding in the seven cases, as supplied by the labourers themselves were:

    1) Does not want to vie for favouritism with the farmer. Fears lack of respect from fellow-labourers for being a favoured driver.
    2) Damages too many vines.
    3) Had an accident while driving (illegally) on the road.
    4) Drove the tractor into a ditch (high clearance tractor) and damaged front fork.
    5) Drinks and drives.
    6) Uses the tractor to make money for himself by carting wood and selling it to the labourers.
    7) Enough drivers on the farm and the farmer prefers the others.

35. Still-birth rate reflects the number of still births per 1 000 births.

36. Infant mortality rate is the number of deaths of children under five years per 1 000 live births.

37. Joubert, E R and Theron, C J "Vital Health Statistics for Stellenbosch Area" in Malnutrition in the Stellenbosch Area - Papers coordinated by Hans Steyn. Carnegie Conference Paper No 184. Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development in Southern Africa. Cape Town, 1984. Appendix 5 p.2.

38. Heyns, M. "Details of the Stellenbosch Area" in Malnutrition in the Stellenbosch Area op cit p.1.

39. Op'T Hof, Dr J: "The Fetal Alcohol Syndrome" (sic) Paper presented at the Conference Alcohol in Perspective, 1981, Johannesburg. SANCA p.5.

40. Id at p.9.

41. Although the quantities consumed by this woman are the same as the previous one, it does not appear to affect her as badly, nor is liquor the prime focus of activities over the weekends. The heavy drinkers seem to make drinking the main purpose of their free time.

42. Vergnani, T. "Associated and Determining Factors of Malnutrition in Children Under the Age of Five in the Stellenbosch Area". Appendix 1 p.1.

43. Id p.5.

44. Steyn, H J. "An Anthropometric Survey of Coloured Sub A Pupils in the Stellenbosch Area" in Malnutrition in the Stellenbosch Area op cit Appendix 2 p.2.

45. Id p.9.

46. Control is not used here in a static sense: see Stedman-Jones, G. "Class Expression Versus Social Control" in History Workshop Vol 4 1977.

47. In the interviews with the 18 farmers/managers the most common substantiation was : "Well, if you withhold liquor from them, they don't pitch up for work, or get angry". Some farmers met with resistance from their labourers. The second argument repeatedly put forward is : "If you pay them more, they'll just spend it all on drink". This is certainly borne out in reality on most farms and forms a quasi-justification for the farmers keeping the labour force at or below that level of bare subsistence.

48. La Hausse, Paul. "Alcohol, the Ematsheni and Popular Struggle in Durban : The Origins of the Beerhall in South Africa, 1902-8". Centre for African Studies Seminar Paper, University of Cape Town. 1983.

49. Cape Times 1.10.84, Sunday Times 7.10.84.

50. For example: The South African Institute of Race Relations Submission to the Manpower Commission on Farm Labour - The Farm Labour Project, Johannesburg 1982. and Haysom, N, and Thompson, C. : Farm Labour and the Law Carnegie Conference Paper No 84, Cape Town 1984.

51. Saving under below subsistance conditions is a rarity.

52. See above p.31-2

53. Some farmers change their work-programme in anticipation of the low productivity. If there is anything that can rather be done productively, which does not demand physically exacting work they'll rather do that than pick grapes.

54. Argus 14.3.81 and Cape Herald 25.8.84.

55. The housing situation on the farm is : three-roomed cottages with electricity (lights and one plug per house), outside taps (one for six houses), outside toilets (three for 12 houses) and one cold water, outside shower for the twelve houses. She has fridge, television, numerous fancy electrical appliances (hairdryer, kettle, electric haircurlers, etc) whereas most labourers only have a kettle and a hot-plate. In addition the farm-manager stood surety for her purchasing a car, something totally out of the reach of the average labourer.

56. See the Case of M below p.193

57. Hofmeyr, W "Rural Struggles in the Western Cape, 1929-30" Centre for African Studies Seminar Paper 1983 University of Cape Town and "Rural Popular Organisation and its Problems : Struggles in the Western Cape, 1929-30" in Africa Perspective Vol 22, 1983 p.26 and Roux, E. Time Longer Than Rope - The Black Man's Struggle for Freedom in South Africa 1948 University of Wisconsin Press p.230.

58. Table F - Male Drinking Patterns

FARM NO	TOTAL NO OF LABOURERS ON FARM	LIGHT DRINKERS	HEAVY DRINKERS	ALCOHOLICS	TEETOTALLERS
1	16	1	12	3	0
2	17	1	11	5	0
5	13	2	9	2	0
9	19	1	14	3	1
TOTAL	65	5	46	13	1

59. Translation: "If a man wants to improve himself and build up something for himself, and he works well, and says to the farmer: 'Master, why don't we do things like this'. Then the farmer says to him: 'So, a clever boy, are you?' and when we knock off, the master says: ' You there, come here, boy, let me give you something if you're so clever'.

And he gives the man a tot, and another tot, and another tot. And the man says: 'Cheers Boss' (the customary response to getting a tot) and the farmer says: 'This boy is a know-all, let me give him another tot'. And the man says: 'Cheers, Boss' and he drinks. The next morning the man wakes up with fright, and he's a baboon".

60. See above p.176-8

61. The agriculture unions, the Foundation for Rural Development, and the Forum Vir Landelike Gemeenskapswerk, are all encouraging farmers to adopt more cooptive methods of reproducing the labour force - Annual Report of the South African Agriculture Union 1980 p.35-56; and chairman's report delivered at the third AGM of the Forum Vir Landelike Gemeenskapswerk 18.11.1983 at the KWV, Paarl.

62. du Toit, V. "An example of a practical prevention programme" Paper presented at the Conference: Alcohol in Perspective Johannesburg 12-14 October 1981.

63. Heyns, M. "Details of the Stellenbosch Area" p.2. in Malnutrition in the Stellenbosch Area - coordinated by Hans Steyn: Carnegie Conference Paper No 184, Cape Town 1984.

64. The Consumer Price Index of 1975=100.0
The Consumer Price Index of 1982=232.6

65. Khan, B. "The Effects of Inflation on the Poor in South Africa" Carnegie Conference Paper No-134 p.28 University of Cape Town 1984. They received R12.00 a week cash wage in 1976 and receive R28,00 in 1984.

66. Translation: Tell me, S, whose hands work this vineyard? Can the farmer pick all the grapes himself? Can he himself do all the pruning, weeding and move the (irrigation) pipes? Does the farmer's wife help tying on the shoots(to trellises)! Who sits on the tractor? It's these two hands (shows his hands) that enrich the farmer. Look, there he goes and buys himself a new car again, and the old one's still new. And we don't even have a bath among all our houses!

67. An example of a labourer's son making a last ditch attempt to even the score between farmer and labourer was heard in the Cape Town Supreme Court on the 10.8.84. The case of S V P (as yet unreported).

P was charged with murder. The evidence revealed that there was a continuing conflict between P, thirteen years old at the time, and a farmer. The farmer, the court was told frequently travelled with a sjambok in his truck, and sometimes wore a revolver in his belt while supervising the labour force. The tension between P and the farmer rose to such a level that some labourers on the farm took P to the truck, showed him the revolver on the seat, and said that the gun will 'be his death'. P stole the gun and hid it. He later broke into the farmer's house to steal bullets for it. Then he set off to shoot the farmer, intending to kill him. He broke into the house, was startled by movements in the farmer's bedroom and withdrew into the neighbouring bedroom, in which the farmer's 18-month old daughter lay asleep. Turning around in her sleep she startled him and he shot her dead, and fled. P, 15 years old at the time of his trial, was found guilty of murder and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. Evidence about his family background showed that both parents were heavy drinkers, and that P had had a materially and psychologically deprived upbringing. An appeal is pending.

68. See Van Onselen, C, Volume 2, New Nineveh. Chapter 4 for a comparison between Hobsbawm's 'Primitive Rebels' and Van Onselen's Ninevite Lumpenproletarian gangs as possessing revolutionary potential. p.195.

69. They are not comparable to the Machine-Breakers of the late 19th Century England, the Luddites. These were organised groups of artisans using wrecking as one of their means of redressing social injustice. See Thompson, E P. The Making of the Englisn Working Class, Pelican, Harmondsworth 1963 p.598-659.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSION

1. Young, J. "Drugtaking, Reaction and the Subterranean World of Play" p.105.

2. Van Onselen, C. Randlords and Rotgut 1886-1903. Volume I New Babylon. p.92

3. Ross, R. "The Rise of the Cape Gentry" p.1-4.

4. Gusfield, J R. "Moral Passage : The Symbolic Process in Public Designations of Deviance" in: Crime and Delinquency by Carl Bersani. Collier-MacMillan, London 1970. p.76-7.

5. Burman, S B. "Symbolic Dimensions of the Enforcement of Law" 3 BJL and S. 1976 p.204-17.

6. Garland, D. and Young, P. (eds) The Power to Punish Heinemann, London 1983 p.9-10.

7. Rabie, M A and Strauss, S A. Punishment, An Introduction to Principles. Lex Patria, Johannesburg 1981 (3rd Edition) p.54-6.

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